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I. INTRODUCTION
The first revision of the Florida Constitution since 1885 was ap-
proved by the November, 1968 general election and went into effect on
January 7, 1969. All articles were changed in 1968 except article V, the
Judiciary Article, which had been rewritten in 1956. A number of amend-
ments were approved after 1968, including the taxation of corporation
profits and the overhaul of the Judiciary Article. By November, 1972,
the entire text of the 1885 constitution had been replaced. Many sig-
nificant changes were brought about,' as illustrated by the following high-
lights:
Article I, Declaration of Rights, now expressly prohibits deprivation
of any right because of race or religion (section 2); prohibits strikes by
1. See generally A People's Constitution will be Offered to Voters, 42 FLA. B. J. 1038
(1968). For perspectives on modern state constitutions, see, e.g., NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION (6th ed. revised 1968); Grad, The State Constitution: Its
Function and Form for our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 (1968); Graves, State Constitutional
Law: A Twenty Five Year Summary, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1966); Swindler, State
Constitutional Law for the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REv. 577 (1971); A. STURM, THIRTY
YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1938-1968 (1970); Note, Theory of State Con-
stitutions, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 542.
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public employees (section 6); prohibits "the unreasonable interception
of private communications by any means," and adds that articles or infor-
mation obtained by illegal search and seizure "shall not be admissible
in evidence" (section 12); prohibits administrative agencies from im-
posing a sentence of imprisonment, or any other penalty except as pro-
vided by law (section 18).
Article II, General Provisions, declares, in broad language, a com-
mitment to environmental protection, and provides a power source for
appropriate legislation (section 7).
Article III, Legislature, requires the legislature to meet annually
(section 3 (b)), and provides automatic legislative reapportionment every
ten years, with special provisions for review in the Supreme Court of
Florida (section 16).
Article IV, Executive, permits interested persons to be heard when
the Governor has requested the justices of the supreme court to render an
advisory opinion (section 1 (c)); creates the office of Lieutenant-Gover-
nor (section 2); requires candidates for Governor and Lieutenant-
Governor to run for election on a single ticket (section 5(a)); permits
the Governor to serve for a maximum of two terms of four years each
(section 5(b)); and reduces the number of executive departments of
state government to not more than 25 plus those specifically provided
for in the constitution (section 6).
Article V, Judiciary (as revised in 1972) simplifies the trial court
system by consolidating the 14 pre-existing types of trial court into two
uniform levels-circuit courts and county courts-and abolishing all other
courts, subject to a phase-out period for municipal courts ending in Jan-
uary, 1977 (sections 5, 6, 20); permits the legislature, by two-thirds
majority, to veto rules promulgated by the supreme court for practice
and procedure in all courts (section 2 (a)); requires the Governor to fill
vacancies in judicial office by appointing one person from a list of at
least three nominated by the judicial nominating commission provided
for that court (section 11); subjects all justices and judges to the dis-
ciplinary authority of the judicial qualifications commission (section 12);
and provides for an elected public defender in each judicial circuit
(section 18).
Article VII, Finance and Taxation, authorizes the legislature to im-
pose a corporation income tax (section 5); extends the homestead exemp-
tion from taxation to include condominiums and cooperative apartments,
and authorizes the legislature to increase the exemption from the base
of $5,000 up to a maximum of $10,000 for owners disabled or over 65
years old (section 6); imposes a "millage cap" limiting the rate of ad
valorem taxation to ten mills for county purposes, ten mills for municipal
purposes and ten mills for school purposes, except that higher millages
can be imposed for payment of bonds or if approved by referendum
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(section 9); and authorizes certain types of industrial aid bond (sec-
tion 10).
Article VIII, Local Government, permits counties to enjoy stronger
self-government by means of charters and ordinances (section 1).
Article IX, Education, permits each school district to exercise local
option whether the school superintendent should be elected or appointed
(section 5).
Article XI, Amendments, establishes a constitution revision com-
mission in 1979 and every 20 years thereafter (section 2), and permits
the people to propose constitutional amendments by means of initiative
petitions (section 3).
Article XII provides a unique procedure for transition from the old
to the new constitution (section 10).
The significant changes in the constitutional text, illustrated above,
were accompanied by an unusually rapid turnover of justices on the su-
preme court. Of the seven justices who were on the court in 1968, only
two remained in 1973.2
This survey discusses the major developments in Florida constitu-
tional law during the period starting with approval of the new constitution
in November, 1968, and ending with cases decided in April, 1974, and
contained in volume 294 Southern Reporter. No attempt is made to cover
criminal law and procedure, since these topics are dealt with in another
survey article.8
II. METHODS OF CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION
Adoption of any change in the constitution requires a vote of the
people in a state-wide election. The 1968 constitution provides a number
of alternative methods by which proposals for constitutional change may
be submitted to the people.4 First, the legislature may, by three-fifths
vote, propose changes in any part or in all of the constitution (section 1).
Second, a 37-member constitution revision commission shall be ap-
pointed in 1979 and every 20 years thereafter to reexamine the consti-
tution and to propose any changes (section 2). Third, an initiative peti-
tion signed by a designated number of citizens can propose certain types
of constitutional change (section 3). As originally expressed in the 1968
constitution, the initiative was available "to propose amendments to any
section of this constitution."
In Adams v. Gunter,5 the supreme court held that this provision
could not be invoked to initiate a proposal to change from a bicameral to
2. Justices Roberts and Erwin.
3. Chatilovicz, Berkowitz & Frisch, Criminal Law, 1971-1973 Survey of Florida Law, 28
U. Mi L. REv. (1974).
4. FLA. CONST. art. XI.
5. 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970).
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a unicameral legislature, since this change would be of such magnitude as
to amount to a revision, not merely an amendment. As a sequel to this
decision, the scope of the initiative was increased by a November, 1972
amendment to the constitution, making the initiative available "to propose
the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this constitu-
tion..., provided that any such revision or amendment shall embrace
but one subject and matter directly connected therewith."8
Fourth, a petition signed by a designated number of citizens can
request a referendum on whether a constitutional convention shall be
called (section 4). If the referendum requests a convention, the next gen-
eral election will include the election of members of the convention.
III. TECHNIQUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In interpreting constitutional provisions, courts generally apply
traditional rules of statutory construction,' such as the rule that when
the text is clear, its plain meaning should be followed, without resort to
extrinsic sources. However, constitutional interpretation sometimes re-
quires special techniques.
A. Extrinsic Sources when Meaning Is Not Clear
When a statute is unclear on its face, resort may be had to its legis-
lative history. When a constitutional provision is unclear on its face, the
relevant history is a combination of the intent of the framers who drafted
the provision, and the intent of the people when they adopted it, found
in such sources as the minutes of the constitutional revision commission,'
pre-existing case law interpreting relevant language,9 and even newspaper
accounts of public debate about the proposed provision."
The minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission of 1966-68
provide a valuable source of reference on the intent of the framers of the
1968 revision. Another significant source is the section-by-section com-
mentary to the 1968 constitution by Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte in vol-
umes 25A, 26 and 26A of Florida Statutes Annotated.
Interpretations of the constitution by the legislative and executive
branches are persuasive indications of its meaning especially if made at
or near the time of adoption."
6. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
7. See generally 6 FLA. JuR. Constitutional Law §§ 11-35; L. H. LEVINSON & C. C.
ALLoWAY, FLORDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASEBOOK 13 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
CASEBOOK]. The classical statement of the canons of constitutional interpretation appears in
T. COOrEY, CONsTruTIoNAL LIEITATIONS (8th ed., W. Carrington, 1927) [hereinafter cited
as COOLEY].
8. E.g., Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970).
9. E.g., Greater Loretta Imp. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970).
10. E.g., Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1971).
11. COOLEY, supra note 7, at 144; Greater Loretta Imp. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234
So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970).
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B. Transition from Old to New Constitution
1. REPETITION OF IDENTICAL PROVISION IN
NEW AND OLD CONSTITUTIONS
If the new constitution contains a provision identical to the corre-
sponding provision in the old, judicial interpretations of the old constitu-
tion retain their validity as interpretations of the new, since the framers
or the voters are presumed to have known the old interpretations and to
have intended to preserve them by repeating the same constitutional lan-
guage.12
2. SIMILAR BUT NOT IDENTICAL PROVISION IN
NEW AND OLD CONSTITUTIONS
If the new constitution contains a provision similar but not identical
to the corresponding provision in the old, the question arises whether the
framers or voters intended a mere change in literary style (in which event
the cases decided under the old constitution continue to govern) or a
change of meaning (in which event the old cases are superseded).
In Hayek v. Lee County,13 the issue was whether article III, sec-
tion 11(a) (1) of the 1968 constitution, on laws "pertaining to ... juris-
diction ... of [court] officers," should receive the same interpretation as
had been given to the corresponding provision of the 1885 constitution
about laws "regulating the jurisdiction . . . of officers.' 1 The court ex-
amined the minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission and de-
termined, on rehearing, that the change was merely one of style and that
the framers intended to preserve the meaning developed by the old cases.
3. OMISSION FROM NEW CONSTITUTION OF PROVISION
APPEARING IN OLD CONSTITUTION
The 1968 revision was submitted to the people in the form of three
resolutions. One revised article VI (Elections), another, article VIII (Lo-
cal Government) and the third, all of the 1885 constitution except article
V (Judiciary). Each of the three resolutions differed concerning transi-
tion from the old to the new constitution. Article VI makes no mention of
transition. Article VIII, section 6(a) provides: "This article shall replace
all of Article VIII of the Constitution of 1885, as amended, except those
sections expressly retained and made a part of this article by reference."
Article XII, revised by the third resolution, provides, at section 10: "All
provisions of Articles I through IV, VII, and IX through XX of the Con-
stitution of 1885, as amended, not embraced herein which are not incon-
12. E.g., Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970).
13. 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970).
14. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20 (1885).
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sistent with this revision shall become statutes subject to modification or
repeal as are other statutes." A somewhat similar transitional provision
appears as section 20(g) of the 1972 revision of article V.
Article XII, section 10 has no counterpart in pre-1968 Florida Con-
stitutions. It drastically changes the transitional rule which was previously
followed by the courts.
The old rule, still applicable except in situations covered by arti-
cle XII, section 10 or article V, section 20(g), is that if a new constitu-
tion omits a provision which was included in the old, the omission is
deemed equivalent to repeal.15 The old rule of omission equals repeal still
applies, for example, to a provision which was stated in the constitutions
of 1838, 1861, 1865 and 1868, but was omitted from the 1885 and 1968
constitutions. Such a provision was repealed by omission from the 1885
constitution and therefore was not available for carry forward to the
1968 constitution under article XII, section 10." A provision carried over
from the 1885 to the 1968 constitution pursuant to article XII, section 10
becomes a statute and loses its character as a constitutional provision. The
justices of the supreme court are not authorized to render an advisory
opinion to the Governor regarding such an item, since their advisory juris-
diction is limited to "interpretation of any portion of the Constitution
upon any question affecting the Governor's powers and duties.11 7
Questions may arise whether a provision of the 1885 constitution is
inconsistent with the 1968 constitution and thus cannot be carried for-
ward as a statute. In State v. City of St. Augustine, the supreme court
stated, in such a situation,
[W]e must consider whether the people of Florida intended to
rewrite the constitutional limitations on the subject of local
bonds and whether said section of the 1968 Constitution entirely
preempts all provisions of the 1885 Constitution on the subject
of local bond elections, the provisions of Section 10, Article XII,
of the 1968 Constitution, notwithstanding. 8
An opinion rendered by the Attorney General in 1972 deals with a
problem of transition from the 1885 to the 1968 constitution 9 The 1885
constitution included a provision which required a two-thirds vote of each
house of the legislature in order to pass bills for payment of claims
against the state.20 No such provision appears in the 1968 revision. How-
ever, the 1968 constitution states: "Passage of a bill shall require a ma-
15. E.g., Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1959). Pursuant to
art. V, § 20(g), the legislature enacted Laws of Florida, ch. 73-303, repealing all provisions
of the pre-1972 art. V.
16. Kirk v. Brantley, 228 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1969).
17. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969).
18. State v. City of St. Augustine, 235 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1970) (emphasis added).
19. Op. AnT' GiEN. FLA. 072-99 (March 24, 1972).
20. FLA. CO NST. art. XVI, § 11 (1885).
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jority vote in each House. ' 21 The Attorney General stated that the require-
ment of a two-thirds vote for claims bills in the 1885 constitution was
inconsistent with the requirement of a simple majority for all bills in the
1968 constitution; therefore the two-thirds requirement could not be
carried forward and claims can be approved in the same manner as any
other legislation, that is, by simple majority.
4. OVERLAP BETWEEN FLORIDA AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Many topics are dealt with in both the Florida and Federal Consti-
tutions. If the federal provision is applicable to the states, such as by "in-
corporation" into the fourteenth amendment, and if the United States
Supreme Court has rendered a clear decision directly on point, the Florida
courts consider themselves bound by that decision. 22 Florida courts may,
of course, invalidate, on state constitutional grounds, state laws valid un-
der the Federal Constitution. 23
The Florida courts regard lower federal court decisions as persua-
sive but not binding as precedents. Thus in Bradshaw v. State,24 the Su-
preme Court of Florida sustained a conviction under a statute25 which
had previously been held unconstitutional by a federal district court. The
Florida court stated: "It is axiomatic that a decision of a federal trial
court, while persuasive if well reasoned, is not by any means binding on
the courts of a state.) 26
IV. ORGANS OF STATE GOVERNMENT
A. Separation of Powers
The separation of powers rule continues to serve a two-fold purpose.
It prohibits any branch of government from encroaching upon the juris-
diction of another and from delegating its powers to another. The text of
the separation of powers provision received only minor stylistic changes
in the 1968 revision of the constitution2 7 and the courts have closely fol-
lowed pre-1968 precedents.
21. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
22. E.g., State v. Leveson, 151 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1963); Davidson v. State, 251 So. 2d
841 (Fla. 1971), vacated 413 U.S. 915 (1973), reaflirmed on remand, 288 So. 2d 483 (Fla.
1973). But see Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging Acceptance of the United States
Supreme Court's Mandates in Florida, 21 U. FrA. L. REv. 349 (1969).
23. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 1972).
24. 286 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973).
25. FLA. STAT. § 877.03 (1973).
26. 286 So. 2d at 6. See also State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlln, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Hall v. State, 282 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973); Brown
v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ; CASEBOOK, supra note 7, at 150.
27. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1968); FLA. CONST. art. II (1885).
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1. PROHIBITION AGAINST ENCROACHMENT
In Kirk v. Baker," a judge of the criminal court of record issued an
order requiring the Governor and his counsel to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt for having attempted to influence the
judge's decision in a pending case. The supreme court noted that judges
of the criminal court of record were subject to suspension from office by
the Governor, and the court assumed that the conferences between the
Governor and the judge "were for the legitimate purpose of learning facts
upon which to base such an exercise of [the Governor's] discretionary
power."29 Upon this assumption, the court held that the Governor and his
counsel were immune from the process of the criminal court of record.
The court expressly disclaimed any opinion as to the immunity of the
Governor if he were accused of a felony or if he were named in contempt
proceedings by a judicial officer subject only to impeachment.
Another confrontation between the executive and judicial branches
arose in Robbin v. Brewer.8  A statute81 provided that the Governor
should appoint court reporters, in certain circumstances, upon recommen-
dation of the circuit judges of the circuit. The Governor, however, re-
jected the judges' recommendation and appointed a different reporter on
the theory that reporters are "officers" and that the Governor can fill
vacancies in "office" pursuant to his constitutional powers.8 2 The district
court of appeal held that reporters are employees, not officers. The Gov-
ernor, therefore, has no constitutional authority to fill vacancies and he
is bound by the statute which requires him to act on the recommendation
of the circuit judges.
An advisory opinion rendered in 197388 determined that neither the
legislature nor the Governor could encroach upon the authority of the
judicial nominating commissions which were created by the 1972 revision
of article V for the purpose of submitting nominations to the Governor
for filling vacancies in judicial office.84 The advisory opinion stated that
the nominating commissions.
are a part of the executive branch of government performing an
executive function which cannot be limited by legislative act.
The Governor has no power to establish rules governing the
operation of the nominating commissions, as the exercise of such
power might tend to curtail the constitutional independence of
the commissions. The power and duty for promulgating rules
for the commissions must rest with the members of the commis-
28. 229 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1969). This is the second of the Kirk v. Baker cases. The first is
discussed in this survey in text accompanying notes 198-99 inira.
29. 229 So. 2d at 252.
30. 236 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
31. FLA. STAT. § 29.01 (1973).
32. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(f).
33. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1973).
34. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11.
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sions. These rules, for the various commissions, are not required
to be uniform throughout the state. 5
Statutes which have been held invalid as encroachments upon the juris-
diction of the supreme court to promulgate rules of practice and proce-
dure are discussed below."'
2. PROHIBITION AGAINST DELEGATION
In an advisory opinion in 196 9,17 the justices of the supreme court
quoted with approval from the 1930 decision in Florida Motor Lines, Inc.
v. Railroad Commissioners that
[a]ll governmental functions may not be among "the powers
of government" which the Constitution separates into three de-
partments.... [W]hen not in conflict with some provision or
principle of organic law, statutes may authorize ... functions
to be performed by administrative or ministerial officers who do
not exercise any of "the powers of government" that are divided
into the three departments, legislative, executive, and judicial.38
Delegation of authority must be accompanied by adequate standards.
This principle was forcefully illustrated in Dickinson v. State ex rel.
Bryant."9 A statute40 authorized the comptroller to issue licenses for the
operation of cemeteries, with consideration to be given to the need for a
cemetery in the community. An applicant had satisfied all other require-
ments but had not convinced the comptroller that a need existed and his
application was denied. The supreme court invalidated the portion of the
statute which required the comptroller to determine need, since no guide-
lines or standards were expressed. "The effect of the statute is to confer
upon the defendant [comptroller] the authority to grant approval to one
yet withhold it from another, at whim, and without guides of account-
ability."' Since the applicant had satisfied all other requirements, the
supreme court affirmed the circuit court's issuance of mandamus to com-
pel the comptroller to grant the license.
In State Department of Citrus v. Griffln,42 the supreme court held
that the Orange Stabilization Act did not constitute an improper delega-
tion of authority. The Act 43 authorized the Citrus Commission to achieve
the statutory purpose by means of marketing orders, to be approved by
referendum of the industry after public hearings, subject to suspension by
the Commission upon a finding that the orders did not tend to effectuate
35. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 30-1 (Fla. 1973).
36. See notes 131-33 infra and accompanying text.
37. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 223 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1969).
38. 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930).
39. 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969).
40. FLA. STAT. § 559.39 (1973).
41. 227 So. 2d at 38.
42. 239 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1970).
43. FLA. STAT. § 601.154 (1973).
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the purposes of the Act. The supreme court found sufficient guidelines
for review of marketing orders in the context of the Act and its stated
purposes to sustain the constitutionality of the statute. The court noted,
for example, that the Commission was not authorized to pledge the credit
of the state and therefore the provisions in the Act permitting it to "bor-
row" must be interpreted to permit borrowing only to the extent that the
funds can be repaid in the same budgetary period.
Delegation by the Florida legislature to a federal agency was at is-
sue in Freimuth v. State.44 A Florida statute 5 defined "hallucinogenic
drug" as "' lycergic acid' . . . and any other drugs to which the drug
abuse laws of the United States apply." The supreme court held that the
Florida legislature
may adopt provisions of federal statutes and administrative
rules made by a federal administrative body, "that are in exis-
tence and in effect at the time the [Florida] legislature acts, but
it would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
for the legislature to adopt in advance any federal act or the rul-
ing of any administrative body that Congress or such adminis-
trative body might see fit to adopt in the future.
' 46
In Florida Welding & Erection Service, Inc. v. American Mutual
Insurance Co.,47 the supreme court considered challenges, on delegation
grounds, against the statute48 dealing with the computation of experience
modification factors for determining premiums payable on workmen's
compensation insurance policies. The statute listed the various relevant
factors and permitted insurance companies either to file their own sched-
ule of rates with the Insurance Commissioner or to delegate this respon-
sibility to a privately owned rating organization. If such an organization
were selected, it would compute and file the rates, subject to making "rea-
sonable means" available whereby any person aggrieved "may be heard"
by the rating organization and subject to further review by the Commis-
sioner. The court held that the statute contained adequate guidelines in
the form of the experience modification factors and provided for ade-
quate procedures in the form of the hearings before the rating organiza-
tion and then before the Commissioner.
B. Courts
1. THE 1972 REVISION OF ARTICLE V
Article V (Judiciary), was revised in March, 1972, the most signifi-
cant change being made in the trial court system.49 The 1972 revision
44. 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972). The case was followed and applied in State v. Welch,
279 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1973) and State v. Camil, 279 So. 2d 832 (1973).
45. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-136 (now FLA. STAT. § 893.02 (1973)).
46. 272 So. 2d at 476 quoting Florida Indus. Comm. v. State ex rel. Orange State Oil
Co., 21 So. 2d 599, 603 (1945).
47. 285 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1973).
48. FLA. STAT. § 627.091 (1973).
49. See, Massey, Hoffmann & Linder, Civil Procedure, 1972-73 Survey of Florida Law,
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abolished 12 of the 14 types of trial court leaving only the circuit and
county courts. 0
2. JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
a. Appeals
The 1972 revision continues to distinguish between the supreme
court's jurisdiction on appeal, which parties can invoke as of right, and
the court's discretionary jurisdiction to review by certiorari or other
writs.5 The supreme court's jurisdiction on appea 5 2 has been expanded
to include final judgments and orders of trial courts imposing life im-
prisonment, if provided by general law. Trial court decisions in bond
validation cases, which previously were reviewable on appeal, are now so
reviewable only if provided by general law.53
Appeal to the supreme court is still available from district court of
appeal decisions initially and directly passing upon the validity of a state
statute or a federal statute or treaty, or construing a provision of the
state or federal constitution.54 In addition, trial court "orders" meeting
these same requirements can be directly appealed to the supreme court.
In Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad,5 the supreme court held that
the term "orders" in the 1972 revision means the same as "final judg-
ments or decrees" in the prior constitutional text,50 since the 1972 revi-
sion gives separate treatment elsewhere to trial court interlocutory or-
ders, which the supreme court may review by certiorari under certain
circumstances. 7
The supreme court made a significant clarification of its jurisdiction
on appeal in Ogle v. Pepin.5 The court distinguished between appeals
from decisions passing on the validity of a statute and from decisions con-
struing provisions of the constitution. In cases involving the validity of a
statute, the supreme court will accept jurisdiction on appeal even if the
lower court did not discuss, explain or even refer to any constitutional
provision, so long as a decision as to the validity of the statute was in-
herent in the case. However, the court will not apply the inherency doc-
trine as a basis for its appellate jurisdiction in cases where the lower court
construed a constitutional provision; in such cases, the lower court deci-
28 U. MTAm L. Rzv. 257 (1974); D'Alemberte, Judicial Reform-Now or Never, 46 FLA.
B.J. 68 (1972).
50. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 7, revising FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 7-12 (1956).
51. See subsections (5), c and d infra for review by extraordinary writs.
52. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b) (2).
53. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (2), revising FLA. CONST. art. V., § 4(2) (1956).
54. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
55. 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974).
56. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
57. FtA. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(b) (3) ; see notes 91-2 infra and accompanying text.
58. 273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973); accord, Dykman v.State, 294 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1974);
State v. Lyons, 293 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d 234 (Fla.
1974).
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sion must expressly "explain, define or otherwise eliminate existing doubts
arising from the language or terms of the constitutional provision.""
The supreme court's appellate jurisdiction has been further clarified
in other recent cases. In Williston Highlands Development Corp. v.
Hogue,6 0 the court found that the circuit court had unnecessarily reached
the constitutional question, but nevertheless retained jurisdiction on ap-
peal from the circuit court's decision. Reams v. State6 held that a judg-
ment holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied to a specific set
of facts is appealable directly to the supreme court. In Cuevas v. State,
62
a defendant entered a guilty plea, which he declared was subject to the
correctness of the trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of the stat-
ute. The supreme court held that the defendant could directly appeal the
trial court's judgment. In Delano Hotel v. Dade County, 3 the supreme
court held that direct appeal cannot be based upon the trial court's
passing upon the validity of a county ordinance, even in a home rule
county, since the constitution refers only to decisions passing upon the
validity of statutes.
b. Certiorari
The constitution continues to list a number of types of certiorari
jurisdiction.
(1) Class of constitutional or state officers
The 1972 revision preserves the supreme court's certiorari jurisdic-
tion to review district court of appeal decisions affecting a class of con-
stitutional or state officers.64 Richardson v. State65 held this jurisdiction
was properly invoked to test the propriety of the prosecuting attorney's
refusal to exchange witness lists, since the outcome affected all prosecuting
attorneys and trial judges in the state. The supreme court expressly re-
ceded from this holding in Spradley v. State,6 6 and made the following
clarification of certiorari jurisdiction over district court decisions affecting
a class of constitutional or state officers:
To vest this Court with jurisdiction, a decision must directly
and, in some way, exclusively affect the duties, powers, validity,
formation, termination or regulation of a particular class of con-
59. 273 So. 2d at 392, quoting from Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So. 2d 407, 409
(Fla. 1958).
60. 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973); accord, Metropolitan Dade County Transit Auth. v.
State Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 283 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1973).
61. 279 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1973); accord, Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d
617 (Fla. 1973).
62. 279 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973).
63. 287 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1973).
64. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (3) ; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
65. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
66. 293 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1974).
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stitutional or state officers. This may be a decision in a case in
which the class, or some of its members, is directly involved as
a party. It may also be in a case in which no member of the class
is a party if the decision generally affects the entire class in some
way unrelated to the specific facts of that case."'
Estes v. City of North Miami Beach6" held that a city official was not a
"constitutional or state officer" within the meaning of this provision.
(2) Question certified by district court to be
of great public interest
The 1972 revision preserves the supreme court's certiorari juris-
diction to review district court of appeal decisions which pass upon ques-
tions certified to be of great public interest.6" In Rupp v. Jackson,70 the
district court of appeal certified its opinion without identifying any
specific question. The supreme court held that the certification was suffi-
cient to invoke the supreme court's certiorari jurisdiction. However, the
supreme court expressed a preference for a form of certification articulat-
ing the specific question:
Presentation of a precise question enhances the probability
that we will pass upon the specific question in mind below; fur-
thermore, preciseness may contribute significantly to our deci-
sion whether to pass upon the merits of the case at all, a decision
which remains solely within our prerogative under the consti-
tution.
(3) Conflict
The 1972 revision makes a small but significant change in the conflict
certiorari jurisdiction of the supreme court, which is now invoked by a
district court of appeal decision "in direct conflict with a decision of any
district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of
law."72 Before 1972, the conflict had to be with another district court
of appeal or with the supreme court.73 Thus, as the supreme court ob-
served in Wales v. Barnes,74 the 1972 revision introduces certiorari juris-
diction based upon a conflict between a district court of appeal decision
and a prior decision of the same district court.
Conflict certiorari, more than any other jurisdictional concept, raises
recurring questions about the respective roles of the supreme court and
67. Id. at 701.
68. 227 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1969).
69. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (3) ; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
70. 238 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1970).
71. Id. at 89.
72. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (emphasis added).
73. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1885, as revised 1956).
74. 278 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973).
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the district courts of appeal. 5 Until the creation of the district courts of
appeal in 1957, pursuant to the 1956 revision of article V,76 the supreme
court was the only court of general appellate jurisdiction in the state.
Since their creation, the district courts have been the general appellate
courts and the supreme court has been limited to enumerated types of
jurisdiction. To the extent that the district courts of appeal are successors
to the pre-1957 jurisdiction of the supreme court, it could be argued that
the district courts can overrule pre-1957 supreme court precedents, sub-
ject of course to supreme court review on the basis of the conflict which
would inevitably be created. Shingleton v. Bussey"I lends some support to
this argument. The district court of appeal decision conflicted with a
1936 supreme court precedent. On conflict certiorari, the supreme court
noted that times had changed, receded from its own precedent, and
affirmed the lower court decision recognizing a direct cause of action by
a third party beneficiary against an insurer in a motor vehicle liability
insurance case. Similarly in Hoffman v. Jones78 the lower court had over-
ruled a supreme court precedent and certified the question as being one
of great public interest. The supreme court flatly stated that district
courts of appeal cannot overrule supreme court precedents. But, in re-
sponse to the district court's certification, the supreme court receded
from its own precedent. It thus reached the same result on the merits as
had been reached by the district court, which had adopted the com-
parative negligence rule in place of contributory negligence.79
The requirement of a conflict can be satisfied by a "misapplication
of law" arising where the district court of appeal expressly adopts a
prior decision as controlling precedent even though the factual situation
under review is materially distinguishable from the case relied upon.s0
Similar considerations prevailed in Sacks v. Sacks."' The district court
declined to order a man to pay child support for a child he had sired while
the child's mother was married to another husband, even though after
the birth of the child the mother obtained a divorce from her first husband
and married the natural father of the child. In reaching this decision, the
district court relied upon the principle that a woman may not "have her
child declared illegitimate and thus receive support for said child from its
75. See, e.g., Comment, Certiorari Review by the Supreme Court of Florida, 28 U.
MIAwa L. REv. - (1974); Note, The Erosion of Final Jurisdiction in Florida's District
Courts of Appeal, 21 U. FrA. L. REv. 375 (1969).
76. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 5 (1956).
77. 233 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
78. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), noted in 28 U. MTAmI L. REv. 473 (1974).
79. The "dressing down" given the district court of appeal in Gilliam v. Stewart, 291
So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), however, suggests that the merits of a case may not be given full
consideration by the supreme court when a lower court overrules its precedent. In Gilliam the
court reaffirmed the archaic "impact rule," quashing the decision below which rejected it.
For a discussion of the case, see 28 U. MiAmi L. REv. 705 (1974).
80. Wales v. Barnes, 278 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973) ; accord, Guerrero v. State, 289 So. 2d
396 (Fla. 1974).
81. 267 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1972).
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putative father if she was married to another person at the time of its
conception." 2 The supreme court held that the district court improperly
applied this general rule to the "unique factual situation" in the present
case, therefore giving rise to conflict certiorari jurisdiction. Similarly
in Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of North Miami,8 the supreme court
held that conflict certiorari can be based upon the misapplication of estab-
lished decisional rules of statutory construction.
The conflict requirement may also be satisfied by consulting the
record in a case. In Gibson v. Maloney, the supreme court observed that
"[ilt is conflict of decisions, not conflict of opinions or reasons, that
supplies jurisdiction for review by certiorari .... When comparing deci-
sions it may be necessary to consult the record to some extent.' 8 4 In this
case, the court consulted the record in order to ascertain that the trial
court had refused to give certain jury instructions requested by defendant,
a circumstance which helped to establish the conflict for jurisdictional
purposes. This decision reaffirmed the four to three holding of Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, Inc.,8" that conflict certiorari jurisdiction could be estab-
lished by examination of the "record proper," meaning the written record
of the proceedings in the court under review except the report of the
testimony. Additionally, even a per curiam affirmance without opinion
by the district court can be subjected -to certiorari review if conflict is
established by the record proper.8"
In Short v. Grossman,87 the supreme court pointed out, however,
that while it will examine the record of the case under review, the court
will not examine the record of the other decision which allegedly conflicts
with the case under review. The court noted an exception to this rule
where there is an initial judicial review of rulings of administrative
bodies. "In such a situation, this Court has reviewed a district court
of appeal decision on certiorari from an administrative body on the
ground of conflict with the decision of another district court of appeal
even though the latter was rendered without an opinion. 88
In Taylor v. Knight, " the district court held that the unsuccessful
party in that court had no constitutional right to obtain an opinion for
use in establishing the existence of a conflict. Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Clendening0 held that conflict certiorari cannot be based upon an
interlocutory order, where the final judgment of the lower court did not
82. 254 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), quashed 267 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1972), con-
formed 269 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
83. 286 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1973).
84. 231 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 1970) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
85. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
86. Whitmore v. Dade County, 292 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1974).
87. 245 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1971).
88. Id. at 220.
89. 234 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
90. 289 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1974).
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depend on that aspect of the interlocutory order which was in conflict
with a prior supreme court decision.
(4) Interlocutory order
The 1972 revision authorizes the supreme court to review, by cer-
tiorari, "any interlocutory order passing upon a matter which upon final
judgment would be directly appealable to the supreme court."91 The pre-
1972 provision was limited to chancery matters. 2
(5) Commissions established by law
Before 1972, the supreme court could issue writs of certiorari to
"commissions established by law."93 The 1972 revision restricts this
jurisdiction to "commissions established by general law having statewide
jurisdiction." 4
c. All writs
Under the 1956 constitution the supreme court could issue "all writs
necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." 95 The
1972 revision eliminates the words "or proper."96 If this change of word-
ing has any effect at all, apparently it restricts the scope of the all writs
jurisdiction. Expansive use of the provision was occasionally made before
1972; no cases have been found interpreting the 1972 revision.
The supreme court invoked its all writs jurisdiction in Mize v.
Seminole County,97 a consolidation of two suits brought in the trial court
concerning a proposal to build and finance by bond issue a courthouse
and jail in the City of Sanford. One of the suits was a bond validation
proceeding. The other requested a declaratory judgment that Sanford
was not the county seat; the granting of such a judgment would remove
the legal basis for the proposed construction and bond issue. By the
time the bond validation suit reached the supreme court (on direct appeal
from the trial court), the declaratory judgment suit had been appealed
from the trial court to the district court of appeal, which had rendered a
decision. The supreme court granted certiorari to review the district court
decision, and consolidated both cases. The court noted that its jurisdiction
in the bond validation suit would be "completely frustrated" unless it
also reviewed the district court decision in the declaratory judgment suit;
consequently the all writs provision authorized review by certiorari.
91. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (3).
92. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
93. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
94. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (3).
95. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
96. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (4).
97. 229 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1969).
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In State ex rel. Pettigrew v. Kirk,95 a petition for a writ of quo war-
ranto was filed in the supreme court seeking to enjoin respondents from
performing certain official acts. Noting the vital public interests involved,
the court stated:
Although quo warranto is not the proper remedy, we are of the
view that since all the parties have appeared before the Court
and argued the questions involved we should exercise our juris-
diction under the all writ section.99
d. Habeas corpus
The 1972 revision preserves the jurisdiction of the supreme court or
any justice, to issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the supreme
court or any justice, any district court or district judge, or any circuit
judge. 0 0
In Lamberti v. Wainwright,'' the supreme court declined to con-
sider, on habeas corpus, those issues already considered and determined
by another appellate court, since such issues are res judicata in collateral
proceedings such as habeas corpus. In State ex rel. Scaldeferri v. Sand-
strom, ' 0 2 the district court of appeal had refused to issue habeas in order
to review allegedly excessive bail imposed by the trial court. Petitioner
then sought original habeas in the supreme court. The supreme court also
declined to issue habeas, since a petitioner should not have repetitious
habeas proceedings available at the various levels of the court system.
The court, however, treated the habeas petition as if it were a petition
for certiorari to review the district court's denial of habeas.
e. Direct review of administrative action
A new provision appears in the 1972 revision giving the supreme
court "the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed
by general law."'' Identical jurisdiction is also conferred upon the dis-
trict0 4 and circuit courts,' 0 ' thereby giving the legislature full flexibility
to allocate this type of jurisdiction among the supreme court and the
lower courts.
f. Certified questions in pending cases'016
Neither the 1972 revision nor its predecessor authorizes the supreme
court to respond to questions certified in pending cases. Nevertheless, the
98. 243 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1970).
99. Id. at 149.
100. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (6); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1956).
101. 284 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1973).
102. 285 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1973).
103. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (7).
104. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b) (2).
105. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
106. This topic is distinct from previous discussion of certiorari jurisdiction over ques-
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court continues to respond to certain types of questions on the basis of
statute10 7 and court rule,1"8 which permit certification to it by either a
federal appellate court 0 9 or a state court.
State court certification was clarified by two 1970 supreme court
decisions. Boyer v. City of Orlando" reaffirmed the rule that the supreme
court will answer a question certified by a trial court only if the question
is one which, if decided by the trial court, would be reviewable on direct
appeal to the supreme court. Moreover, the supreme court will not decide
the certified question if the trial court has already decided it, since the
certified question procedure should not be used as a substitute for the
appellate process.
In State v. Hayles,"' the trial court certified questions to the district
court of appeal which in turn certified them to the supreme court. In re-
sponse, the supreme court interpreted certain language in a criminal
statute1 2 and determined that, as thus interpreted, the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague. Justice Drew's dissenting opinion pointed out
that the supreme court had no appellate jurisdiction over a trial court's
decision interpreting a statute, and therefore he urged the supreme court
to refrain from responding to the certified question on this point."3 The
majority of the supreme court evidently regarded the interpretation of
the statute as an essential ingredient of their ruling on the constitution-
ality of the statute as thus interpreted; since the constitutional question
could be directly appealed from the trial court to the supreme court, the
majority responded to the constitutional question, together with the re-
lated question of statutory interpretation.
g. Advisory opinions to the Governor
The constitution authorizes the Governor to request the opinion of
the justices of the supreme court "as to the interpretation of any portion
of this constitution affecting his executive powers and duties. 1 4 The
1968 revision added a new sentence to this provision, as follows:
tions certified by a district court of appeal to be of great public interest. See heading b, 2
supra.
107. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1973).
108. FLA. App. R. 4.6, 4.61.
109. E.g., Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Inst., 467 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1972), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 356-59 infra. See Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certifi-
cation: A reexamination to Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 21 (1969).
110. 232 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1970). When the case returned to the Supreme Court of
Florida on appeal, some five months after the court's refusal to answer the certified question,
the court decided, by four votes to three, to affirm the circuit court's judgment. 238 So. 2d
84 (Fla. 1970). The United States Supreme Court reversed, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
111. 240 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
112. Fla. Laws ch. 67-136 (now FLA. STAT. §§ 893.01 et seq. (1973)).
113. 240 So. 2d at 3 (Drew, dissenting).
114. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c). For a discussion of this provision, see Comment, Ad-
visory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in Intergovernmental Cooperation, 24 U. FLA.
L. REV. 328 (1972).
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The justices shall, subject to their rules of procedure, permit
interested persons to be heard on the questions presented and
shall render their written opinion not earlier than ten days from
the filing and docketing of the request, unless in their judgment
the delay would cause public injury." 5
In two important post-1968 advisory opinions, the justices agreed
to answer questions of broader scope than had been generally answered
in the past, and in both opinions the justices suggested that the broader
scope was appropriate in view of the procedural changes introduced in
1968, whereby an adversary proceeding became available. In a 1970
advisory opinion"16 as to the constitutionality of the 1970 General Appro-
priations Bill, the court observed that "[t]his court was not always in
agreement under the Constitution of 1885 as to whether or not such a
question could be answered."" 7 A 1971 advisory opinion 18 answered the
governor's inquiry as to whether a corporation income tax could be im-
posed by statute under the existing constitution."' The justices stated:
It has long been the policy of this Court to decline to express
any opinion on the constitutionality vel non of a proposed legis-
lative enactment prior to its adoption by the Legislature, and
our judicial action in this case is not to be construed as a change
at this time of that long standing policy. 2 '
But the justices pointed out that the Governor's request cited his various
constitutional and statutory responsibilities to recommend budgetary
and other measures, and to manage the fiscal affairs of the state. The
justices also took notice of a substantial deficit between the originally
requested budget and the currently available revenue, "which deficit,
unless resolved in some appropriate manner, could result in fiscal
chaos."' 2 ' Finally, the justices referred to the introduction of adversary
proceedings by the 1968 revision as a development that had "enlarged
to some extent the power of this Court to be of assistance."' 2 The cumu-
lative weight of all circumstances persuaded the justices to answer the
Governor's question.
h. Discipline of attorneys
The 1972 revision of article V vests the supreme court with "exclu-
sive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of
115. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c) (1968), revising FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1885).
116. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
117. Id. at 8.
118. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1971).
119. The justices replied that a corporation income tax could not be imposed. Sub-
sequently, on November 2, 1971, art. VII was amended so as to authorize such a tax. FLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 5(b).
120. 243 So. 2d at 576.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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law and the discipline of persons admitted.' 123 The pre-1972 judiciary
article included a provision, omitted in 1972, authorizing the supreme
court to provide for an agency to handle admissions and to provide for
the handling of disciplinary matters in the circuit and district courts of
appeal or by commissions appointed by the supreme court, subject to
its supervision and review.124
A memorandum 125 filed in 1970 by Justice Drew, as chairman of the
Supreme Court Rules Committee, stated that the district courts of appeal
and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Florida Bar in
disciplinary matters, pursuant to the integration rule,126 which rule pro-
vides also that the forum first asserting jurisdiction shall retain the same
to the exclusion of the others. Justice Drew's memorandum noted that
if the circuit court suspends a lawyer for a fixed period of time, the lawyer
automatically returns to active status at the end of that period. However,
if the circuit court disbars and its decision is not disturbed on appeal by
the supreme court, the lawyer remains disbarred until such time as he
shall apply for reinstatement to the Board of Governors. The circuit
court has no jurisdiction to order reinstatement.
i. Discipline of judges
The 1972 revision preserves but restructures the Judicial Qualifi-
cations Commission 27 which was originated by a 1966 amendment to
article V. 128 Further, a two-thirds vote of the Commission is now required
in order to confer jurisdiction upon the supreme court to order that a
justice or judge be reprimanded or removed from office for willful or
persistent failure to perform his duties or for other conduct unbecoming
a member of the judiciary, or be involuntarily retired for any permanent
disability that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties.
By a vote of four to three in 1970,29 the supreme court modified the
recommendations of the Commission and ordered a public reprimand of
a circuit judge upon finding he had engaged in conduct unbecoming a
member of the judiciary. The judge was further admonished
to comply with his oath as a member of the judiciary and to
abide by the Canons of Judicial Ethics as a member of the
judiciary, particularly in cooperating with his fellow judges,
following the normal method for seeking procedural changes
as to the administration of justice . . . and refraining from
seeking personal publicity or attempting to advance his per-
sonal ambitions through the public information media. 380
123. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
124. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 23 (1956).
125. In re The Florida Bar v. Tannenbaum, 240 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1970).
126. INTEGRATION RULE oF THE FLORIDA BAR, art. 11, § 11.14.
127. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
128. FA. CONST. art. V, § 17A (1966).
129. In te Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971).
130. 238 So. 2d at 574.
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j. Rules for practice and procedure
The 1972 revision continues to authorize the supreme court to
adopt rules for practice and procedure in all courts and adds a new pro-
viso: "These rules may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds
vote of the membership of each house of the legislature."''
A number of recent decisions have invalidated statutes which conflict
with rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme
Court.3 2 A statute can be invalidated on this ground, even though a
non-adversary proceeding is involved.'
C. Legislature
1. SESSIONS
The 1968 revision8 4 of article III requires annual sessions of the
legislature instead of the biennial sessions as provided previously. 88 In
odd-numbered years the annual session must start in April. In even-
numbered years it starts in April unless another date is fixed by law.
2. APPORTIONMENT
Drastic changes in apportionment were accomplished by the 1968
revision. 6 The 1885 constitution 87 required reapportionment sessions
to be held every ten years. However, this proved totally unsuccessful. 8
Legislatures did not live up to their responsibility. The Florida courts
declined to enforce apportionment and the federal courts ordered reappor-
tionment, which had the effect, in part, of increasing the number of
members of each house beyond the constitutional maximum. The framers
of the 1968 revision intended to establish a "fail-safe system."
In the second year following each decennial census, the legislature
is now required to apportion the state into between 30 and 40 senatorial
districts and between 80 and 120 representative districts. 3 9 All districts
may be either contiguous, overlapping, or identical in territory. If the
legislature falls to apportion during the regular session, the Governor
is required to call a special 30-day session which has a duty to reapportion.
If the legislature adopts a reapportionment resolution, the Attorney
131. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a), revising FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1956).
132. School Bd. v. Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973); In re Clarification of Rules of
Prac. & Proc., 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973); Clement v. Aztec Sales, Inc., 283 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1973); Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). See generally Note,
The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Sub-
stance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 87 (1971).
133. In re The Florida Bar-Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1973).
134. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(b).
135. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1885).
136. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
137. FLA. Co NsT, art. VII, § 3 (1924).
138. D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. III, § 16, 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. at 794 (1970).
139. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a)
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General shall petition the supreme court for a declaratory judgment on
the validity of the apportionment, and the supreme court shall conduct
an adversary proceeding and render a decision within thirty days. 40 If
the court finds the apportionment invalid, the Governor shall reconvene
the legislature for a 15-day extraordinary apportionment session, the
results of which shall again be submitted to the court by the Attorney
General. 4 ' If the supreme court twice disapproves the legislative appor-
tionment, or if the legislature fails to pass any apportionment resolution,
the Attorney General shall petition the supreme court, and the court shall
itself, within sixty days, render an apportionment order. 4 2
In a 1972 decision, 43 the supreme court ruled, by a vote of four to
three, that the 1970 apportionment law was valid under the federal and
state constitutions. The court held that
the variable multi-member districts prescribed in the apportion-
ment plan are not per se invalid.... We recognize that variable
multi-member districts may be subject to challenge where the
circumstances of a particular case may operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population. 44
The court retained jurisdiction over any future proceedings which might
challenge the validity of the apportionment plan on the basis of its prac-
tical effect as shown by the election results. In supplemental proceed-
ings,141 the court found the apportionment plan valid as applied as well
as on its face. One of the cases 146 noted the enactment of a law giving
broad home rule powers to municipalities and thereby removing
from the legislative arena the vast bulk of the local bills which
have previously created a need for all citizens in a municipality
to have an effective voice in selecting the senators and repre-
sentatives to present such local legislation. While the problems
presented by petitioners might have raised sufficient questions
to require the appointment of a Commissioner in this cause
prior to the adoption of the [Municipal Home Rule Act], such
questions no longer exist. 47
3. INVESTIGATIONS
Legislative power to investigate is broadened by the 1968 revision.
Each house, when in session, can compel the attendance of witnesses, as
before, and can now also compel production of documents and other evi-
140. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
141. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
142. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(f).
143. In re Apportionment Law, 263 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1972).
144. Id. at 809.
145. In re Apportionment Law, 279 So. 2d 14; 281 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1973).
146. In re Apportionment Law, 281 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1973).
147. Id. at 486.
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dence.114 The punishment for contempt is limited to a fine of $1,000, or
imprisonment for 90 days, or both; previously the punishment was un-
limited, except that imprisonment could not extend beyond the final
adjournment of the legislative session. The investigative power, but not
the power to punish, may be conferred by law upon committees when the
legislature is not in session; the 1885 constitution allowed each house to
delegate investigative power to its own committees, subject to guidelines
established by law.
Delegation of investigative power was at issue in Johnston v. Gal-
len, '4 decided in 1969 but governed by the 1885 constitution'5" which
was in effect when the case arose. The speaker appointed a select com-
mittee when the House was not in session, and the committee issued a
subpoena requiring a witness to testify. The witness filed suit challenging
the validity of the subpoena. The speaker claimed that he had appointed
the committee under authority of a House resolution to the effect that
"[t] he Speaker shall appoint such select committees as may be necessary
or authorized by the House of Representatives." The supreme court held
that, even if the House had intended to authorize the speaker to appoint
the committee, the House lacked constitutional authority to do so. The
House could confer its investigative power upon committees, but could
not delegate to the speaker the authority to confer such power upon com-
mittees. The court stated: "The constitutional inhibition against delega-
tion of legislative power applies not only to the enactment of laws but
also to other legislative functions."''
The 1970 decision in Hagaman v. Andrews 52 arose under the 1968
revision. A standing committee of the House of Representatives con-
ducted an investigation into the Governor's Club, a private organization
which collected membership dues in minimum denominations of $500 and
which disbursed these funds under the supervision of Governor Kirk in
the payment of his official, quasi-official and political expenses. In the
course of its investigation the committee issued a subpoena duces tecum
to a bank in which the club allegedly maintained an account, for the pro-
duction of the bank's records of deposits and disbursements of the club.
The bank filed suit to determine whether its duty to protect the confiden-
tiality of its depositors' records had to yield to the committee's subpoena.
The supreme court held the subpoena proper and ordered the bank to
comply. The court found a substantial connection between the Gov-
ernor's Club and the activities of the government of the state, constituting
148. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5; revising FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 9, 10 (1885).
149. 217 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1969).
150. The constitutional provision at issue in this case was Fla. Const. art. III, § 10
(1885), revised Fla. Const. art. III, § 5. The later provision "provides substantially broader
powers to the legislative investigating process." D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. III, § 5,
25A FiA. STAT. ANN. at 794 (1970).
151. 217 So. 2d at 321.
152. 232 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
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"the substantial State interest necessary to sustain the right of the com-
mittee to inquire into the membership list of the association." '58
Part of the court's opinion was based upon the traditional right of
the legislature, through its committees, to conduct investigations on
matters which are potential subjects of legislation. Other parts of the
opinion go further and suggest that the legislative investigation may be
justified as a means of informing the public even if no future legislation
is contemplated. Thus the concluding paragraph of the opinion states:
"The sum and substance of the whole matter is the right of the citizen
to know about The Governor's Club, or similar organizations, for this
right instills confidence in government, just as the right to speak and
be heard improves government.' '1 54 This rationale is troublesome, espe-
cially in view of the unfortunate experience, in Florida as well as
other jurisdictions, of legislative investigations undertaken for the stated
purpose of informing the public;", too often the underlying purpose has
been harassment of the persons under investigation and interference with
their associational rights.
Johnson v. McDonald56 held that the constitutional grant of investi-
gatory power to legislative committees' 57 extends also to the subcommit-
tees thereof.
4. TITLE AND SUBJECT OF LAWS
The 1968 constitution restates prior requirements that "every law
shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith,
and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." 5 8 In Board of
Public Instruction v. Doran,'5 9 the supreme court sustained the validity
of the Sunshine Law 6 ° against a number of challenges, including a chal-
lenge that it violated the one-subject requirement. The court stated:
The term "subject of an act" within this provision means the
matter which forms the groundwork of the act and it may be
as broad as the Legislature chooses so long as the matters in-
cluded in the act have a natural or logical connection .... The
fact that a certain statute embracing the matter of open meetings
for certain boards and commissions also contains provisions for
criminal penalties and an injunction by application of citizens
does not make the act unconstitutional.' 6'
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id. at 9.
155. See, e.g., Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1962); Gibson v. Florida Legis.
Invest. Comm., 108 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1958).
156. 269 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1972).
157. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
158. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16 (1885).
159. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
160. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1973).
161. 224 So. 2d at 699.
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In State ex rel. Shevin v. Metz Construction Co.,1 62 the supreme
court ruled that to be valid, an act which prohibited discriminatory
local ordinances against the factory built housing industry must be inter-
preted to prohibit only future enactments, since a prospective intent
could be reasonably inferred from the title, while an intent to invalidate
pre-existing discriminatory ordinances could not.
5. SPECIAL LAWS
The 1968 revision eliminated the prior distinction between special
and local laws by defining "special law" to mean "a special or local
law."'10 3 The procedure to enact special laws and the types of subject
matter prohibited in special laws are substantially retained in the 1968
revision, with minor changes.' 64 In Hayek v. Lee County,'65 the supreme
court held that the 1968 revision made a change in style only, and not
in meaning, by prohibiting special laws "pertaining to" certain topics,
where the 1885 constitution had prohibited special laws "regulating"
certain topics.
The 1969 decision in Veterinary Medical Society, Inc. v. Chapman 66
affirmed the traditional rule that special legislation, by definition, need
not apply uniformly throughout the state. The court sustained the validity
of a special law requiring the licensing and vaccination of dogs and the
establishing of impounding agencies in Pinellas County. The require-
ments of equal protection are satisfied so long as the special law applies
equally to all within the locality affected; statewide equality is not con-
stitutionally required.
Housing Authority v. City of St. Petersburg'67 involved a statute 68
which created housing authorities in Pinellas County with powers differ-
ent from those of housing authorities in every other part of the state. The
supreme court held that this was a special law, which was void unless
enacted with the constitutionally required notice.
In Wednesday Night, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,69 the supreme
court sustained the validity of a statute17 which set the hours for the
sale of alcoholic beverages statewide, but which permitted these hours
to be changed by ordinance of any municipality or, as to unincorporated
areas, by any county. The court held this was a general, not a special,
162. 285 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1973).
163. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(g). The theoretical difference between special and local
laws was discussed in State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 287, 99 So. 804 (1924).
164. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 10, 11, revising FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20, 21 (1885). See
D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. III, §§ 10 and 11, 25A FLA. STATs. ANN. at 690, 732
(1970), where the 1968 provision is compared, in detail, to its predecessor.
165. 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970).
166. 224 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1969).
167. 287 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1974).
168. FLA. STAT. § 421.53 (1973).
169. 272 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1972).
170. FLA. STAT. § 562, 14 (1973).
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law even though the law was likely to result in different hours of sale in
different parts of the state. The court held that the legislature could
properly establish, by general law, that this was a matter for local de-
termination.
Adequacy of notice of a special act was at issue in City of Naples
v. Moon,171 where the supreme court held that the notice given by the
city concerning its proposed charter amendment was adequate as notice
of the special act which the legislature enacted as a substitute, since the
same subject matter was covered by both.
One of the topics which cannot be reached by special law is "punish-
ment for crime."""2 An Attorney General's Opinion in 1972178 ruled that
this provision was not violated by a pollution control act1 74 of local appli-
cation which defines certain conduct as a misdemeanor, without specifying
the punishment, since the punishment is provided by the general statute
setting the punishment for misdemeanors, not by the special statute de-
fining the offense.
A similar result was reached in Stephens v. Board of County Com-
missioners.175 A special act authorized the county commissioners to grant
franchises for garbage service and to set rates and otherwise regulate the
collection and disposal of garbage. Relying on this special act, the com-
missioners passed a resolution providing, inter alia, that any violation of
the resolution or of the special act would be a misdemeanor punishable
by a $100 fine and/or imprisonment for thirty days. The supreme court
held that the penalty provision was invalid because it attempted to do,
under authority of a special law, that which the legislature itself cannot do
by special law; namely, determine the punishment for an offense. The
court's opinion necessarily implies that the commission was authorized to
define certain conduct as a misdemeanor, provided the commission did not
specify the punishment.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Hibbard,17 6 a statute trans-
ferred the power to issue gun permits in the named county from. the
county commissioners to the sheriff. The supreme court held that the
transfer of power was a primary purpose of the statute, which, thus,
violated the prohibition against special laws pertaining to the duties of
officers.
By a vote of four to three, the supreme court sustained the validity
of a special act in City of Cape Coral v. GAC Utilities, Inc.17 7 The statute
171. 269 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1972).
172. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a) (4).
173. OF. ATr'y GEN FLA. 072-43 (Feb. 9, 1972). This opinion was subsequently con-
firmed by Stephens v. Board of City Comm., 278 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 1973).
174. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-1362.
175. 278 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1973).
176. 292 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974).
177. 281 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1973).
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divested the Public Service Commission of jurisdiction to regulate public
utilities furnishing water and sewers within the named city and con-
ferred such jurisdiction upon the city commission. The court held this
act did not violate the constitutional prohibition against special laws
pertaining to "regulation of occupations which are regulated by a state
agency," since the statute divested the Public Service Commission of
jurisdiction at the same time it conferred jurisdiction upon the city com-
mission, and consequently the utilities within the city were no longer
"regulated by a state agency."
6. CONFLICT BETWEEN SPECIAL AND GENERAL LAWS
Hillsborough Island House Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Town
of Hillsborough Beach"' reaffirmed the case law to the effect that a
special statute usually takes precedence over a general statute on the
same subject. The town charter of Hillsborough Beach (a special law)
provided the specific projects suitable for bond financing. Chapter 169
of Florida Statutes (a general law) provided that money may be borrowed
for the advancement of municipal powers and purposes, a much broader
grant than the town charter. The supreme court ruled that the town "can
borrow money under chapter 169 but not by means of bonded indebted-
ness unless such bonds come within the limitations of [the town
charter] ."'79
7. GENERAL LAWS OF LOCAL APPLICATION-POPULATION ACTS
The 1968 revision for the first time expresses constitutional guide-
lines concerning general laws of local application. i 0 These laws typically
are drafted as "population acts," to be effective only in counties whose
population falls within a stated range. This device was often used before
1968181 and the supreme court developed a series of precedents to prevent
certain abuses. These pre-1968 precedents are, to some extent, reflected
in the revised text of the 1968 constitution.
The first rule expressed in the 1968 constitution is that population
acts are prohibited on any subject concerning which a special law would
be prohibited.112 This is a significant change from prior case law188 and
evidently reduces the motivation for legislators to introduce measures in
the format of population acts. The second rule in the 1968 constitution is
178. 263 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1972).
179. Id. at 212.
180. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 11(a), (b); D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. III, § 11,
25A FLA. STATS. ANN. at 733, 736; Sparkman, The History and Status of Local Government
Powers in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. Rv. 271 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sparkman].
181. Sparkman, supra note 180, at 280-3, 298-9; see notes 183-90 infra and accompany-
ing text.
182. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a).
183. Sparkman, supra note 180, at 280; CASEBOOK, supra note 7, at 401.
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that in the enactment of population acts on permissible subject-matter,
"political subdivisions or other governmental entities may be classified
only on a basis reasonably related to the subject of the law.' 1 84 This rule
restates pre-1968 case law.185 A third requirement of the pre-1968 cases
was that the population bracket must be left open-ended so that sub-
divisions may move into or out of the designated population range from
time to time as their populations change.'86 This requirement was not
written into the text of the 1968 constitution, but apparently survives
in the case law.18 7
The social utility of population acts underwent a change with the
adoption of the 1968 constitution. Before 1968, the state legislature was
obliged to legislate on many matters of concern only to single counties
since the counties themselves were without general legislative power to
govern their own affairs. The large volume of special acts adopted at
each legislative session was supplemented by population acts. This may
have provided a certain amount of convenience by dispensing with some
of the procedural requirements which would have been applicable to
special laws, such as local referendum or notice. Moreover, population
acts could be enacted before 1968 even on subjects concerning which
special laws were prohibited. 88 However, the 1968 constitution increased
the availability of county home rule (in all matters other than taxation) 89
and correspondingly reduced the counties' need for action by the state
legislature.
Recognizing this change, the 1971 legislature enacted chapter 71-
29,190 repealing literally thousands of population acts and reenacting all
of them as follows: all relating to courts became general laws; all
affecting a county became ordinances of the affected county; all affecting
a municipality became ordinances of the affected municipality; and all
affecting a school district became regulations of the affected school dis-
trict. Obviously the 1971 legislature did not and could not prevent future
legislatures from enacting population acts; the 1968 constitution ex-
pressly authorizes population acts within the stated guidelines.'' Never-
184. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1I(b).
185. Sparkman, supra note 180, at 281-2; CASEBOOK, supra note 7, at 402. See, e.g.,
Morris v. Bryan, 198 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1967); Yoo Kun Wha v. Kelly, 154 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
1963; State ex rel. CotterilU v. Bessenger, 133 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1961).
186. E.g., State v. City of Miami Beach, 234 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1970) (decided under
the 1885 constitution); Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 132 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1961).
187. Arguably the requirement of open-ended population brackets is inherent in the
requirement that the population bracket be reasonably related to the subject-matter of the
act.
188. Sparkman, on the basis of "a glance through the population acts in effect through
1970," found that population acts had been "occasionally" enacted on subjects concerning
which special laws were prohibited, "although more than ninety percent of the acts did not
involve such prohibited subjects." Sparkman, supra note 180, at 280-1.
189. FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (g)-(h).
190. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-29.
191. See notes 180-85 supra and accompanying text.
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theless, chapter 71-29 suggests that population acts will not be used
as widely in the future as they were in the past.'92
A remarkable decision by the supreme court in 19701" sustained
the validity, under the 1885 constitution, of a population act enacted in
1967. The act authorized the imposition of a municipal resort tax by any
city or town within any county having a population between 330,000 and
340,000, or a population over 900,000, according to the latest decennial
census, provided that the act is applicable only to those cities and towns
whose charters specifically provide for such a tax by charter provision
adopted before January 1, 1968. The court noticed that only cities and
towns in Broward and Dade Counties were covered by the act. This clas-
sification was found to be reasonable in view of "this state's interest in
the promotion and further development of the tourist industry. '1'9 4 Fur-
ther, the court held that the population bracket was open-ended since
other counties could move into or out of the coverage of the act as de-
termined by their census every ten years. The requirement that cities
must make charter provision for such a tax before January 1, 1968, was
not deemed to close the bracket, presumably because any city in any
county could have adopted an appropriate charter provision before Jan-
uary 1, 1968, to be triggered in the event the county's population ever
entered the population bracket of the act.
8. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The 1968 revision includes a new provision requiring the legislature
to prescribe a code of ethics for all state employees and non-judicial offi-
cers "prohibiting conflict between public duty and private interests."' 9 5
The legislature implemented this section by enactments codified in Flor-
ida Statutes, chapter 112. An Attorney General's Opinion rendered in
1971196 ruled that a member of the legislature may, without violating the
conflict of interests standards, accept employment, either as a consultant
to the Okaloosa Island Authority, or as a supervisor in a county school
system.
192. Sparkman, supra note 180, at 305, reports a combined total of special acts and
population acts of 292 in 1972, a sharp reduction from prior years:
1972 292
1971 592
1970 534
1969 1,211
1967 1,584
1965 1,832
1963 1,473
Obviously the enactment of ch. 71-29 is not the only factor causing this reduction.
193. State v. City of Miami Beach, 234 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1970).
194. Id. at 106.
195. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
196. Op. ATTY. GEm. FLA. 071-137 (June 8, 1971).
1974]
582 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
D. Executive
1. GOVERNOR-GENERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
The 1968 revision restates, with minor changes, the supreme execu-
tive power of the Governor and his responsibility to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. 19 7 The scope and limits of the Governor's
power to execute the laws are illustrated by the first of the Kirk v. Baker
cases.' Governor Kirk ordered the state attorneys of the Fifth and the
Eleventh Circuits to take each others' places for an indefinite period of
time; the supreme court found that the Governor was acting pursuant to
a statute which implemented his constitutional powers, and therefore the
court sustained this action. The Governor further ordered the visiting
state attorney, upon being transferred to the Eleventh Circuit, to pros-
ecute a specific case named by the Governor. However, the judge before
whom that case was pending appointed another lawyer to serve as acting
prosecutor in the case. The supreme court ruled that the Governor had no
statutory authority to designate a prosecutor for a specific case, and ap-
parently his "raw" constitutional power was not sufficient to support this
action, which the court declared void. The supreme court found that the
trial judge had no statutory authority either, but that the appointment of
an acting prosecutor was within the inherent power of a court possessing
criminal jurisdiction and was therefore proper even without a statutory
foundation. This case places heavy reliance upon statutes as a source of
the Governor's power, perhaps because the subject-matter of the case
involves the functions of state attorneys, who are required by the judiciary
article "to fulfill duties prescribed by law."'
The one-term limitation on the Governor, which existed in the 1885
constitution and its predecessors, was changed in 1968 so as to allow the
Governor to serve for two successive four-year terms. 0 0
2. LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
The office of Lieutenant Governor existed under the constitutions of
1865 and 1868, was abolished by the 1885 constitution, 01 and was rein-
stated by the 1968 constitution. 20 2 The Governor and Lieutenant Gov-
ernor run in the primaries and in the general election on a joint ticket.
The Lieutenant Governor succeeds to the office of Governor upon the
death, incapacity or impeachment of the Governor.
197. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a); FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 1, 5, 6 (1885).
198. 224 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1969). The second of the Kirk v. Baker cases is discussed in
text accompanying note 28 supra.
199. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6(6) (1956).
200. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b), revising FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1885).
201. The history is sketched in Commentary, supra note 138 on art. IV, § 2, 26 FLA.
STATS. AqN. at 71.
202. FLA. CONST. art. IV, II 2, 3, 5.
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3. CABINET SYSTEM
The 1968 constitution preserves the elected cabinet, composed of the
Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Commis-
sioner of Agriculture and Commissioner of Education." 3 The constitution
gives a one-sentence description of the basic duties of each cabinet mem-
ber and provides further that "they shall exercise such powers and per-
form such duties as may be prescribed by law.12 °4 This language, although
slightly changed from the 1885 constitution, 2 5 has permitted continuation
of the previous pattern of numerous boards, created by statute, the mem-
bers consisting of the Governor and some or all cabinet members.20 6
4. ATTORNEY GENERAL
The 1968 revision provides that the Attorney General shall be the
chief state legal officer,207 a somewhat stronger statement than the pre-
vious constitution which described him as "the legal advisor of the Gov-
ernor, and of each of the officers of the Executive Department... ,"08
In State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough,2 09 the Attorney General filed
an original mandamus action in the supreme court seeking authority to
intervene in proceedings before the Public Service Commission "on be-
half of all citizens of the State of Florida who are consumers of the elec-
trical services provided by Florida Power Corp. in a pending application
for rate increase before the PSC." The court held that the Attorney Gen-
eral can represent the state as a consumer and will, in that posture, be
able to render as much service to the general public as if he appeared as
their representative.
State ex rel. Shevin v. Kerwin2 10 held that the state, through the At-
torney General, is a proper party to any action in which the constitution-
ality of a statute is raised. When the trial court finds a statute unconstitu-
tional, it is proper that the Attorney General appear on appeal to defend
the statute even if he was not a party in the trial court. And, in some cases
of great magnitude or importance, it may be necessary for the Attorney
General to intervene in the cause at the trial level.
State ex rel. Shevin v. Morgan2 ' held that the Attorney General has
standing to bring an action to abate, as a public nuisance, an "automatic
203. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4. On the cabinet system in general, see McCollum, The
Florida Cabinet System: A critical Analysis, 43 FLA. B.J. 157 (1969); Dickinson, The Florida
Cabinet, 43 FLA. B.J. 337 (1969); Weiss, In Defense of Florida's Cabinet System, 43 FLA.
B.J. 341 (1969).
204. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
205. FrA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 20-26 (1885).
206. D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. IV, § 4, 26 FLA. STAT. ANN. at 77, (1970). The
pre-1968 system is clarified in Op. A=rY. GEN. FiA. 067-54 (Aug. 14, 1967).
207. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(c).
208. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 22 (1885).
209. 257 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1972).
210. 279 So..2d 836 (Fla. 1973).
211. 289 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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scarecrow" in a strawberry field adjacent to a residential subdivision
which emits "loud and raucous shotgun-like sounds at 55-second intervals
from dawn to dark, seven days per week."
5. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
A completely new provision in the 1968 constitution declares:
All functions of the executive branch of state government
shall be allotted among not more than twenty-five departments,
exclusive of those specifically provided for or authorized in this
constitution. The administration of each department, unless
otherwise provided in this constitution, shall be placed by law
under the direct supervision of the governor, the lieutenant gov-
ernor, the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer
or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the gov-
ernor, except:
(a) When provided by law, confirmation by the senate or
the approval of three members of the cabinet shall be required
for appointment to or removal from any designated statutory
office.
(b) Boards authorized to grant and revoke licenses to en-
gage in regulated occupations shall be assigned to appropriate
departments and their members appointed for fixed terms, sub-
ject to removal only for cause. 12
The schedule to the 1968 constitution delayed the effective date of this
section until July 1, 1969,218 and the legislature enacted the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1969214 by that date, accomplishing the task of reducing over
150 departments to less than 25. In connection with this process, the jus-
tices of the supreme court issued an advisory opinion 15 to the effect that
the Public Service Commission was not an executive department, but was,
instead, "a part of the legislative or the judicial branch of government." '21 6
6. SUSPENSIONS
The 1968 constitution substantially restates the Governor's power to
suspend state officers not subject to impeachment and county officers, for
malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence,
permanent inability to perform the duties of the office, or commission of
a felony.217 The Governor may fill the office by appointment for the
period of the suspension. The Senate may remove or reinstate the sus-
212. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
213. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 16.
214. FLA. STAT. ch. 20 (1973).
215. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 223 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1969).
216. Id. at 40.
217. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7. See generally Barr & Karl, Executive Suspension and
Removal of Public Officers under the 1968 Florida Constitution, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 635
(1971).
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pended officer, and the Governor may reinstate him before the Senate acts
on removal.
Until 1968 municipal officers were subject to suspension in the same
manner as state and county officers.218 The 1968 constitution reduces the
Governor's power over municipal officers. His only power now is to sus-
pend elected municipal officers indicted for crime until acquitted and to
fill the office for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term,
unless these powers are vested elsewhere by law or the municipal char-
ter.2
19
In Fair v. Kirk,220 a federal district court, affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court, held that an officer has no constitutional right to a
hearing before suspension. The court assumed that he would be entitled
to a hearing before removal and Florida Statutes so provide.221 State ex
rel. Meyerson v. Askew 222 held that the Senate improperly removed an
officer where the Senate's findings involved different grounds than those
mentioned in the Governor's order of suspension. Crowder v. State ex rel.
Baker223 held that an executive order suspending an officer must allege
facts with some degree of specificity, although the standard is not as strin-
gent as is required for an indictment or information. In this case the ex-
ecutive order was declared invalid for failure to meet the applicable stan-
dard of specificity.
7. CLEMENCY
Before 1968, the constitution provided a Pardon Board, consisting
of the Governor, Secretary of State, Comptroller, Attorney General and
Commissioner of Agriculture. 224 The Governor's presence was required
for a meeting, but the Board made decisions as a unit, with or without
the concurrence of the Governor. The 1968 constitution makes no men-
tion of the Pardon Board, but provides that similar functions shall be
carried out by the Governor "with the approval of three members of the
cabinet.1225 Thus the Governor's vote and initiative are now essential and
the approval can come from any three members of the Cabinet. As a mat-
ter of practice, the cabinet meets on pardon matters, although opinions
vary as to whether this is necessary under the 1968 constitution.2 26
The Parole and Probation Commission remains substantially un-
changed, except that a six-year term of office is now provided for its mem-
bers.227
218. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (1885).
219. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(c).
220. 317 F. Supp. 12 (N. D. Fla. 1970), aff'd 401 U.S. 928 (1971).
221. FLA. STAT. § 112.47 (1973).
222. 269 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1972).
223. 285 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
224. FLA. CO NST. art. IV, § 12 (1885).
225. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
226. The accompanying text is based on interviews conducted by the author during a
study of the pardon and parole processes in Florida, Dec. 1972-Jan. 1973.
227. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c); FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 32 (1885).
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8. GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH COMMISSION
The Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission continues its constitu-
tional existence. 228 Fewer details are contained in the 1968 constitution
than its predecessor and more aspects of the Commission's functions are
subject to statutory control.229
Whitehead v. Rogers,280 decided in 1969, illustrates the autonomy en-
joyed by the Commission under the 1885 constitution, which controlled
this case. A huntsman was arrested for discharging firearms on Sunday,
a crime under state statute. 281 However, the Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission had promulgated an order providing an open season for the
hunting of mourning doves and the defendant asserted he had indeed been
hunting mourning doves during the Commission's open season at the time
of his arrest. Faced with a conflict between the state statute and the Com-
mission's order, the supreme court held that the Commission's order must
prevail, since the 1885 constitution expressly conferred authority upon
the Commission to fix hunting seasons.
The 1968 constitution omits mention of hunting seasons, but pro-
vides that the Commission "shall exercise the non-judicial powers of the
state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life, except
that . . . penalties for violating regulations of the commission shall be
prescribed by specific statute.' 2 32 This language appears to preserve the
supremacy of the Commission in such matters as hunting seasons.
9. OFFICERS
In State Department of Citrus v. Huff, 233 the district court of appeal
held that the Department of Citrus exercises corporate powers necessary
to promote the general welfare, but is not a corporation with the full
powers and duties of private corporations. It is, therefore, not subject to
the statutory requirement234 that corporate officers and directors be in-
demnified for attorney fees incurred in the successful defense of a crimi-
nal action.
V. ORGANS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Article VIII, Local Government, was significantly revised in 1968.
The general thrust of the revision is to increase local autonomy, but the
legislature retains substantial control over the framework of local govern-
ment.
228. FLA. Co NsT. art. IV, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (1885).
229. Commentary, supra note 138 on art. IV, § 9, 26 FIA. STAT. ANN. at 131.
230. 223 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969).
231. Fla. Laws, ch. 51-26484 § 10 (repealed 1969).
232. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
233. 290 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
234. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) (c) (1973).
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A. Counties
Before 1968, a county could achieve home rule status only through
an amendment to the constitution.8 5 Dade was the only county granted
home rule before 1968 and the Dade County Home Rule Amendment is
preserved in the schedule of the new article VIII.236
The 1968 revision, for the first time, authorizes any county, pursuant
to general or special law, to adopt a charter which can be adopted,
amended or repealed only by referendum.287 Every county has ordinance
making powers. The basic constitutional difference between charter and
non-charter counties is three-fold. First, the charter itself contains pro-
visions which are part of the law of the county. Second, special laws re-
quire a referendum in a charter county, in order to override inconsistent
county ordinances. Third, in the event of a conflict between a county ordi-
nance and a municipal ordinance, in a charter county the charter shall
provide whether the county or municipal ordinance shall prevail, while in
a non-charter county the municipal ordinance must prevail.
Implementing legislation 288 has granted broad powers, both to char-
ter and to non-charter counties, leading a commentator to observe: "The
range and scope of the powers enumerated by the [county home rule]
law are so broad and comprehensive as to encompass all readily imagin-
able local government concerns. '239 The same author notes that the legis-
lature has significantly reduced the number of special laws and popula-
tion acts enacted annually apparently in deference to the autonomy of
county commissions.
Davis v. Gronemeyer240 involved an attempt by Escambia County,
under the 1968 revision, to repeal statutes241 which created a civil service
system for county personnel and established a Civil Service Board to ad-
minister the law. In 1970 the Escambia County Commission enacted
ordinances repealing the statutes and creating a new civil service system.
The supreme court first ruled that the old Board had standing to bring
suit to test the constitutionality of the new county ordinances, since the
ordinances could be characterized as "the ultimate violation" of the stat-
utes. On the merits, the court noted that Escambia County was a non-
charter county and thus could enact ordinances only to the extent not
inconsistent with general or special law. The county derived a certain
amount of additional authority from the schedule to article VIII, which
provides: "Local laws relating only to unincorporated areas of a county
on the effective date of this article may be amended or repealed by county
235. Sparkman, supra note 180, at 286-288.
236. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e).
237. FA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c).
238. FLA. STAT. ch. 125 (1973).
239. Sparkman, supra note 180, at 298.
240. 251 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
241. Fla. Laws, 1969, 69-234 (repealed 1971); FLA. STAT. §§ 125.64-.69 (1973).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ordinance." '242 However, this authority did not avail in the present case,
since the statutes applied to the incorporated as well as the unincorporated
areas of the county. The court therefore held that the county was without
authority to enact an ordinance inconsistent with the statutes.
In Dade County v. Acme Specialty Corp.,243 a district court of ap-
peal held unconstitutional a county ordinance banning the sale of spar-
klers, since a state statute244 authorized such sales.
Other cases on counties will be discussed under later headings of this
survey, especially those dealing with taxation2 45 and borrowing.
246
B. Municipalities
1. POWERS
The 1968 constitution includes the statement:
Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and propri-
etary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and
may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as other-
wise provided by law.247
The dominant case regarding municipal powers during the period
under survey was decided by a four-to-three vote of the supreme court in
1972. In City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc.248 the court in-
validated a municipal rent control ordinance on three grounds: that the
city did not have power to enact an ordinance on rent control; that the
ordinance was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, without
guidelines, to the rent agency; and that the ordinance conflicted with
state law. On the first issue, regarding the power of the city to enact rent
control ordinances, the court noted that the 1968 revision of article VIII
had expanded municipal powers, but continued:
The powers of a municipality are to be interpreted and con-
strued in reference to the purposes of the municipality and if
reasonable doubt should arise as to whether the municipality
possesses a specific power, such doubt will be resolved against
the City.2
49
This statement is, basically, a repetition of the doctrine known as "Dil-
242. FA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(d).
243. 292 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
244. FLA. STAT. § 791.01 (1973).
245. See notes 515-87 infra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 588-618 infra and accompanying text.
247. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b). D'Alemberte notes that "under the new language,
all municipalities have governmental, corporate and proprietary power unless provided other-
wise by law, whereas under the 1885 constitution, municipalities had only those powers ex-
pressly granted by law." Commentary on art. VIII, § 2, 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. at 292 (1970).
248. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Fleetwood Hotel]; noted in
28 U. MLA-x L. REv. 518 (1973); 25 U. FA. L. Rav. 597 (1973); 1 F.S.U.L. Riv. 360 (1973)
249. 261 So. 2d at 803.
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Ion's Rule," which the Supreme Court of Florida embraced as long ago
as 1913, to the effect that municipalities can exercise "only such authority
as is conferred by express or implied provisions of law.... If reasonable
doubt exists as to a particular power of a municipality, it should be re-
solved against the city.' 250
A more expansive view of municipal powers than that expressed in
the Fleetwood Hotel case was taken by the Attorney General in a 1972
opinion, which ruled that
[m]unicipal corporations may enact and enforce legislation to
protect those civil rights guaranteed by the state and federal
constitutions, where the subject of such legislation has not been
displaced or preempted by state or federal action and where such
legislation is not prohibited by general or special law.25'
The matter has been clarified by the Municipal Home Rules Powers
Act,252 which became effective on October 1, 1973. The Act, in an ap-
parent attempt to expand municipal power beyond the scope of the Fleet-
wood Hotel decision, defines the constitutional term "municipal purpose"
to mean "any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or its
political subdivisions. ' 25 3 The Act then gives municipalities the power to
enact any legislation
concerning any subject matter upon which the state legislature
may act, except:
(a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise
of extraterritorial power, which require general
or special law pursuant to § 2 (c), Art. VIII of
the state constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the constitu-
tion;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or
county government by the constitution or by gen-
eral law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a
county charter adopted under the authority of
§§ 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the state con-
stitution.2"
As previously mentioned, one of the grounds of the Fleetwood Hotel
decision was that the rent control ordinance was an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power. On this point the court noted that
[t]he same restrictions which apply to the Legislature's delega-
250. Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 56-57, 62 So. 922, 924 (1913); J. DiLLoN, 1
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 237 (5th ed. 1911).
251. Op. ATTY. GE. FLA. 072-216 (July 10, 1972).
252. FLA. STAT. Ch. 166 (1973).
253. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2) (1973).
254. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (1973).
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tion of legislative authority also apply to the enactment of mu-
nicipal ordinances under the general police power by munici-
palities in that city ordinances must not constitute an improper
delegation of legislative, executive or administrative power.255
The court thus reaffirmed its 1971 decision in Municipal Court, City of
Fort Lauderdale v. Patrick,250 which invalidated a provision of the city
charter authorizing the mayor, by proclamation, to establish a curfew and
a penalty for its violation, enforceable by the municipal court. The court
held in Patrick that these matters were legislative and therefore must be
decided by the city commission.
Pinellas Apartment Association, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg257
dealt with the rates charged by the city for its garbage collection and dis-
posal service. Some consumers sued when the city increased its rates. The
evidence tended to show that users of bulk containers (dumpsters) were
being charged slightly more than the city's cost to handle this type of con-
tainer, while users of garbage cans were being charged slightly less than
the city's cost. However, the evidence did not indicate that the rates were
arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, and the court, therefore, sus-
tained the rates. The court noted that mathematical exactitude is not re-
quired, and that "[t] here is nothing inherently wrong with the city mak-
ing a modest return on its utility operation or certain portions thereof,
providing the rate is not unreasonable in light of the service provided."25
This last proviso raises serious questions as to the propriety of the rate
structure of certain city owned utilities which deliberately and consis-
tently charge rates high enough to yield a substantial profit to be turned
over to the general fund of the city as a significant portion of the city's
budgeted revenues and thereby reduce the burden on ad valorem tax-
payers at the expense of utility consumers.
In City of Riviera Beach v. Witt, 59 the court held that the employ-
ment of a city prosecutor is a governmental, not a proprietary function.
Therefore, an employment contract which purported to extend beyond
the terms of office of the contracting officers could not effectively bind
their successors.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPALITIES
The 1968 revision restates prior provisions for the establishment or
abolition of municipalities and the amendment of their charters by special
or general law.20 °
State ex rel. Lee v. City of Cape Coral2"' held that a special act estab-
255. 261 So. 2d at 809.
256. 254 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Patrick].
257. 294 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
258. Id. at 678.
259. 286 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
260. FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 2(a) ; FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 8 (1885).
261. 272 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
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lishing a city was constitutional, but that lands too remote from the pop-
ulated area and from city benefits must be excluded from the city limits.
The court's opinion was a per curiam affirmance and consequently the
rationale was not expressed.
3. ANNEXATION
The 1968 revision states: "Municipal annexation of unincorporated
territory, merger of municipalities, and exercise of extra-territorial powers
by municipalities shall be as provided by general or special law.' 262 This
substantially restates prior provisions. 26
In City of Long Beach Resort v. Collins,26 4 the supreme court sus-
tained the validity of a special statute which provided for the merger of
several cities and the surrounding unincorporated areas. The statute pro-
vided for an election only in the unincorporated areas and the outcome of
this election was in favor of merger. Residents of the cities had no op-
portunity to vote on the question. The court found no denial of equal pro-
tection, and concluded that the legislature has complete power to create
or abolish municipalities, and may do so on its own terms.
C. Consolidation
Before 1968, a separate constitutional amendment was required for
each proposal to consolidate a county government with the government of
one or more municipalities within its borders. 265 Three such amendments
were adopted dealing, respectively, with Duval-Jacksonville,2 66 Monroe-
Key West 267 and Hillsborough-Tampa. 2 s The only consolidation imple-
mented by referendum before 1968 was the Duval-Jacksonville consolida-
tion.269
The 1968 revision of article VIII authorizes the legislature, by special
law, to propose consolidation plans without need of further constitutional
amendment.2 70 The legislative proposal must provide for a referen-
262. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(c).
263. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, 8 (1885). The analysis of the proposed 1968 revision,
published on July 20, 1968 by the Legislative Reference Bureau, comments that the provision
in the 1968 revision "clarifies the power of the Legislature that is implicit in the 1885 Con-
stitution. No substantive change."
264. 261 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1972).
265. D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. 8, § 3, 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. (1970). Legislative
Reference Bureau, n. 263, comments that, "the type of consolidation permitted by [art. VIII,
§ 3, 1968 revision] requires separate constitutional authorization in each county under the
1885 constitution."
266. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (1885).
267. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (1885).
268. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 24 (1885), which included partial home rule powers as
well as consolidation.
269. Jackson v. Consolidated Government, 225 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1969) sustained the
validity of the Jacksonville Consolidation Charter against attack on various constitutional
grounds.
270. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
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dum either of the county alone, or of the county and each affected mu-
nicipality, as may be provided in the plan. Consolidation "shall not extend
the territorial scope of taxation for the payment of pre-existing debt ex-
cept to areas whose residents receive a benefit from the facility or service
for which the indebtedness was incurred. 27'
City of Jacksonville Beach v. Albury272 held that even after the con-
solidation, certain unconsolidated "quasi-municipal corporations" con-
tinued to exist and could exercise certain ordinance-making and adminis-
trative powers.
D. Transfer of Powers
A new provision in the 1968 revision 27 authorizes the transfer or
contracting of any function or power of a county, municipality or special
district to another such entity, by law or by resolution of the governing
bodies of each of the affected governments, after approval by referendum
of the electors of the transferor and of the transferee, "or as otherwise
provided by law."
VI. ELECTIONS
Article VI, Suffrage and Elections, as revised in 1968, substantially
restates the 1885 constitution. 4 In addition, it grants power to the legis-
lature to regulate political party functions and to provide for registration
and elections in municipalities and other governmental entities created by
statute. The twenty-one year minimum age for voting, included in the
1968 revision,275 has been superseded by the 26th amendment to the
United States Constitution, establishing a nationwide voting age of eight-
een years.
Extensive case law developed during the period under survey.
A. Campaign Practices
Adams v. Sutton2 76 sustained the validity, under the 1885 constitu-
tion, of a statute2 77 prohibiting liquor licensees from making political
campaign contributions. A subsequent suit in federal court by the same
parties on the same issue was dismissed,278 upon the finding by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the federal issues had been litigated and
decided previously by the Florida courts in Adams.
271. Id.
272. 291 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
273. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
274. FLA. CONST. art. VI; FLA. CONST. art VI (1885).
275. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
276. 212 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 404 (1969).
277. FLA. STAT. § 99.161 (1973).
278. Rankin v. Florida, 418 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Maloney v. Kirk2 79 held that the 1885 constitution was violated by
a statute'8 which provided, in part:
The nomination or election to office of any person who willfully
violates the provisions of [another statute dealing with the re-
ceipt, handling and disbursement of campaign funds] may be
declared void by the court of competent jurisdiction....
The statute was declared unconstitutional since it attempted to add to
the constitutional qualifications of candidates for office.
B. Resign-to-Run Law
The resign-to-run law, enacted in 1970, provides, in part:
No individual may qualify as a candidate for public office who
holds another elective or appointive office, whether state, county
or municipal, the term of which or any part thereof runs con-
currently with the term of office for which he seeks to qualify
without resigning from such office not less than ten days prior
to the first day of qualifying for the office he intends to seek.
Said resignation shall be effective not later than the date upon
which he would assume office, if elected to the office to which he
seeks to qualify, the expiration date of the term of the office
which he presently holds, or the general election day at which
his successor is elected, whichever occurs earliest.281
Holley v. A dams282 held this statute valid as regards a state officer
seeking another state office. Distinguishing Maloney v. Kirk,2  the su-
preme court stated that the statute "does not relate to the qualifications
one must possess in order to hold office, but merely conditions under
which he may become eligible to be a candidate."'284 Similarly, in Deeb
v. Adams,285 a three-judge federal district court held that the resign-to-
run law did not violate federally protected rights by requiring candidates
for state office to resign in order to qualify. The companion case of
Stack v. Adams2 8 held, however, that the resign-to-run law did violate
the United States Constitution as regards candidates for federal office.
By requiring such candidates to resign from state office as a precondition
of running for federal office, the statute imposed an additional qualifica-
tion for federal office beyond the qualifications contained in article I,
section 2, clause 1 of the Federal Constitution.
Evers v. Lacy28 7 held that a candidate who did not resign although
279. 212 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968), noted in 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 408 (1969).
280. FLA. STAT. § 104.27 (1973).
281. FLA. STAT. § 99.012(2) (1973).
282. 238 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1970), noted in 25 U. MimU L. REV. 339 (1971).
283. 212 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
284. 238 So. 2d at 408.
285. 315 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
286. 315 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
287. 257 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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required to do so by the resign-to-run law was without standing to bring
suit to challenge absentee ballots "but for which, undisputedly, he would
have won." The court held that since he was not eligible to be a candidate,
he was not an "unsuccessful candidate" with standing to attack the
results.
In an advisory opinion rendered in 1970,288 the justices interpreted
the resign-to-run law to mean that surrender of the resigned office takes
effect simultaneously with the election of the successor in the general
election; therefore no vacancy occurs in the office and the Governor does
not have occasion to use his appointive power to fill a vacancy. 89
Since the constitution lists resignation as one of the occurrences creating
a vacancy,29 this advisory opinion implies that resignation takes place
on the effective date when the incumbent leaves his office, not on the
date he announces his decision.
In State ex rel. Cherry v. Stone,29' a district court of appeal held that
the Secretary of State had no duty to conduct an independent inquiry
into the qualifications of candidates. The court therefore declined to issue
mandamus to require the Secretary to ascertain whether a candidate had
complied with the resign-to-run law. The same court, in Eastmore v.
Stone,29 2 pointed out that the Cherry rule applied only to latent defects
in the candidate's qualifications. If, instead, patent defects appeared on
the face of the papers, the Secretary was bound to disqualify the candidate.
C. Filing Fees
In Fair v. Taylor,9 8 a three-judge federal district court found un-
constitutional Florida statutes29 4 imposing a filing fee, amounting to five
percent of the annual salary of the office sought. The filing fee provisions
were deemed to be reasonable in amount if applied uniformly as a
means of regulating the ballot; however, the court ruled that the state
must provide an alternative method of obtaining a place on the ballot
that does not involve the payment of a substantial sum of money to the
state, so that the filing fee does not exclude candidates who are unable
to pay it.
The court formulated a method which would satisfy constitutional
standards, to be invoked by candidates until the Florida legislature
determined another method. The court's formula requires a candidate
either to pay the filing fee or to file an affidavit that he cannot pay it
without imposing an undue burden on his personal resources. After filing
the affidavit, petitions may be circulated on behalf of the candidate, and
288. Advisory Opinion to Governor, 239 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1970).
289. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(f).
290. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 3.
291. 265 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
292. 265 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
293. 359 F Supp. 304 (M. D. Fla. 1973).
294. FLA. STAT. §§ 99.061, .092, 105.031 (1973).
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his name shall be placed upon the ballot if petitions are filed with the
requisite number of signatures, as follows: candidates for statewide office
require 10,000 signatures; candidates for any federal, state or county
office elected on less than a statewide basis require petitions signed by
one percent of the population of the elective district, but not less than
100 nor more than 3,000 signatures.
D. Qualifications of Electors
Article VI, section 3 requires each person making application for
registration as an elector to take the following oath: "I do solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Florida, and that I am qualified
to register as an elector under the Constitution and laws of the State of
Florida." A statute repeats the oath verbatim in context of laws regu-
lating voter registration. 29 5 In Fields v. Askew, 298 the supreme court
sustained the validity of the oath, noting that the United States Supreme
Court had sustained similar oaths for public employees in recent cases297
which were "sufficiently analogous to control."
Beacham v. Braterman,298 a federal district court decision, sustained
the validity of article VI, section 4, which disqualifies any person con-
victed of a felony from voting or holding office until restoration of civil
rights.
In Hinnant v. Sebesta,299 a federal court invalidated the Florida
statute300 imposing a sixty-day residency requirement on electors. An
opinion of the Attorney Generals'0 ruled, subsequently, that regardless
of the fate of voter residency statutes, Florida could continue, by statute,
to require candidates for judicial office to have been registered to vote
in the state in the last preceding general election. There is no absolute
connection, in the Attorney General's view, between qualification of
voters and qualification for elective office. Andrews v. Lindens02 held that
a city charter may permit nonresident property owners to participate in
city elections.
E. Minority Political Parties
Beller v. Adamss08 involved a Florida statute"°4 which provided that
only "recognized" political parties, with more than five percent of the
295. FIA. STAT. § 97.051 (1973).
296. 279 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1973).
297. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971).
298. 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
299. 363 F. Supp. 398 (M. D. Fla. 1973).
300. FLA. STAT. § 97.041 (1973).
301. Op. ATTY. GEN. FLA. 072-257 (Aug. 10, 1972).
302. 284 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
303. 235 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1970).
304. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(14) (1973).
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registered electors of the state, could place a party candidate on the ballot.
The supreme court upheld the five percent provision, but permitted plain-
tiff to satisfy it by filing a petition signed by five percent of the registered
electors of the state. Following the decision, statutes were enacted, 80
requiring signatures of three percent of the registered electors to place
minority party candidates on ballots for statewide offices and five percent
on ballots for less than statewide offices. The new statute was upheld in
a three-judge federal court, which was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court. 06
F. Presidential Primary Elections
The Florida Presidential Preference Primary Law0 7 provides for
selection of candidates for ballot inclusion by a Presidential Candidate
Selection Committee composed of the Secretary of State, Speaker of the
House, President of the Senate, minority leaders of both House and
Senate, and chairmen of the two major political parties. In Quinn v.
Stone,808 the supreme court held this system did not violate equal protec-
tion or free speech because there must be some type of control of the
ballot and these were reasonable procedures.
Yorty v. Stone309 involved withdrawal of a name selected for the
ballot by the committee. Mayor Yorty was an announced "national"
presidential candidate, but he did not want his name to appear on the
Florida preference primary ballot. The supreme court sustained the valid-
ity of the statutory requirement810 that he must either leave his name on
the ballot or declare himself not to be a presidential candidate. The court
held this statute was a reasonable exercise of the police power and not
a denial of equal protection, due process, or the candidate's right of
privacy.
G. Municipal Recall Elections
The 1885 constitution, in the Dade County Home Rule Amendment,
recited that the charter "[s]hall provide a method of recall of any com-
missioner .... ,,311 The charter implemented this requirement by pro-
viding that, after one year in office, "[a]ny member of the Board of
Commissioners ... may be removed in a recall election on the petition"
of a percentage of the voters.8 " The schedule to the 1968 revision of ar-
305. FLA. STAT. §§ 101.261-62 (1973).
306. Beller v. Kirk, 328 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem. sub nom., Beller v.
Askew, 403 U.S. 925 (1972).
307. FLA. STAT. § 103.101 (1973).
308. 259 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1972) .
309. 259 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972).
310. FLA. STAT. § 103.101 (1973).
311. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11(1) (i) (1885).
312. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY HomE RuLE CHARTER, § 7.02 (1957).
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ticle VIII states that all provisions of the Dade County charter adopted
under the old constitution continue as valid.313
In Gordon v. Leatherman,314 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a county commissioner had a property right in his office which could
not be taken away except by due process of law. But, continued the court,
a recall petition executed pursuant to the home rule charter satisfied the
requirements of due process even though no notice of the reasons was
given, since no such notice was required by the charter.
In Lalor v. Dade County,"' a district court of appeal refused to en-
join a recall election. The plaintiffs alleged that the compilation of
petitions was erroneous and that enough signatures were not collected.
The court refused to interfere with the political process unless it were
shown to be clearly without basis in law.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS
A. Declaration of Rights3 10
1. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 17
Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod,18 challenged the
exemption from property taxes which had been granted to homes for the
aged owned by religious organizations and operated primarily for reli-
gious purposes. The supreme court sustained the tax exemption and
observed: "A state cannot pass a law to aid one religion or all religions,
but state action to promote the general welfare of society, apart from any
religious considerations, is valid, even though religious interests may be
indirectly benefited.) 319
2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS AND ASSEMBLY
320
Lieberman v. Marshall321 arose out of an attempt to conduct a rally
of Students for a Democratic Society on the campus of Florida State
University. Upon petition of the University president, the circuit court
issued an injunction ex parte, forbidding members of SDS from holding
a rally or sponsoring a speaker in any building on campus; the injunction
did not forbid the use of campus grounds. Later the same day, the order
was served on members of SDS as they were starting to occupy a campus
building where they had scheduled a rally. Students who did not leave
313. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e).
314. 450 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1971).
315. 258 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
316. Due process and equal protection are discussed in subsections C and D infra.
317. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
318. 239 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1970).
319. 239 So. 2d at 261. This holding derived from the decision in Walz v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
320. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5.
321. 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970), noted in 25 U. MiAMI L. REv. 515 (1971).
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immediately upon the reading of the court order were arrested and cited
for contempt. The supreme court held that the injunction was properly
issued
to prevent the occupation of a portion of a campus building, by
a student organization whose denial of recognition has not been
shown to be invalid, to hear a speaker whom the university nei-
ther approved nor disapproved, in circumstances which reveal
calculated and deliberate efforts to publicly confront, embarrass,
defy and challenge the university in the enforcement of its reg-
ulations. 2
Although the court relied heavily upon the fact that SDS had been denied
recognition as a campus organization, it did not discuss the circumstances
surrounding the denial or the standards, if any, which would apply if the
denial were subjected to judicial review.323
Another free speech case124 arose out of a political rally in Talla-
hassee in support of the presidential candidacy of Alabama Governor
George Wallace. An area outside the rented stadium was reserved for
protesters. However, petitioner entered the stadium itself and then un-
rolled a sign he had been carrying, which bore the legend, "Racism is
Destroying my Country." He was ushered out, attempted to return, and
was eventually arrested, charged and convicted of "disturbing the peace."
The district court of appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that while
petitioner had every right to display his sign in the area outside the
stadium reserved for demonstrators, he had no right to interfere with the
exercise of first amendment rights by the persons who reserved the sta-
dium for their meeting. "Petitioner's contention that he can speak while
another citizen already has the floor can only serve to diminish the
right of both to the unfettered exercise of constitutional freedoms."32
Of course obscene speech is not constitutionally protected. Decisional
conflict persisted for a number of years between the Florida courts. and
the lower federal courts in Florida as to the definition of obscenity. 26
This conflict may have been resolved by the 1973 United States Supreme
Court decisions in Miller v. California32' 7 and companion cases.
In Rhodes v. State, 28 decided after Miller on the basis of facts
occurring before Miller, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the
322. 236 So. 2d at 130.
323. In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) the Supreme Court held that the burden rests
upon a university or college to show that recognition of the organization would pose a sub-
stantial threat to the educational process; mere disagreement with the philosophy of the
organization is not sufficient.
324. Carlson v. City of Tallahassee, 240 So. 2d 866 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970), cert. denied,
244 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1971).
325. 240 So. 2d at 868.
326. See, e.g., Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Fla 1970), vacated, 413 U.S.
902 (1973) for reconsideration in light of Miller v California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
327. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
328. 283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973).
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pre-Miller tests must apply to the case at bar, and that the Miller test
would be adopted prospectively. Applying the pre-Miller test, the Florida
court sustained the validity of the applicable Florida obscenity statute, 29
and held that authoritative judicial interpretations of that statute had
been published before the offense in the case at bar, giving the defendants
adequate notice of the meaning of the statute. Rhodes also sustained the
validity of the seizure of the film on the basis of a warrant issued ex parte
by a circuit judge following his consideration of affidavits submitted by
grand jurors upon their collective viewing of the film.
In Davison v. State,30 on remand from the United States Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of Miller, the supreme court found the
Florida obscenity standard valid under the Miller test. Further, the Flor-
ida court ruled that "contemporary community standards" could be
applied by reference either to an entire state, as in Miller itself, or to a
smaller community; Alachua County was an appropriate community
from which to determine contemporary standards. Finally, the court sus-
tained the validity of the seizure of the film at the time of the arrest of
the theatre operator pursuant to a warrant.
The use of broad injunctions against the sale of obscene materials
was prohibited by the supreme court in Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub.811
The circuit court had permanently enjoined the owners and operators of
a bookstore from selling obscene or pornographic materials and from
further operation of their business in such a manner as to annoy the
community. The supreme court held that such a blanket injunction is
constitutionally invalid because it does not put the respondent on notice
as to what is prohibited, and thereby creates an unacceptable restraint
on his freedom to vend publications. A valid injunction would have to
name each publication involved and the evidence submitted to the trial
court in support of the injunction would have to include one copy of each
item sought to be suppressed, unless the defendant stipulated that the
exhibits were representative of the entire stock. The court reserved judg-
ment on the issue whether a nuisance theory might, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, be applicable to obscenity proceedings.
In Hoffman v. Carson,332 a go-go dancer was unsuccessful in her
attempt to obtain an injunction to restrain the sheriff from prosecuting
her for indecent exposure. She argued that her performance was protected
by the constitutional guarantee of free speech. The supreme court held
that her performance was conduct, not speech, nor even symbolic speech,
and therefore not protected by the constitution. But an Attorney General's
opinion rendered in 197 183 ruled that a stage performance that includes
a scene where members of the cast appear in the nude is not "obscene"
329. FLA. STAT. § 847.01 (1973).
330. 288 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1973).
331. 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971).
332. 250 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 981 (1971).
333. Op. ATTY. GEr. FLA. 071-329 (Oct. 12, 1971).
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unless, in addition to being nude, they engaged in "some lascivious, vul-
gar or indecent exhibition of their bodies."
In the June, 1974 decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,3 4 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court
of Florida and invalidated Florida's "right to reply" statute. 35 The
Court held that the statute violated the first amendment by imposing a
requirement upon newspapers that they publish a reply by any candidate
against certain types of criticism previously published in the newspaper.
A somewhat similar result had been reached by the district court of appeal
in Town of Lantana v. Pelczynski. 6 An ordinance prohibited publication
or circulation of any charge or attack against any candidate for election
during the seven days before the election, unless the charge or attack had
been personally served upon the candidate at least seven days before the
election. The court held the ordinance unconstitutional as a violation of
free speech under United States Supreme Court decisions, even if not
under Supreme Court of Florida decisions.
In Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp.,"' a district court of
appeal held that a candidate for the city commission could not recover
in an action for libel against a newspaper which had published paid adver-
tisements shortly before the primary and run-off elections, charging he
was an un-American with pro-Castro Communist allegiance.
3. RIGHT TO WORK
The 1968 constitution repeats the right to work provision and adds
that public employees shall not have the right to strike.888 Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Ass'n. v. Ryan383 held that with the exception of the
right to strike, public employees have the same rights of collective bar-
gaining as are granted to private employees. The collective bargaining
rights of public employees were emphasized in Bassett v. Braddock,40
in which the court held that the Sunshine Law8 4' was not violated where
preliminary contact with a teacher representative was in private; to
require such contacts to be public, said the court, would destroy mean-
ingful collective bargaining which is guaranteed to public employees by
the constitution.
In Classroom Teachers' Ass'n. v. Legislature,8 42 plaintiffs brought a
class action to compel the legislature to enact standards on collective
bargaining by public employees in order to implement guarantees con-
334. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974), reversing 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973). The Florida decision is
noted in 28 U. Mmm L. REv. 219 (1973).
335. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973).
336. 290 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
337. 293 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
338. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
339. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
340. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
341. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1973).
342. 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
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tained in the right to work provision. The petition was denied as prema-
ture. However, the supreme court declared itself ready to establish
guidelines by judicial decree unless the legislature acts on the matter
within a reasonable time.
4. IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS843
In Ryan v. Ryan, 44 the supreme court sustained the validity of
Florida's new no-fault divorce law8 43 against a number of challenges. One
challenge asserted that the law amounted to an impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts, since the law applied to preexisting marriage "contracts"
and had the effect of reducing the opportunities for alimony available to
parties who had entered into marriage before enactment of the law, and
who might obtain divorces subsequent to its enactment. The court held
that potential alimony is not a property right and is therefore not pro-
tected by the prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts
which was repeated in the 1885 and 1968 constitutions.
Goodfriend v. Druck346 interpreted Florida's usury statutes 47 in
context of the rule against impairment of the obligation of contracts. A
promissory note was issued in 1962, guaranteed by Goodfriend individ-
ually, bearing interest at ten percent until maturity in 1966, and "deferred
interest" at fifteen percent from maturity until date of payment. These
interest rates were allowable as charges against an individual guarantor
under the usury statute in effect when the note was issued in 1962. By
statutory amendment in 1965, however, the maximum interest rate charge-
able against individual guarantors was reduced to ten percent. Subse-
quently the promissor defaulted and the lower courts ruled that the guar-
antor must pay deferred interest at the rate of fifteen percent, on the
theory that the non-impairment of contracts rule prevented the 1965
statute from affecting the terms of the 1962 note. The supreme court re-
versed and ordered deferred interest to be paid at ten percent, the max-
imum rate allowable by the 1965 statute, which remained in effect
throughout the litigation. The court held that the pre-1965 usury statute
had created no vested right to interest and, therefore, the 1965 statute
controlled the courts as the latest expression of the legislative will. The
court placed substantial reliance upon its 1972 decision in Wilensky v.
Fields,848 which had reached a similar result. Neither Goodfriend nor
Wilensky reached the question whether a supervening amendment to the
usury statute could effect a forfeiture of the principal as well as the inter-
est of a usurious loan, but both cases imply that a forefeiture of the
principal would violate the non-impairment of contracts rule.
343. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
344. 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973).
345. FLA. STAT. § 61.001 et seq. (1973).
346. 289 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1974).
347. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.03, .071, .11(1) (1973).
348. 267 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
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In Castellano v. Cosgrove,849 a statute enacted after the creation of
a trust account required that trusts as to which the settlor is sole trustee
be executed in accordance with the formalities required for the execution
of wills. The supreme court held that this statute could only apply pro-
spectively, because an attempt at retroactive application would be uncon-
stitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
In Morton v. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp.,8 50 a district court of appeal
applied the non-impairment of contracts rule as a test for reviewing a
circuit court order on appeal. The circuit court had relieved the plaintiff
of his obligation to pay interest as provided under a note and mortgage
and had enjoined the holders thereof from enforcing their rights. The
district court reversed this order as a judicial impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts and a taking of property without due process of law,
in violation of the Florida and Federal Constitutions.
In Schine Enterprises, Inc. v. Askew,8 51 a business corporation had,
in 1952, entered into a contract with Florida Inland Navigation District,
a state agency created by statute. The contract provided that when the
District received a bona fide offer to purchase a certain parcel of property
"at a price and upon terms satisfactory to it," the District would notify
the corporation, which would have "the first and exclusive option for
30 days to purchase the property from the [District] at the same price
and on the same terms offered to the [District]." In 1964 the District
solicited bids for the property but none were deemed satisfactory. In
1965 the legislature enacted a statute requiring the District to convey the
property, without consideration, to the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Fund for outdoor recreation and conservation purposes. In 1966
the District entered into a 99-year "dedication agreement" with the
Trustees for one dollar, reciting the requirements of the 1965 statute and
also declaring the dedication to be subject to the "option agreement" with
the business corporation. The district court of appeal held that the cor-
poration had not suffered an impairment of the obligation of contracts, nor
had its property been taken without due process of law. The court held
that the corporation's interest was properly characterized as a "right to
first refusal," which could only be triggered if the District received a
satisfactory bona fide offer. Since this event had not taken place, the cor-
poration could not complain. Further, the court held that the "dedication
agreement" between the District and the Trustees was not a conveyance but
was rather an "intra-entity transfer" of the use of the property. The prop-
erty was not conveyed out of governmental ownership into private owner-
ship. "We know of no prohibition against the transfer of property from
one governmental agency to another so that the latter may put it to uses
which it is better able to administer.
8 52
349. 280 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1973).
350. 290 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
351. 291 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
352. Id. at 133.
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5. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The 1968 revision adds two significant provisions to the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure.8 53 The right is extended so as
to protect against "the unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions by any means," an obvious reference to wiretapping and bugging.
And the final sentence, newly added in 1968, declares: "Articles or infor-
mation obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible into
evidence."
This exclusionary rule is not, on its face, limited to criminal pro-
ceedings. It apparently applies to any kind of proceeding. In Markham
v. Markham,854 the supreme court held that tape recordings must be
excluded from divorce proceedings, when the husband had obtained the
recordings by tapping the telephone line of his house so as to record
conversations between his wife and a third party.
In Renbur Drugs, Inc. v. Board of Pharmacy, 3 5 a pharmacist sought
judicial review of the Board's revocation of his license. He asserted that
the Board's action was based upon evidence obtained by an illegal search
and seizure. The court found that the evidence had been obtained legally.
By looking into the legality of the search, the court implied that the out-
come of this inquiry could affect the outcome of the case. Thus this case,
like Markham v. Markam, supports the implication that the exclusionary
rule applies in non-criminal as well as criminal proceedings.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
Article I, section 18, added to the constitution as part of the 1968
revision, states: "No administrative agency shall impose a sentence of
imprisonment, nor shall it impose any other penalty except as provided
by law."
In 1968 large numbers of teachers "resigned" during a crisis in school
administration and funding. Eventually the school board agreed to re-
instate any teacher, provided he paid a $100 fine. A federal district
court,856 exercising pendent jurisdiction to decide a matter of state law,
ruled that the $100 fine was a "penalty" in violation of Article I, sec-
tion 18 and that Article I, section 18 restated prior Florida constitutional
case law. The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.857 The su-
preme court ruled that the fine was legally proper as liquidated damages
and was not a "penalty" within the meaning of Article I, section 18.358
353. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. See Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in
Noncriminal Proceedings, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 38 (1969).
354. 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), noted in 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 166 (1973).
355. 249 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
356. National Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instr., 299 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
357. 448 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1971).
358. National Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instr., 260 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1972).
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The Fifth Circuit accepted this statement of Florida law and reversed
the district court, finding no violation of federally guaranteed rights.85'
7. ACCESS TO COURTS
The 1968 Constitution preserves the guarantee, traceable to the
Magna Carta,860 that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial
or delay."361
Pre-1968 interpretations of this section were remarkable, 62 but no
more so than the four-to-three decision rendered by the supreme court
in 1973 in the case testing the no-fault insurance law.863 The statute 6 '
provided, in part, that the traditional right of action in tort for property
damage arising from an automobile accident was abolished, and that a
victim must look to property damage coverage with his own insurance
company, unless the victim had chosen not to purchase property damage
insurance and had suffered more than $550 property damage. The Court
ruled this portion of the statute unconstitutional as a denial of access
to the courts. The court declared:
We hold, therefore, that where a right of access to the courts
for redress of a particular injury has been provided by statutory
law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has be-
come part of the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat.§ 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power to abolish such
a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the
rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless
the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of
meeting such public necessity can be shown.36 5
B. Environmental Protection
Article II, section 7, a completely new provision in the 1968 constitu-
tion, states: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made
by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and
unnecessary noise." This policy statement could be used in various ways:
359. 467 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1972).
360. "To none will we sell, to none will we deny, or delay, right or justice." MAGNA
CARTA, § 40, found in 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. 6 (1970).
361. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
362. E.g., Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958); Smith v. Jackson County, 129
Fla. 787, 176 So. 858 (1937); Wilson v. O'Neal, 118 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
363. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
364. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1973).
365. 281 So. 2d at 4.
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as a means of protecting legislation against assertions that the legislature
has exceeded the proper scope of the police power; as a means of persuad-
ing legislators and other officials to exercise their discretion in favor of
the stated policy; and even as a means of compelling official action to
implement the policy. So far, however, the dramatic use of Article II,
section 7 has been made in eminent domain cases, and discussion of this
section will be postponed until a later heading of this survey dealing with
eminent domain.8 66
C. Substantive Due Process and the Police Power
Case law on substantive due process and the police power has not
been noticeably changed by the transition from the 1885 to the 1968
constitution. This continuity has resulted because the same due process
clause is repeated in both constitutions, 367 and because the notion of the
police power is rooted in unwritten constitutional doctrine developed
through judicial interpretation of the inherent powers of sovereign gov-
ernments.8 81 The courts often neglect to cite the due process clause of the
constitution, implying that their decisions do not depend upon any
specific constitutional language.
The familiar rule869 is that the state may legitimately exercise its
police power, provided the two requirements of substantive due process
are satisfied. First, the police power must be exercised for a permissible
purpose: promotion or protection of the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare. Second, the police power must be exercised reasonably.
The vagueness of these standards permits considerable leeway.
When the validity of a local government's exercise of police power
is under consideration, a threefold test can be applied: First, whether
this type of police power could be exercised by the state, under the doc-
trine of substantive due process; second, whether the state has conferred
sufficient authority upon the local government to enable it to exercise
this power; and third, whether the subject-matter has been preempted by
a higher government, either federal, state, or county. Some examples of
the exercise of the police power, such as the Fleetwood Hotel case, have
been given under the Local Government heading of this survey.8 70 Addi-
tional examples are included under the present heading, together with
cases involving the police power of the state itself.
366. See notes 485-93 infra and accompanying text.
367. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 12 (1885).
368. See State ex rel. Lanz v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, 110 So. 522 (1926); CASEBOOK,
supra note 7, at 755.
369. See generally CAsEBooK, supra note 7, at 755; 6 FLA. JuR. Constitutional Law
§ 157-72 (1956); Nachwalter, Substantive Due Process in Florida, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 99
(1966); Semet, Florida Constitutional Law, 1963-1964 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIA I
L. REv. 888 (1964).
370. See notes 247-59 supra and accompanying text.
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1. HEALTH
A statute87' enacted in 1941 prohibited the sale of "filled milk"
products, consisting of milk blended with non-milk fat. A 1967 statute872
continued the ban against "filled milk," but expressly permitted the sale
of "imitation milk," made entirely of synthetic products, so long as the
word "imitation" appeared on the label. A food distributor brought an
action to declare the 1941 statute unconstitutional.8713 Witnesses testified
that filled milk was more nutritious and digestible than any imitation
milk. The supreme court concluded that the public health could not
possibly be served by banning filled milk while permitting the less desir-
able imitation milk. The Court held the 1941 statute invalid, noting that
the 1967 revision of the statute permitting the sale of imitation milk
"removed the constitutional props out from under the filled milk pro-
vision.1 374
Borras v. State 75 sustained the validity of a statute8 7 which im-
posed criminal penalties for the possession of marijuana. The supreme
court, finding marijuana was a "harmful, mind-altering drug," held that
the police power of the state to protect public health could reasonably be
exercised as provided by the statute.
In State ex rel. Furman v. Searcy,877 the Brevard County Commis-
sion adopted a regulation, pursuant to general law, requiring applicants
for temporary septic tank permits to sign a standard agreement as a
precondition for the issuance of a permit. The agreement included an
undertaking by the applicant to pay his pro-rata share of the cost of any
future installation of a sewer system, as well as the regular charges for
service after connection to the system. In addition, the agreement in-
cluded an acknowledgment by the applicant that any future sewer instal-
lation would constitute an improvement to each lot in the subdivision.
The district court of appeal observed that similar acknowledgments have
been held as a waiver or estoppel, preventing the signer from challenging
the legality of future assessments. The court noted that the county may
impose reasonable regulations in the interests of public health, but
ruled that the terms of the agreement were unreasonable, and conse-
quently violated substantive due process.
2. SAFETY
State v. Eite3T 8 sustained the validity of a statute879 which required
motorcyclists to wear protective helmets while riding public highways;
371. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20496, § 3 (repealed 1971).
372. FLA. STAT. § 502.161 (1973).
373. Conner v. Cone, 235 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1970).
374. Id. at 498.
375. 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
376. FLA. STAT. ch. 398 (1973).
377. 225 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
378. 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969); accord, Cesin v. State, 288 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
379. FLA. STAT. § 316.108 (1973).
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the supreme court found that the statute was a reasonable safety measure.
In Carter v. Town of Palm Beach,80 the supreme court invalidated
a municipal ordinance which prohibited the operation of a surfboard
or skimmer upon any beach or in the surf adjacent to any beach within
the town limits. The court acknowledged the power of the municipality
to regulate and control these activities throughout the town and to pro-
hibit them at certain places along the beach. However, the court held
that the outright prohibition of these activities throughout the town was
arbitrary and unreasonable, since these activities do not constitute a
nuisance per se.
In Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad,88 the supreme court
sustained the validity of a statute88 2 which required the display of a
lighted fusee or other visual warning whenever a train is engaged in a
switching operation or otherwise blocks a street any time from one-half
hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise. The court interpreted
the statute as impliedly allowing a reasonable time to provide the lighting
after the train blocks the street and held the statute, as thus interpreted,
to be a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interests of public
safety.
3. GENERAL WELFARE
World Fair Freaks & Attractions, Inc. v. Hodges,8 ' involved a
criminal statute which prohibited the exhibition for pay or compensation
of any crippled or physically distorted, malformed or disfigured person
in any circus, side show or other place where an admission fee is charged.
The supreme court held the statute384 unconstitutional because of a lack
of any reasonable standards or definitions which could be followed in
enforcement. The court added an observation on the police power:
The validity of the statute as a regulation for the protection of
the public health, morals and welfare seems questionable in
light of the fact that the statute is hinged upon the charging
of admission. Apparently, there is no prohibition against exhibi-
tions without charge. 5
Newman v. Carson386 sustained the validity of a statute8 7 which
required the keeping of certain records by persons or firms regularly
buying and selling junk or secondhand goods. The supreme court found
that the statute was a reasonable means of preventing the sale of stolen
380. 237 So. 2d 130 (Fa. 1970).
381. 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974).
382. FLA. STAT. § 357.08 (1973).
383. 267 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1972).
384. FLA. STAT. § 867.01 (1973).
385. 267 So. 2d at 819.
386. 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1973).
387. FLA. STAT. § 811.165 (1973).
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merchandise and of increasing the possibility of returning such goods to
the rightful owners "in the interest of public welfare."
Florida Citrus Commission v. Hi-Acres Concentrates, Inc.,888 inval-
idated regulations of the Citrus Commission which required containers of
frozen citrus concentrate to have an "easy open" feature. The purpose of
the regulations was to improve the quality of containers used in the citrus
industry, thereby leading to increased sales and the promotion of the
general welfare of the citrus industry and of the state. The district court
of appeals acknowledged that the state's police power can properly be
exercised in a reasonable manner in the interests of the citrus industry,
but held that the "easy open" regulations were an unreasonable inter-
ference with matters which should be resolved in the free enterprise mar-
ketplace.
In Hill v. State,889 the supreme court upheld a statutory require-
ment"' ° included on the application form for a shrimping permit whereby
the applicant agrees to permit any agent of the State Board of Conserva-
tion to board the vessel at any time. The court interpreted the consent as
authorizing an agent to board the vessel for the limited purpose of deter-
mining whether the vessel carried the shrimping permit as required by
law, and as not authorizing any search or seizure of the contents of the
vessel. Other statutes, not at issue in this case, permit agents to board,
search and seize on the basis of warrants or probable cause. The court
held that the requirement on the application form, under the court's
limiting interpretation, constituted a reasonable exercise of the police
power.
Florida Real Estate Commission v. Windsor 9' invalidated a stat-
ute 92 which required attendance at a college or university located in Flor-
ida as a prerequisite to registration as a real estate salesman. The district
court of appeal held that this requirement bore no reasonable relationship
to public safety, health, morals or general welfare.
4. BUSINESSES AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
The courts have traditionally recognized that certain types of busi-
ness are "affected with a public interest." Examples include common
carriers, innkeepers, insurance, gambling, intoxicating beverages and bank-
ing. Regulation of a business affected with a public interest is strongly
presumed to be a reasonable exercise of the police power.893
Williams v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.894 sustained the
388. 227 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1970).
389. 238 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1970).
390. FLA. STAT. § 370.15(5)(a) (1973).
391. 284 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
392. FLA. STAT. § 475.17(4) (1973).
393. CASEBOOK, supra note 7, at 804.
394. 245 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1970).
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validity of a statute"' which imposed a 120-day moratorium on increases
in automobile insurance rates, so as to prevent increases until a special
session of the legislature could study the matter and establish statutory
guidelines to regulate the rates charged for such insurance. The supreme
court found that insurance is a business clearly affecting the public wel-
fare; that the fixing of reasonable rates at which insurance can be sold is
a proper exercise of the police power; and that the moratorium pending
legislative study was a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis,"9 6 the supreme court observed that the
Public Service Commission must set rates to be charged by public utilities
for their services at such a level as to assure a fair return, as a require-
ment of Florida and federal due process. The court held that the new
state income tax89 7 must be considered as an expense of doing business
and consequently as one of the factors in arriving at the rate needed to
provide a fair return, although the tax should not necessarily be passed
through, dollar for dollar, to the consumer.
D. Equal Protection
The 1968 revision of the constitution added a new provision to the
equal rights section:398 "No person shall be deprived of any right because
of race or religion." In other respects, the constitutional language re-
mains unchanged, and the case law follows traditional lines.
Florida Cities Water Co. v. Board of County Commissioners"9 held
that equal protection is not violated by laws which subject most utility
companies in the state to regulation by the Public Service Commission,
but which authorize Hillsborough County Commissioners to regulate the
rates of utilities within that county. Nor, held the court, is equal protec-
tion violated by the fact that, in exercising their respective jurisdictions,
the Public Service Commission and the Hillsborough County Commission
use different methods for computing the rate which may be charged by a
utility. The court observed: "A reasonable rate under both acts can only
be one which allows a fair net return on the investment. That different
methods are used in arriving at what is a reasonable rate does not con-
stitute a denial of equal protection of the law. '400
A marketing order under the Florida Celery and Sweet Corn Market-
ing Law401 was at issue in Joe Hatton, Inc. v. Conner. °2 The order ap-
plied only to producers in the sixteen southern counties of the state. One
producer in that area, covered by the order and therefore obliged to pay
395. F&. Laws 1970, ch. 70-989.
396. 289 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1974).
397. FLA. STAT. ch. 220 (1973).
398. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
399. 244 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1971).
400. Id. at 739.
401. FLA. STAT. § 573.17 (1973).
402. 240 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1970). The statute involved was FLA. STAT. § 573.17 (1969).
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an assessment and submit to regulation, complained that producers in the
Zellwood area were not covered by the order, and therefore were exempt
from payments and regulation, although they were benefited from the
advertising and other activities resulting from the order. The producer
claimed that the law, as applied in this instance, deprived him of due pro-
cess and equal protection. The court rejected this contention, finding that
the Zellwood area had its own conditions and growing seasons which
justified its exclusion from the marketing order, even though certain in-
cidental benefits resulting from the marketing order, such as advertising,
might "spillover" and benefit the Zellwood producers.
In Hall v. King, °8 the supreme court held unconstitutional a statute
which provided for the revocation of the license of a real estate broker if
he became a nonresident of the state. Citing federal decisions, the court
held: "Unless there is a reasonable, compelling, state interest justifying
the residency requirement, it cannot be upheld for it clearly has a chilling
effect on Florida real estate brokers who might wish to reside in another
state. 4 °4 In rejecting the Real Estate Commission's argument that the
residency requirement was justified in order to facilitate the disciplining
and policing of brokers, the court stated: "The Florida Bar has numerous
nonresident members and it has not suffered disciplinary hardships." 40 5
But in Caizza v. Caizza,40 6 the supreme court sustained the statute4
0 7
which imposes a six-month residency requirement upon parties seeking
a divorce in Florida. The court found the requirement justified by the
compelling state interest in requiring a provable durational resi-
dency so that Florida may avoid intrusion upon the rights and
interest of a sister state that might otherwise be paramount
while still insuring the integrity of its judicial decrees as against
future collateral attack in distant courts.408
In Selby v. Bullock,40 9 a motorist was injured when his car collided
with cattle on a highway at night. The statute required the victim to
prove, in order to recover in such cases, that the owner of the cattle had
intentionally or negligently permitted his cattle to stray on the highway.
The victim argued that this statute denied him equal protection since vic-
tims of injuries caused by dogs can hold the owners strictly liable without
the need to prove intent or negligence. The supreme court noted that the
same statute which required the victim to prove the intent or negligence
of the cattle owner also required the cattle owner to fence his cattle off
the highway. These two requirements, in combination, were held to con-
403. 266 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1972).
404. Id. at 34.
405. Id.
406. 291 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1974).
407. FrA. STAT. § 61.021 (1973).
408. 291 So. 2d at 571.
409. 287 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1974).
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stitute a reasonable classification, consistent with the requirements of
equal protection. In an instructive passage, the court stated:
To require fencing by the livestock owner and, in addition
thereto, hold him strictly liable would place an impossible bur-
den on the livestock industry. Those in the livestock industry
would become virtual insurers, and this would retard and dimin-
ish stock raising as an important part of Florida agri-business.
A key question is whether a fencing requirement or strict liabil-
ity will have the greatest effect on protecting the motoring pub-
lic by keeping cows off the highway. The answer appears clear.
Cows know little of strict liability but do respect barbed wire.
... To keep livestock off the highway requires fencing. To re-
quire fencing, there must be incentive to the livestock owner.
The incentive is civil responsibility only for damage caused by
his negligence or his intent.410
The court did not demonstrate the source of its finding that cattle owners
could be persuaded to fence their cattle only by an incentive which re-
duced the victim's chances of recovery in a tort action. This finding is
especially troublesome since the fencing statute contains criminal pen-
alties which the court by implication found ineffective as a means of pro-
curing compliance. If these matters are henceforth to become factors in
resolving equal protection problems, the court would render an invaluable
service by indicating how it determined, for example, that the criminal
statute was ineffective, and that the public interest justified an incentive
via the law of torts.
In Castlewood International Corp. v. Wynne4l1 the supreme court
invalidated, on equal protection grounds, a statute which required all
sales of beer and wine to retail licensees to be for cash, while hard liquor
sales could be on 10 days' credit. The court noted the tendency, in recent
federal and state decisions, to hold the government to constitutional stan-
dards of due process and equal protection, even when regulating types of
activity which were traditionally regarded as possessing marginal social
utility, and which were consequently permitted, if at all, as privileges
granted by the state on whatever terms the legislature might impose.
Thus the court held that the beer industry, like any other, was entitled to
equal protection, and could not be subjected to unreasonable classifi-
cations.
E. Zoning
Zoning is a special type of exercise of the police power.41 2 It is sub-
ject to the general doctrines of substantive due process and equal protec-
tion and the decisions of zoning authorities are presumed correct, as are
410. 287 So. 2d at 21-22.
411. 294 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974).
412. CASEBOOK, supra note 7, at 814.
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the decisions of other official agencies. However, the presumption in favor
of the validity of zoning decisions is expressed by a special formula, sug-
gesting that non-zoning cases should be used as precedent only with ex-
treme caution. The traditional formula, reaffirmed in 1972 in Renard v.
Dade County,413 is that the reviewing court must sustain a zoning ordi-
nance which is "fairly debatable." This formula, uninformative on its
face, is a useful means of evoking the case law applicable to zoning and of
separating this case law from police power cases in non-zoning matters.
The Renard case made important clarifications regarding standing
to sue in zoning cases. The court dealt separately with standing in three
types of situations. First, in order to have standing to enforce a valid
zoning ordinance, a plaintiff must allege special damages, peculiar to him-
self, different from those suffered by the community as a whole. 14
However the court noted that changed conditions, including increased pop-
ulation growth and density, require this rule to be applied more leniently
than it had been applied in the leading case of Boucher v. Novotny415 in
1958. Second, a plaintiff challenging a validly enacted zoning ordinance
as being an unreasonable exercise of the legislative power, under the
"fairly debatable" test, must show a "legally recognizable interest, which
is adversely affected by the proposed zoning action .... 1  Third, "[a] ny
affected resident, citizen or property owner of the government unit in
question" has standing to challenge a zoning ordinance which is al-
legedly void because not properly enacted. 17
Even if a plaintiff has standing under Renard, judicial relief may
still be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district
court of appeal in Medical Arts, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh"8 restated the rule:
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit to
challenge a specific provision of a zoning ordinance as it affects his par-
ticular property, but not to challenge the constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance in its entirety. The court also held that the estoppel doctrine,
which has been invoked against local governments in a number of recent
cases, 41 can also be invoked against other parties. In this case, adjacent
property owners brought suit to challenge a zoning ordinance, but only
after the owner had invested substantial sums in construction. The court
held that the plaintiffs should be estopped from bringing suit since they
had sat back and failed to object while the owner was proceeding with
construction.
In City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel, Inc.,420 the district
413. 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Renard].
414. Id. at 837.
415. 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958).
416. 261 So. 2d at 828.
417. Id.
418. 293 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
419. See notes 420-22 infra and accompanying text.
420. 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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court of appeal expressed the rule regarding estoppel in zoning cases as
follows:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to a local gov-
ernment exercising its zoning power when a property owner (1)
in good faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government
(3) has made such a substantial change in position or has in-
curred such extensive obligations that it would be highly inequi-
table and unjust to destroy the right he acquired.42'
The court further held that the mere possession of a building permit does
not create a vested property right; such a right arises where the owner
possesses a permit and where the circumstances giving rise to equitable
estoppel exist. In this case, however, the owner had acquired a vested
property right in the existing zoning, but had relinquished that right by
voluntarily surrendering the building permit.
In City of North Miami v. Margulies,422 the owner of property was
issued a conditional use permit pursuant to the zoning ordinance which
provided that when the conditions of such a permit were fulfilled, a build-
ing permit would issue. However, upon fulfilling all the conditions of the
conditional permit, at considerable expense, the owner was denied a build-
ing permit, apparently because the policy of the city council had changed
as the result of an election occurring in the interim. The court held that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be invoked and ordered the city
to issue the building permit.
Metropolitan Dade County v. McGeary4 3 restates the familiar rule
that a court has jurisdiction to set aside a zoning ordinance, but not to
write a new one, since the latter is a legislative matter.
Two recent decisions involve the distinction between governmental
and non-governmental parties to zoning. Jefferson National Bank v. City
of Miami Beach 24 held that a zoning ordinance which permits a city but
not a private citizen to operate a parking lot on a parcel within a district
zoned residential is valid and does not deny equal protection. Metropoli-
tan Dade County v. Parkway Towers Condominium Ass'n4 25 held that a
county may build a governmental facility (in this case, a jail) without
regard to the county's own zoning.
F. Administrative Due Process
The Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA)426 provides sig-
nificant procedural safeguards for parties in some types of relationship
421. Id. at 869.
422. 289 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
423. 291 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
424. 267 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
425. 281 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
426. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1973), revised, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-310. During the writing
of this survey, Florida enacted a new Administrative Procedure Act, one section of which
becomes effective October 1, 1974, the remainder January 1, 1975. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-310.
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with state administrative agencies. Bay National Bank and Trust Co. v.
Dickinson4 27 warns that not all relationships were covered by the APA.
The case involved the function of the state's Comptroller, as State Com-
missioner of Banking, in deciding whether or not to issue certificates of
authority to transact the business of banking. The Comptroller issued a
certificate to an applicant, after investigation, but without first conducting
a public hearing. An objector, who operated an existing bank near the
site of the newly authorized bank, sought a declaratory judgment that the
Comptroller should have conducted a public hearing in order that inter-
ested parties could appear, offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and
otherwise engage in adversary proceedings on the merits of the applica-
tion. The district court of appeal denied relief, holding that the function
at issue was "quasi-executive or quasi-legislative in which legal rights,
duties, privileges, or immunities are not the subject of adjudication. 42 8
The agency action, therefore, did not necessitate a public hearing under
Florida Statutes section 120.22 (APA).429 The court held, further, that no
constitutional right of the objector was violated by the Comptroller's
failure to provide a prior public hearing.
The Bay National Bank case, recently cited with approval by the
supreme court,480 permits the Comptroller to issue "certificates" which,
for all practical purposes, are licenses to engage in the banking business,
without providing an opportunity for a public hearing. Few functions of
state government are more readily subject to favoritism, arbitrariness and
even corruption. If this sensitive function can be carried out without a
public hearing, other agencies may understandably seek to characterize
their own functions as "quasi-executive" or "quasi-legislative." The 1974
revision of the APA significantly expands coverage, and supersedes the
holding of Bay National Bank.411
Even in cases admittedly governed by the APA, the Florida courts
have compiled an uneven record. In Mack v. State Board of Dentistry,432
While a full discussion of the Act is beyond the scope of this survey it is appropriate to note
here that the new Act may significantly extend the right to a public hearing before a state
agency. Section 1 of the Act (FLA. STAT. § 120.57) provides for a formal hearing "in all
proceedings in which substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency" (em-
phasis added). This language appears broader than the provision in FLA. STAT. § 120.22
(1973) that "[any party's legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities shall be determined
only upon public hearings by an agency.. ." (emphasis added). It is suggested that the new
requirement of a formal hearing wherever agency action affects "substantial interests" of a
party was intended to overrule the decision in Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 229 So. 2d 302
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (discussed in text accompanying notes 427-31 infra).
427. 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
428. Id. at 306.
429. See note 426 supra.
430. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dickinson, 282 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1973). See
also, Yonge v. Askew, 293 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
431. The accompanying text is based upon statements made by various officials at public
meetings of the Florida Law Revision Council during the drafting of the revision of the
Administrative Procedure Act, during 1973 and 1974. This subject will be further explored in
another article by the present author, to appear in a future issue of this Review.
432. 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 960 (1971).
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings by the Board, although a Florida district court of appeal had
denied relief on the same record.483 The Fifth Circuit declared:
[T]his was not a hearing. It was an ungoverned confrontation.
We hold that Dr. Mack, as a matter of fact, has not had a hear-
ing in that sense required of anything which claims to be an ad-
ministrative hearing as known to the jurisprudence of this
Country.434
Concern for the client of th6 administrative agency was demonstrated
by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Dubin v. Department
of Business Regulation.485 The Board had refused to issue the annual re-
newal of a horse trainer's license. At the administrative hearing, the
Board took the position that the licensee had the burden of making a new
demonstration of his qualifications in order to qualify for each annual
renewal of the license. The court rejected this view and reaffirmed the
case law holding that, once a license has been issued, the annual renewal
must follow as a ministerial duty; if the Board proposes to discontinue
the license, the Board must initiate revocation proceedings, in which the
Board bears the burden of proving grounds for revocation.
In State ex rel. Vining v. Real Estate Commission,488 the supreme
court held that the constitutional right to remain silent extends to license
revocation proceedings. Along similar lines, in Lurie v. State Board of
Dentistry,43 7 the supreme court held that a statute438 which grants im-
munity from prosecution or from "any penalty or forfeiture" is not
limited to criminal matters, but also protects against administrative pro-
ceedings for revocation of a professional license. This decision expressly
overrules the contrary holding in Headley v. Baron.43 9
Gentry v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regula-
tions,44° reversed a disciplinary order which the Board had issued against
a physician. The court held the order invalid because it did not recite
specific findings of fact as required by due process and equal protection.
Upon remand,44' the Board made findings that the physician had diag-
nosed seven patients as suffering from gonorrhea and had treated them
for that condition, and that subsequent diagnoses by other physicians re-
vealed that the patients did not have the disease. On the basis of these
findings, the Board placed the physician's license in probationary status
433. Mack v. Pepper, 192 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 551
(Fla. 1972).
434. 430 F.2d at 864.
435. 262 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
436. 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973); accord Kozerowitz v. Florida Real Estate Comm.,
298 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974).
437. 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1974).
438. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1973).
439. 228 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1969).
440. 283 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
441. 293 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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for two years, with the requirement that she personally report to each
semi-annual meeting of the board to give a progress report. The court in-
terpreted the Medical Practices Act4 42 as precluding the imposition of any
disciplinary sanctions against a physician who makes an honest but in-
correct diagnosis, although a patient might hold the physician civilly
liable in such a case. The court therefore quashed the Board's order. It
is submitted that this decision pays altogether too much deference to the
interests of the dangerously negligent physician and altogether too little
deference to the expertise of the Board in fashioning a remedy designed
to protect the public interest.
In Pauline v. Borer,443 the supreme court held that in the circum-
stances of the case, agency action in suspending a real estate broker's
license was too "harsh and unusual." A public reprimand was the appro-
priate penalty, and the court remanded to the agency for modification of
the penalty. The constitutional basis for the court's decision was appar-
ently article I, section 17, which prohibits "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or un-
usual punishment ...."
In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Mobile America
Corp.,4 44 the supreme court ruled that the circuit court rather than the
Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over a claim for money dam-
ages filed by a consumer against a utility company. The circuit court may,
in its discretion, refer questions to the Public Service Commission for a
non-binding determination as to whether the defendant utility company
has complied with statutory standards for the rendition of service to its
consumers.
Procedural due process rights of prisoners have become a matter of
increasing concern. The lower federal courts have assumed leadership
in this area445 which could have been, and arguably should have been,
brought within the reach of constitutional due process by the Florida
courts. The 1974 revision of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act
is worded with sufficient breadth to include the disciplining of prisoners
and the administration of the parole and probation systems,446 and the
Act should therefore effectuate significant reforms in these areas.
G. Due Process in "Quasi-Public" and "State Action" Contexts
Some recent cases demonstrate that the due process guarantee can
apply not only to governmental actions, but also to certain types of "quasi-
public" or "state action" situations. In McCune v. Wilson,4 47 the su-
preme court reviewed disciplinary proceedings instituted by a voluntary
442. FLA. STAT. § 458.1201 (1973).
443. 274 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
444. 291 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1974).
445. See, e.g., Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
446. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(1)(b), (2), (8); 120.57, included in Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-
310, § 1 (1974 revision of Florida Administrative Procedure Act).
447. 237 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter referred to as McCune].
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association of real estate appraisers against one of its members, without
adequate notice or opportunity for a fair hearing. The court noted :448
Professional organizations, although voluntary in nature, often
attain a quasi-public significance. In public view, membership
in such organizations may appear to be a tangible demonstra-
tion of professional competence and skill, professional respon-
sibility, and acceptance by one's professional peers. The fact
that an individual member expelled from membership may not
be prohibited from practicing his chosen occupation or profes-
sion is not a sufficient test to determine whether he needs and is
entitled to judicial protection from unfair proceedings or arbi-
trary actions. When a voluntary association achieves this quasi-
public status, due process considerations come into play.
The court found that the association of real estate appraisers was indeed
a quasi-public organization and therefore had to conduct fair proceed-
ings before a member could be expelled or disciplined.
In Lee v. High School Activities Association, Inc.,441 a high school
student complained about his exclusion from interscholastic athletic ac-
tivities by the association, a non-profit entity, the members of which were
the principals of almost every public and private high school in the state.
The court found that the association had
the exclusive authority and responsibility for supervising and
controlling all phases of interscholastic athletics in both the pub-
lic and private high schools in the State of Florida. Hence, the
conduct of the affairs of FHSAA undoubtedly is state action in
the constitutional sense. 50
The court held that the association must provide procedural due process
and must exercise its functions in a reasonable manner. This decision
cites McCune and numerous United States Supreme Court decisions in
support of its result, but the Lee court uses the term "state action," found
in the fourteenth amendment, United States Constitution, rather than the
term "quasi-public" which was used in McCune. The choice between
these two terms may be significant, since their meaning is not identical.
"State action" is apparently that which triggers fourteenth amendment
due process, whereas "quasi-public" entities may be required to respect
the due process clause of the Florida Constitution even if the federal
restraints do not apply to them.
In Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley,451 the supreme court held that
self-help repossession by a creditor does not constitute state action under
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and is there-
fore not controlled by Fuentes v. Shevin.452 The court did not discuss the
448. Id. at 172.
449. 291 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
450. Id. at 638.
451. 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
452. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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possible applicability of Florida constitutional due process which, as in-
dicated by McCune, can be required even where no state action is in-
volved. In Monyek v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc.,453 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, permitted a private hospital to deny a
physician the privilege of practicing at the hospital without a hearing or
statement of reasons, in apparent conflict with McCune insofar as a hos-
pital, by denying the privilege of practicing, gives a clear indication to
the public that the physician has failed to retain the acceptance of his
professional peers.
H. Clarity of Statutes and other Due Process Requirements
The familiar rule of criminal law that a statute is void if excessively
vague 454 has some analogies in non-criminal contexts.
A Florida statute authorized the forfeiture of the charter of a cor-
poration, as well as other sanctions, if any officer or controlling person en-
gaged in certain designated activities, or was connected directly or indi-
rectly with organizations, syndicates or criminal societies engaged in such
activities.455 In Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth,456 the supreme
court held the statute unconstitutional, as being "too vague, indefinite
and uncertain to constitute notice of the acts which may result in the for-
feiture of the charter of a corporation... ."
Another statute, however, was sustained against a vagueness chal-
lenge in Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell.457 The stat-
ute provided:
Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, or maintain, own or
lease ... any place where any law of the state is violated, shall
be deemed guilty of maintaining a nuisance, and the building,
erection, place, tent or booth and the furniture, fixtures and con-
tents are declared to be a nuisance. All such places or persons
shall be abated or enjoined...
This statute was invoked by the state attorney, who filed a complaint
seeking to abate a nuisance. The court implied that proceedings for an in-
junction to abate a nuisance could be supported by a less precisely worded
statute than would be needed for the imposition of criminal penalties. The
court found that the wording of the complaint was sufficiently clear to
give defendants reasonable notice, and that
[t]he statutes under attack are not so vague and indefinite as to
invade the constitutional rights of the defendants in the case sub
453. 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
454. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974).
455. FLA. STAT. § 932.58 (1973).
456. 251 So. 2d 849, 854 (Fla. 1971).
457. 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972).
458. FLA. STAT. § 823.05 (1973).
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judice, where the plaintiffs seek an injunction. If the injunction
does issue, it must be definite and certain." 9
The ultimate question, not discussed in the opinion, is whether the statute
gives sufficient guidelines to the courts to enable them to dispose properly
of requests for injunction. If the guidelines are insufficient, the statute
violates the separation of powers under the doctrine laid down in City of
Auburndale v. Adams Packing Ass'n,410 that a statute may permit a court
to determine whether conditions or circumstances prescribed by the legis-
lature have been met to bring the statute into play, but may not define
what these conditions or circumstances are.
In Billings v. City of Orlando,461 the supreme court sustained the
validity of a special act which required a mandatory contribution of five
percent of each police officer's salary, by payroll deduction each payday,
for deposit to a pension fund. If the officer is discharged or resigns prior
to becoming entitled to a pension, he shall forfeit one-half of his contribu-
tion and shall receive a refund of the other half. Citing case law from
other states, the court held that mandatory salary deductions for a public
employee pension fund do not give rise to private property right in the
fund monies until such time as the employee becomes eligible for the
pension. Further, held the court,
even if the sums in question were considered private property,
we are satisfied as to the necessity and reasonableness of the
procedure involved here, by which the 50% of contributions for-
feited, in effect "paid for" the various benefits which petitioners
received under the city's pension plan. No denial of due process
has been shown.6 2
Mackenzie v. Hillsborough County468 sustained the statute464 which
provides a maximum fee of $750 payable to court-appointed counsel in
criminal cases. The supreme court noted that a request to increase the
maximum fee should be addressed to the legislature rather than to the
judiciary.
I. Eminent Domain
The eminent domain section of the 1968 revision states: "No private
property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compen-
sation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of
the court and available to the owner."48 5 This provision replaces two
which appeared at separate places in the 1885 constitution.468 The single
459. 262 So. 2d at 884.
460. 171 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1965).
461. 287 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1973).
462. Id. at 320.
463. 288 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1974).
464. FLA. STAT. § 925.035 (1973).
465. FLA. CoNs'. art. X, § 6(a).
466. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 12; art. XVI, § 29 (1885).
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section on eminent domain in the 1968 constitution combines and restates
the two provisions which appeared in the 1885 constitution.4 17 Post-1968
case law appears to proceed on this assumption, and the 1968 eminent
domain section must therefore be interpreted in light of the prior cases
dealing with both of its predecessor provisions in the 1885 constitution.
Four topics continue to arise in litigation: (1) takings vs. regulations;
(2) inverse condemnation; (3) public purpose; and (4) amount of com-
pensation.
1. TAKINGS V. REGULATIONS
Cases continue to distinguish between takings and regulations. The
distinction makes sense only with the realization that the terms are not
given their usual meaning in this context, but instead are used for con-
clusory purposes: a "taking" is that which triggers the constitutional
right to compensation, and a "regulation" is a non-compensable inter-
ference by the government with the use of private property. The obvious
example of a taking is the acquisition of property through condemnation
proceedings by the state or a utility company.468 Another example of a
taking, to be discussed under the next heading, arises from a continuing
trespass when the doctrine of inverse condemnation recognizes a "taking
in fact." Other situations clearly involve non-compensable regulations. In
Mailman Development Corp. v. City of Hollywood,"9 the court held that
a zoning ordinance cannot be regarded as a taking. If the ordinance is un-
reasonable or arbitrary, the affected property owner may obtain a judicial
determination that the ordinance is invalid or unenforceable against him,
but the owner is not entitled to compensation on that account.
Some cases have implied that an exercise of the police power may be
regarded as a regulation if it goes into effect at a reasonable time and re-
mains in effect for a reasonable period of time, but will otherwise be re-
garded as a taking. In E. B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade
County,470 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a conclusion on
fourteenth amendment due process grounds, in harmony with the prior
rulings of the Florida courts on state constitutional grounds, 471 regarding
an ordinance which prohibited certain types of outdoor advertising within
a designated distance from expressways. The ordinance provided a five-
year phase-out period, during which pre-existing signs could remain on
display. The Fifth Circuit held that because of the reasonable phase-out
period, the owner was not entitled to compensation. The case implies
467. Legislative Reference Bureau, Analysis of Proposed 1968 Revision at 17 (1968);
D'Alemberte, Commentary on art. X, § 6(a), 26A FLA. STAT. ANN.
468. This example invokes the literal text of FLA. CoNsT. art. X § 6(a).
469. 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
470. 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970).
471. E.g., State ex rel. Boozer v. City of Miami, 193 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert.
denied, 201 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1967).
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that if advertising had been abruptly terminated without a reasonable
phase-out period, compensation would have been required.
A similar implication can be read into an opinion rendered in 1972
by the Attorney General,472 advising that the legislature may validly
authorize the cities and counties to adopt "interim" or "stopgap" ordi-
nances which place a moratorium on the development of certain areas for
a reasonable period of time, and that property owners affected by such
ordinances would not be entitled to compensation for the limitation on
the use of their property. The opinion implies that a moratorium for an
unreasonably long period of time would be regarded as a taking.
If property is intentionally destroyed as a nuisance, pursuant to a
regulatory program, the owner has no constitutional right to compensa-
tion, although the legislature may bestow such amounts of compensation
as it sees fit. In Conner v. Carlton,473 decided in 1969 under the 1885
constitution, the supreme court applied this principle to sustain the
validity of the program to control and prevent the spread of brucellosis, a
cattle disease. The statute and regulations required cattle owners to present
their cattle for tests conducted by the Commissioner of Agriculture to deter-
mine if the cattle were infected. Any cattle found to be infected were
required to be immediately branded with a distinctive mark, removed
from the herd, sold at public auction and slaughtered within fifteen days
after identification. The state was required to pay compensation on the
basis of an impartial appraisal, but in no event more than $12.50 per
animal slaughtered.
The Conner court distinguished the facts before it from the burrow-
ing nematode cases, 474 which involved the state's "pull-and-treat" pro-
gram to eradicate the spreading decline of citrus trees caused by the
burrowing nematode. In those cases the court noted that the nematode
traveled underground at an average rate of 36 feet per year and that
fruit borne by trees during the early stages of infestation was no different
from fruit on uninfested trees. In these circumstances the court held,
in effect, that infested trees should not be treated as nuisances. Conse-
queritly, an owner was entitled to a hearing before the destruction of
allegedly infested trees and was entitled to just compensation, computed
of course in light of the infestation. Similar principles applied, a fortiori,
to healthy trees which were ordered pulled in order to establish a cleared
zone to prevent further spread of the citrus decline. The court emphasized
that "the prohibition against the taking of private property 'without just
compensation' . is not limited to the taking of property under the right
of eminent domain. 475
472. Op. ATrTY. GEN. FLA. 072-15 (Jan. 12, 1972).
473. 223 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 272 (1969) [hereinafter
referred to as Connor].
474. State Plant Board v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Corneal v. State Plant
Board, 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
475. State Plant Board v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1959).
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In Conner, however, the court held that diseased animals posed a
more serious and immediate danger which entitled the legislature to in-
voke the nuisance doctrine. Thus summary action was authorized, and
the owner had no constitutional right to compensation. He could there-
fore not complain about the amount, if any, provided by statute.
Distinctive lines of cases have developed in connection with torts
committed against private property by governmental agencies or officers.
If the tort is likely to recur continually, under circumstances amounting
to a taking in fact, the doctrine of inverse condemnation can be invoked,
and the owner is entitled to compensation for the taking of his property.476
If, on the other hand, an isolated tort occurs, the owner is not entitled to
recover for a taking but he may be entitled to tort damages, unless suit
is barred by the sovereign immunity of the defendant.4 7
7
In Elliott v. Hernando County,47 the court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action in alleging that the defendant county had con-
structed an elevated road adjacent to plaintiffs' property, had failed to
provide for proper drainage of the natural flow of rain, and had thereby
subjected plaintiffs' property to flooding from rain, resulting in unsani-
tary and uninhabitable conditions. The court noted that the injury was
likely to recur whenever rain fell and therefore amounted to a taking
within the meaning of the eminent domain provision. Further, the court
observed that the cause of action arose and was filed during a period
when the state had waived its sovereign immunity from suits in tort.
Evidently the complaint sought alternative relief in tort and inverse
condemnation, and the court ruled, on motion to dismiss, that both types
of relief could properly be pursued.
2. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The doctrine of inverse condemnation, adopted by the District Court
of Appeal, First District, in 1964 in City of Jacksonville v. Schumann,47 9
entitles the owner to recover the value of property which has been "taken
in fact," although there has been no formal exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain. Schumann allowed recovery by the owner of a residential
property which had been rendered uninhabitable by low overflights of
jet aircraft using a recently extended runway at an adjacent airport. In
Northcutt v. State Road Department,4 0 decided in 1968, the district
court held that inverse condemnation could not be the basis for recovery
by owners of residences when an interstate highway was constructed in
the vicinity. The court, distinguishing the case from Schumann, anal-
ogized the plaintiffs in Northcutt to the owners of property adjacent to
476. See notes 453-458 infra and accompanying text.
477. See heading M infra for a discussion of sovereign immunity.
478. 281 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
479. 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965).
480. 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), petition for cert. dismissed. 219 So. 2d 687
(Fla. 1969).
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railroad tracks, who have traditionally been denied relief under inverse
condemnation. Additionally, as a policy matter, the court observed that
if recovery were allowed, it would "bring to an effective halt the construc-
tion, operation and maintenance of access roads and highways within the
State of Florida. '481
In Hardwick v. Metropolitan Dade County,482 the owner of a resi-
dence alleged that the county was operating the adjacent Suniland Park
in such a manner as to create a "nuisance and/or trespass." He sought
injunctive relief and damages or, in the alternative, relief under the
theory of inverse condemnation. The district court affirmed the circuit
court's finding that the park was not a nuisance and that while plaintiff
was subject to discomfort through the use of the park by thousands of
children each year, his property had not been "taken in fact." The dis-
trict court also affirmed the circuit court's decision to "balance the
equities" between the parties by a six-point order which provided, for
example, that "no inning of baseball, no quarter of football and no quarter
of basketball shall begin after 10:00 P.M .... No play by play descrip-
tion of any athletic event shall be given by bullhorn, loud speaker or any
electronic device.' 4 3
In Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Alderman,4 4 the court
held that the owner is not entitled to a jury determination of the question
whether there has been a "taking in fact" of his property, since this is
a matter of law for determination by the judge alone.
3. PUBLIC PUPOSE
The leading case in this area is Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida
Power & Light Co.,48 5 arising out of FP&L's proposal to construct a
nuclear-powered generating plant. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, had applied familiar principles in determining that the "public
purpose" test could be satisfied by the taking of land in order to construct
a canal for circulating and cooling water for the plant, but the test could
not be satisfied by the taking of land for use as permanent storage of
muck and rock excavated from the canal; the specific land was needed
for the former but not for the latter purpose. 4 6 The supreme court af-
firmed on this poin s8 and proceeded to make new law on other aspects
of the case. Seadade had objected to the proposed taking on the grounds
that: (1) the entire project would harm the environment by causing the
discharge of heated water into Biscayne Bay, and (2) the entire project
481. 209 So. 2d at 711.
482. 256 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
483. Id. at 389.
484. 238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
485. 245 So. 2d 209, (Fla. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Seadade]; noted in 24 U.
FLA. L. REV. 392 (1972).
486. 232 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
487. 245 So. 2d at 210-12.
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needed the prior approval of numerous federal, state and local regulatory
agencies, and the public purpose test could not be satisfied until all neces-
sary approval had first been obtained. In reply the supreme court for-
mulated the following guidelines:
Article II, Section 7, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., contains a
declaration that the protection of our natural resources shall be
the policy of the State. The protection of resources, being a
policy of the State, is an appropriate matter for consideration
in condemnation cases. We think it logically follows that if
taking and condemnation is sought in furtherance of a con-
demning authority's project affecting natural resources, and
independent authorities guarding the public interest must ap-
prove the project before it can be put into operation, it is
within the discretionary power of the judiciary to require that
safeguarding of the public interest be demonstrated by the
condemning authority ....
In a proper case, the judiciary may require, first, that the
condemning authority reasonably demonstrate that the regula-
tions and requirements of the independent authorities can and
will be met; second, that condemnation and taking in advance
of project approval will not result in irreparable damage to
natural resources and environment, should the independent au-
thorities decline to approve the proposed project.4 s8
The court found from the record that FP&L had satisfied both require-
ments and therefore it approved the taking as qualifying under the
public purpose test. Without extensive discussion, the court determined
that FP&L should not be required to postpone acquisition of the property
until after all approvals had been obtained. It observed:
It would be unreasonable to allow canal construction to begin
only after all permissions have been granted since this would
needlessly postpone the benefits of the completed facilities,
which would stand idle and untested until completion of the
canal. A rational balance must be struck between protection
of the public interest in our natural resources under Article II,
section 7, Florida Constitution, and the completion of public
works which are also in the public interest.489
In a special concurring opinion,"" Justice Ervin suggested that
in this type of case, the condemnor should acquire a defeasible fee unless
and until the necessary approvals are obtained from the independent
agencies. If the approvals are denied, the condemnee should be required
to refund all condemnation proceeds within a short time, otherwise abso-
lute title should vest in the condemnor.
The main innovation in Seadade is the court's use of the environ-
488. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
489. Id.
490. Id. at 216 (Ervin, J., concurring).
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mental protection policy statement of article II, section 7 as an ingre-
client of the public purpose test in a condemnation proceeding. This
raises the question whether article II, section 7 may in future situations
be applied in other contexts where a public purpose test is imposed, such
as borrowing, 49'1 spending492 and the tax exemption of property owned
by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public pur-
poses.4 93 A more remote question is whether the court may merge other
constitutional provisions; for example, if the equal protection clause were
coupled with the tax exemption provision, the result could be the denial
of tax exemption to a hospital which practices racial discrimination, a
result which would overrule Maxwell v. Good Samaritan Hospital.
Another essential aspect of Seadade is the role of the various inde-
pendent agencies which had authority to grant or deny permits for the
project. The court deferred to the expertise of these agencies and did not
undertake a separate judicial determination of the environmental issue;
the court's only determination was whether these independent agencies
were likely to grant approval and whether irreparable damage would be
caused if they denied approval after the condemnation had taken place.
In situations where no independent agency has jurisdiction to protect
the environment, the supreme court continues to pay great deference to
the discretion of the condemning authority, as illustrated by the post-
Seadade decision in Hillsborough County v. Sapp.495 The county sought
to condemn two parcels of property for the purpose of constructing a
highway needed to provide access to a new high school then under con-
struction. The proposed right-of-way ran up to the front door of the home
of one condemnee and completely through the home of another. The
condemnees argued that an alternative route could be located in a large
unoccupied wooded area nearby. The district court vacated the order of
taking, finding it was a gross abuse of discretion since an alternative
route could be used which would cause less interference with private
interests.496 The supreme court reversed, holding that the lower court
had erred in focusing solely on the question whether an alternative route
was available.497 Other factors should have been considered, including
"cost, environmental factors, long-range area planning, and-in this
case-the safety considerations necessary when designing a highway next
to a school. '4 8 The court went on to describe the judicial role in such
cases:
491. See notes 592-94 infra and accompanying text.
492. See notes 619-31 infra and accompanying text.
493. See notes 541-52 infra and accompanying text.
494. 204 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1967), appeal dismissed, 392 U.S. 656 (1968).
495. 280 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1973).
496. 262 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
497. 280 So. 2d at 445.
498. Id. It is noteworthy that here the court did not attach any greater dignity to
environmental factors than others. Compare with Seadade.
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Once a condemning authority decides that a taking is necessary,
selects one of the alternatives open to it, and applies to a court
for approval of the taking, the role of the court is limited to
assuring that the condemnor acted in good faith, did not exceed
its authority, and did not abuse its discretion. ... When the
trial court approves the determination of a reasonable necessity
and finds no abuse of discretion, a reviewing court is then limited
to deciding whether or not there was competent substantial evi-
dence to support the decision of the trial court.499
Along similar lines, in a series of cases involving the condemnation
of land for the proposed Cross Florida Barge Canal, 00 the supreme court
held that the condemning authority need not show absolute necessity,
but could prevail upon showing reasonable necessity. After reasonable
necessity was established, the only ground upon which the condemnee
could object was bad faith or abuse of discretion.
These cases were reaffirmed in Ball v. City of Tallahassee,"°1 where
the supreme court discussed the condemnor's burden of going forward
with evidence in condemnation cases. The court held that the condemnor
must present evidence that the property is needed, otherwise the petition
fails. Of course the condemnee can challenge the allegation of need. In
addition, the condemnee can present evidence of either abuse of discretion
or bad faith, and either one of these grounds, if proven, can constitute
an independent basis for rejecting the petition even if the condemnor has
already successfully demonstrated need.
Public necessity and good faith were involved in Dade County v.
General Waterworks Corp."2 The county commission resolved to acquire
all privately-owned water and sewer systems operating in the county,
"subject to approval and determination of the fiscal feasibility by the
[county commissioners] of the purchase price established either through
negotiation or through eminent domain proceedings. '50 8 The condemnee
argued that the county's affirmation of necessity and good faith was dis-
credited by the resolution which made the condemnation subject to a
subsequent determination on fiscal feasibility. The supreme court noted
that necessity and good faith are required by the statutes on condemna-
tion, 50 4 which also permit a condemnor to abandon an acquisition by
refraining from paying the amount of the condemnation judgment into
the registry of the court. Thus, reasoned the court, necessity and good
499. Id.
500. Canal Auth. v. Litzel, 243 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1970); Canal Auth. v. Miller, 243 So.
2d 131 (Fla. 1970). Both cases are discussed in Boyer and Goldberg, Real Property Law, 26
U. MiAmas L. REv. 96, 112 (1971). See also Silver Springs, Inc. v. Canal Auth., 252 So. 2d
295 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 266 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1972).
501. 281 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1973).
502. 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972).
503. Id. at 635.
504. FrA. STAT. §§ 73.021, .111 (1973).
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faith can coexist with the concept that the condemnor may abandon the
project, even after judgment. The court concluded:
[T]he Constitution only requires that the property be acquired
for a public purpose, not for an absolute public necessity. In
our view, a purpose may be public without being of such com-
pelling necessity that condemnation is required whatever the
price.... [I]t was not improper for Dade County to recognize
the possibility of later abandonment in its authorizing resolu-
tion. Such a result is especially appropriate where, as here, the
proper method of valuation of the properties is vigorously con-
tested, and the amount of the final judgment will probably
fluctuate considerably depending on the valuation method
ultimately arrived at. 505
In City of Miami v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,506 the city
petitioned to condemn, for park purposes, property owned by the rail-
road, including some which was used as port facilities. The district court
held, first, that as between these two parties, each of which had a general
power of eminent domain, neither had an inherently higher right of emi-
nent domain than the other. Second, the court noted the "prior use doc-
trine,'? to the effect that, as between two public bodies, property already
devoted to a public use may not be taken for another public use without
express legislative authority. Third, the court ruled that, for purposes of
the "prior use doctrine," the railroad was not a "public body," but was
a "franchised public use company." Accordingly, in order to resist con-
demnation, the railroad had to prove not only prior public use, but also
a use necessary for the successful operation of the railroad. The court
found the test satisfied as to part of the property in question, and ex-
cluded this portion from condemnation.
In City of Jacksonville v. Moman,507 the city petitioned to condemn
a large area for slum clearance purposes, apparently with the intent of
selling the property to the privately owned Methodist Hospital for use
by the hospital in constructing its own private professional building. The
court restated the rule of Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency,50 to the
effect that slum clearance can satisfy the public purpose test and that
if the area in general can be characterized as a slum, the entire area can
be condemned, including properties located within the area which could
not, individually, be regarded as slums. In denying condemnation, how-
ever, the court stated:
[T]he record in this case reflects that the city bypassed nu-
merous slum parcels in order to reach this block which, by its
own admission, is not a slum. The city planners and sociologists
505. 267 So. 2d at 636-37.
506. 286 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
507. 290 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
508. 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
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decided that this neighborhood needed to be wiped out in order
to provide a "cohesive" area compatible with the existing instal-
lations. Such a conclusion is not in this jurisdiction a basis for
seizing property owned by a citizen." 9
4. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp.,510 discussed above in
connection with the public purpose test, also involved a dispute regarding
computation of the "full compensation" payable to the owner upon the
taking of property. The condemnees were privately-owned water and
sewer systems. Part of their properties had been acquired as in-kind
contributions from customers, in aid of construction of the utility sys-
tems. Dade County, in the exercise of its regulatory powers in deter-
mining the rates charged by these utilities for their services, had required
that the contributed property be given a book value of zero. The supreme
court held that the book value of zero, while resulting from an appro-
priate exercise of Dade County's regulatory power over rates, should
not govern the computation of the "full compensation" in the eminent
domain proceedings. Nor, continued the court, could "full compensation"
be computed by means of capitalizing the earnings of the utility systems,
since the amount of these earnings had been affected by their rate struc-
ture, which in turn had been affected by the zero book value at which
the contributed property had been recorded. The court ruled that what-
ever valuation method was adopted by the trial court on remand, the
method must "take into consideration the value of the contributed
property.) 511
Full compensation is required with regard not only to the property
taken, but also as to certain types of interest in the property retained.
The courts continue to use the term "severance" damages to mean those
types of interest in retained property which are compensable as a matter
of constitutional right, and the term "consequential damages" to mean
those types of interest which are not compensable as a matter of consti-
tutional right and which consequently depend upon legislative grace for
the amount of compensation, if any.5 12
In Young v. Hillsborough County,513 the supreme court held that
when a portion of a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the owner
is entitled to severance damages as a matter of constitutional right in
addition to full compensation for the portion taken if the taking dimin-
509. 290 So. 2d at 107.
510. 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972); see notes 502-05 supra and accompanying text.
511. 267 So. 2d at 639.
512. See, e.g., State Dept. of Trans. v. Stubbs, 285 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); Division of
Admin., State Dept. of Trans. v. Baredian, 287 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Division
of Admin., State Dept. of Trans. v. Hillsborough Ass'h, Inc., 286 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1973); Note, Eminent Domain: Compensation for Business Damages in Florida, 22 U. FXA.
L. lIEv. 163 (1969).
513. 215 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1968).
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ishes the value of the portion of the land retained by the owner. Hill v.
Marion County,51 4 held that the owner is entitled to present evidence to
the jury not only of the decrease in market value, but also of the "cost
to cure," that is, the amount he would have to expend in relocating im-
provements in order to enjoy his remaining land to the same extent as
before the taking, even if the cost to cure is more than the decrease in
market value.
J. Taxation
1. ALLOCATION OF TAXING POWER BETWEEN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The 1968 revision clarifies the respective taxing powers of the state
and of local governments (including school districts)."', Ad valorem taxes
on real estate and tangible personal property are available only to local
governments, and the state may not levy any such tax. Ad valorem taxes
on intangible personal property are available only to the state and may
not be levied by local governments. All other forms of taxation are
preempted to the state except as provided by general law.
In City of Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, Inc.,51 the supreme court
pointed out that the 1968 revision changed the manner in which the state
could confer its residual taxing power upon local governments. Before
1968, a special or local act sufficed to authorize a local government to
impose any form of taxation other than ad valorem taxes; under the 1968
revision, a general law is required. Birdsong Motors involved a so-called
license tax levied by the city, measured by the amount of gross sales
of the merchant during the preceding fiscal year; the tax was $10 for the
first $3,000 of annual sales, and an additional $1.00 for every $1,000 in
annual sales above 3,000. The only relevant general law authorized cities
to impose license taxes. The court held that the Tampa tax did not qualify
as a license tax within the meaning of the general law, but was in fact a
sales tax unauthorized by general law. Further, the court ruled that the
tax had not been authorized by "grandfathering," either by statute or
by the schedules to the 1968 revision of the constitution.
Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County51" 7 involved an excise tax levied by
Dade County, in reliance upon a general law which authorized municipal-
ities to levy an excise tax of not more than ten percent on purchases of
electricity, metered or bottled gas, water service, telephone service and
telegraph service. The statute provided that in the event a municipality
imposed the tax on the purchase of one of the utility services listed in the
statute, "and a competitive utility service or services are purchased in
the city or town, then such ordinance shall impose a tax in like amount
514. 238 So. 2d 163 (Fla 1st Dist. 1970).
515. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1(a), 9(a).
516. 261 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
517. 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1972).
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on the purchase of the competitive utility service or services. ,, ." Dade
county imposed the tax upon purchases of the utility services listed in
the statute, and also upon fuel oil, on the grounds it was a "competitive
utility." The supreme court held that the language of the statute, to the
effect that "such ordinance shall impose a tax in like amount on the pur-
chase of the competitive utility service," should be construed as permissive
rather than mandatory. This construction was required, said the court, in
view of the language of the 1968 constitution, which provides that local
governments "may be authorized by general law to levy other taxes." Ac-
cordingly, the court continued:
Cities can refuse to impose a fuel tax because under the 1968
constitution, a city can only be authorized, not required "by
general law" to impose "other taxes. ". . . Although the munici-
pality must receive the authority to levy this tax on public
utilities, and services competitive thereto, from the Legislature,
it has legislative discretion to determine what is competitive and
whether, in fact, to impose such a tax.519
The supreme court remanded the case for further consideration by
the trial court, "to determine whether or not the taxing authority in its
free discretion intended the imposition of the tax or whether it adopted
the tax under the belief that it was mandated by the state to do so.' '52°
State v. City of Miami Beach,521 demonstrated that a population act
could effectively confer the power to collect an excise tax upon cities and
towns located in counties falling within certain population brackets.
Case law has preserved the traditional distinction between taxes
and assessments. In Lake Howell Water & Reclamation District v.
State,52 2 the supreme court held that a special assessment levied by a
drainage district against owners of property within the district is not
a tax. The court noted that neither the 1885 nor the 1968 constitution
makes express provisions regarding special assessments; therefore, pre-
sumably, these assessments may be authorized pursuant to the inherent
power of the legislature, without regard to the restrictions imposed upon
the taxing power.
2. ALLOCATION OF TAXING POWER WITHIN THE COUNTY
The 1968 revision contains significant provisions regarding the allo-
cation of taxing powers within the county.
518. 271 So. 2d at 120 (emphasis in original).
519. Id. at 122-23 (emphasis in original).
520. Id. at 123.
521. 234 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1970).
522. 268 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1972).
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a. Power of county to impose taxes pursuant to general law
authorizing municipalities to tax
In State ex rel. Volusia County v. Dickinson,'23 the supreme court
sustained the validity of an excise tax levied by the county on sales of
cigarettes in the unincorporated area. Volusia had become a home rule
county by the time the tax was imposed, and the home rule charter ex-
pressly provided that the county would have such municipal powers as
may be required to fulfill the intent of the charter. The tax was levied in
reliance upon a general law which authorized municipalities to levy such
a tax. The court held that the taxing power of counties must be consid-
ered in the light of the Local Government article of the constitution.
article VIII, section 1 (g) provides that a charter county "shall have all
powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law." This
provision, when read together with the constitutional provisions regarding
the taxing powers of counties and municipalities, led the court to conclude
that, "unless precluded by general or special law, a charter county may
without more under authority of existing general law impose by ordinance
any tax in the area of its tax jurisdiction a municipality may impose.; 524
b. Limitation on taxing power of county
Article VIII, section 1(h) states: "Property situate within munici-
palities shall not be subject to taxation for services rendered by the
county exclusively for the benefit of the property or residents in unincor-
porated areas." The supreme court interpreted this new provision in City
of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc. 25 Pinellas County
entered into a contract with Briley, Wild, a firm of consulting engineers,
for the construction and expansion of sanitary sewage facilities. The
beginning phase involved construction of a master sewage treatment
plant in the unincorporated area of the county, together with transmission
lines and lift stations. The county auditor sought a declaratory judgment
on the propriety, under article VIII, section 1(h), of expending monies
raised by county-wide ad valorem taxes to pay for sewage facilities to be
constructed in the unincorporated area. The City of St. Petersburg and
some taxpayers intervened in the suit and objected to the expenditure.
The court assumed, without discussion, that the constitutional pro-
vision, by prohibiting counties from levying taxes for certain purposes,
also prohibits the counties from expending general tax revenues for these
purposes. The court then held that article VIII, section 1 (h),
prohibits the taxation of municipally situated property by the
County for any services rendered by the County where no
523. 269 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1972).
524. Id. at 11.
525. 239 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
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real or substantial benefit accrues to city property from such
services. Conversely, this provision permits such taxation
where such service is found to be of real and substantial
benefit to such property. 520
The court found that the sewage project would confer a substantial benefit
upon the entire county, "healthwise and recreationwise," even though "the
benefits may not be direct in the sense that owners of city-located prop-
erty will physically use the expanded treatment plant, lines and lift sta-
tions. '' 27 The expenditure of general tax revenues for this purpose was
therefore found proper. In dictum, the court speculated about the type of
project which might run afoul of article VIII, section 1 (h). Examples
included
a library set up in an unincorporated area for the use and benefit
of the area residents or, perhaps, a park or recreation facility
for the residents of such area. Even the establishment of fire
fighting facilities in a particular unincorporated area may not
reasonably be said to be of consequential benefit to the incor-
porated areas.528
Burke v. Charlotte County,529 sustained the validity of a county tax
which was levied to provide for the construction of roads. The supreme
court held that the roads, although not within municipal limits, would
sufficiently benefit municipal residents to justify imposition of the tax
in the incorporated as well as the unincorporated areas of the county.
c. County preemption of municipality's power to levy
ad valorem taxes
Article VII, section 9 (b) provides that ad valorem taxes shall not be
levied in excess of ten mills each for all county purposes, for all municipal
purposes and for all school purposes, except that higher rates may be
levied for any of these purposes when authorized by referendum or when
required for the payment of bonds. A later heading will discuss various
aspects of this so-called "millage cap." 5 0 Germane to the present dis-
cussion is the last sentence of Article VII, section 9(b), which states:
"A county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized
by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal pur-
poses."
This new provision was at issue in State ex rel. Dade County v.
Dickinson.51' The Dade County Home Rule Charter authorizes the
county government to render certain municipal-type services throughout
526. Id at 822-23.
527. Id. at 823.
528. Id. at 824.
529. 286 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973).
530. See notes 582-86 infra and accompanying text.
531. 230 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1970).
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the county, even in areas where municipal governments still exist. The
court held that, without a referendum, Dade County may levy up to ten
mills for county purposes and up to an additional ten mills if justified
by municipal-type services rendered by the county. The millage imposed
by the county for municipal-type services preempts the power of munici-
palities to impose taxes without referendum; thus if the county imposed
ten mills for county purposes and another ten mills for municipal pur-
poses, the county would thereby entirely preempt the power of munici-
palities to impose taxes without referendum, and the municipalities would
have to seek a referendum in order to impose any tax at all. The court
noted that "the demarcation between county purposes and municipal pur-
poses is uncertain" and urged the legislature to clarify the distinction.5 2
3. INCOME AND INHERITANCE TAXES
The 1885 constitution, as revised in 1924, 533 prohibited taxes upon
inheritances or upon income, except that the state could impose an in-
heritance tax to the extent it could be credited or deducted from any sim-
ilar federal tax. The 1968 revision534 allowed an income tax subject to the
same limitation that applied to inheritance taxes, and the limitation appli-
cable to both income and inheritance taxes was changed so that Florida
could impose either type of tax to the extent it could be credited or
deducted from any similar state or federal tax.
In an advisory opinion rendered in 1971, 51' the justices of the su-
preme court ruled that corporations as well as natural persons enjoyed
the protection against income taxes unless such taxes could be credited or
deducted against state or federal taxes. Subsequently, in November 1971,
the people approved an amendment to Article VII, section 5, which
now reads as follows:
Section 5. Estate, inheritance and income taxes.
(a) NATURAL PERSONS. No tax upon estates or inheritances
or upon the income of natural persons who are residents or citi-
zens of the state shall be levied by the state, or under its au-
thority, in excess of the aggregate of amounts which may be
allowed to be credited upon or deducted from any similar tax
levied by the United States or any state.
(b) OTHERS. No tax upon the income of residents and citizens
other than natural persons shall be levied by the state, or under
its authority, in excess of 5% of net income, as defined by law,
or at such greater rate as is authorized by a three-fifths (3/5)
vote of the membership of each house of the legislature or as
will provide for the state the maximum which may be allowed
532. Id. at 137.
533. FLA. CONST. art IX, § 11 (1885, revised 1924).
534. FLA. COwST. art VII, § 5.
535. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1971).
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to be credited against income taxes levied by the United States
and other states. There shall be exempt from taxation not less
than five thousand dollars ($5,000) of the excess of net income
subject to tax over the maximum amount allowed to be credited
against income taxes levied by the United States and other
states.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. This section shall become effective
immediately upon approval by the electors of Florida.5 36
The intent of the framers of the constitutional amendment was expressed
in a preamble adopted by the legislature as part of House Joint Resolu-
tion 7-B (1971), which also adopted the constitutional amendment itself
for submission to the people. While the preamble was not voted upon by
the people, it evidently represents a primary source for future determina-
tions of the intent of the framers. It states:
[I]t is intended by this amendment to limit death and income
tax immunity to natural persons, as opposed to artificial persons
or entities created by or pursuant to law such as business cor-
porations, professional corporations, banking associations, sav-
ings and loan associations and other entities brought into being
by compliance with state or federal statutes; and
this amendment will, however, continue to prohibit imposition
of these taxes upon trusts created by private contract between
settlors and trustees, but the legislature will not be barred from
imposing a tax on those forms of business trusts which obtain
special statutory attributes from the state or federal govern-
ment, such as so-called "Massachusetts business trusts."
In December, 1971, a special session of the legislature enacted a
tax statute,BT implementing the constitutional amendment which had
been adopted the previous month.
4. IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION
a. Immunities
Neither the 1885 nor the 1968 constitution mentions immunity from
taxation. Case law has held, however, that property owned by the state
or a county is immune from taxation, regardless of the use to which the
property is put.5 8
The leasehold interests of parties who lease land from a county are
not immune from taxation. Case law has developed the rule that the
legislature may confer tax exemption upon such interests if it finds that
they serve a public purpose. The 1968 decision in Hillsborough County
536. The italicized words were added by the November, 1971 amendment.
537. FLA. STAT. ch. 220 (1973).
538. See, e.g., Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1968); Orlando Util. Comm. v. Milligan, 229 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 237
So. 2d 539 (Fla 1970).
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Aviation Authority v. Walden589 dealt with a statute enacted in 1961
which authorized local governments to impose ad valorem taxes on lease-
hold interests of private, profit-making businesses located on publicly
owned property, except that leaseholds were exempt if the property was
used for a "public function or public purpose authorized by law." The
supreme court held that the leasehold interest of Bartke's Restaurant on
land owned by the county at Tampa airport was tax exempt because the
operation of an airport restaurant was a "predominantly public purpose;"
the same case denied tax exemption to the predominantly private purposes
of such businesses as car rental companies, service stations, motels, a con-
struction company which rents a hangar for the storage of its private
executive aircraft, an aircraft repair and salvage company, and a company
engaged in repair of radio or communications equipment.
Straughn v. Camp,4' further elaborated upon the ability of the legis-
lature to confer tax exemptions upon the interests of lessees of county
property if they serve a public purpose. The property in question was
owned by Santa Rosa Island Authority, an entity created by statute to
exercise some of the powers of Escambia County with regard to a portion
of Santa Rosa Island. A special law enacted in 1949 conferred tax exemp-
tion upon all properties owned or used by the Authority, including prop-
erty which was leased to private parties, on the basis of a legislative
determination that the public purpose carried out by the Authority should
be attributed to all activities carried on by the lessees. Portions of the
Authority's property were leased to private parties. Some of the leases
declared that the lessee would be liable for any taxes which might law-
fully be imposed, while other leases were completely silent on the question
of taxation. In fact, all lessees were granted tax exemption until the enact-
ment of a statute in 1971, which repealed a 1949 statute conferring the
tax exemption. The Escambia tax assessor then assessed ad valorem taxes
upon the leasehold interests of the lessees, who sought judicial relief.
The supreme court held that the legislature is fully authorized to
repeal prior tax exemption laws, and that the 1971 legislature was justi-
fied in determining that the lessees were not serving a public purpose.
The court implied that even if the legislature had found a public pur-
pose, this finding could be judicially reviewed, since the constitution
requires the leasehold to be taxed where the predominant use is for private
purposes. The court also ruled that the statute repealing the exemption,
which became effective December 31, 1971, should be applied to all
leasehold interests, including those created prior to that date, and that
such a result did not impair the obligation of contracts, since the Au-
thority had never contracted to confer permanent tax exemption, nor
could it have constitutionally entered into such a commitment. The court
further held that the leaseholds would be taxable for the year 1972 and
539. 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968) [hereinafter referred to as Walden].
540. 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974).
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thereafter, in conformity with legislative intent, and in order to avoid a
discriminatory and unconstitutional interpretation.
b. Exemption of municipal property
The 1885 constitution provided that property held and used exclu-
sively for municipal purposes was exempt.541 The 1968 revision tightened
this exemption by making it available only to "property owned by a
municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes,"
unless the property is located outside the municipality, in which event
general law may require the municipality "to make payment to the taxing
unit in which the property is located."" 2 The 1968 revision declares that
qualifying municipal property shall be exempt from taxation, and the
exemption is consequently self-executing, without the need for imple-
menting legislation.
In Orlando Utilities Commission v. Milligan,5 48 decided in 1970
under the 1885 constitution, the county tax assessor assessed real property
owned by the city-owned utility and used exclusively as a recreation area
for employees of the utility and their families. The city claimed the
property was exempt from taxation since it was used for municipal pur-
poses. The district court denied the claim for exemption. While the opera-
tion of the utility facilities was a public purpose, the recreation area was
not essential to the operation of the facility, but was primarily for the
private benefit of the utility's employees and their families.
Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,544 decided in
1973 by the supreme court, considered constitutional provisions regard-
ing the tax exemption of property used for municipal purposes. Dade
County attempted to impose ad valorem taxes upon leasehold interests
valued at approximately $15 million which were owned by Pan American
and located on land owned by the county at Miami International Airport.
The leases, executed in 1962, included a provision that the county would
"if not prohibited by law, assume and pay any and all taxes or improve-
ment charges of any nature which may be levied or assessed against...
the leasehold interest of Pan American therein."'5 45 Dade County did not
attempt to impose a tax so long as the 1885 constitution was in effect.
However, beginning in 1970, on the theory that the 1968 constitution had
changed the tax status of this type of property, the county imposed the
tax. The county relied, primarily, on a sentence at the end of article VII,
section 10(c) in the 1968 constitution regarding revenue bonds, to the
effect that if any private corporation or person occupies a project financed
541. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; art. XVI, § 16 (1885).
542. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a). See Note, Property Tax Exemptions under Article
VI1, sec. 3(a) of the Florida Constitution of 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 641 (1969).
543. 229 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1970).
544. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Pan American]; noted in
26 U. FIA. L. REv. 149 (1973).
545. 275 So. 2d at 507 (emphasis in original).
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by such bonds pursuant to contract or lease with the governmental body
which issued the bonds, "the property interest created by such contract
or lease shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately
owned property." The supreme court rejected the county's contention,
upon determining that the above constitutional language compelled tax-
ation of property only if it was financed by bonds issued after the effec-
tive date of the 1968 constitutional revision, and even then only if the
bonds were revenue bonds of the type described in article VII, section
10(c). The Pan American bonds had been issued before 1968, and were
not of the type described in section 10(c); therefore, this section did
not compel taxation.
Next the court considered whether Pan American's activities were
for a public purpose. The court discussed this question within the frame-
work of article VII, section 3(a), which confers tax exemption upon
property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for a public
purpose. In the present writer's view, this approach was completely inap-
propriate. First, the property subjected to taxation was the leasehold
interest owned by Pan American, not the lessor's ownership interest;
second, the lessor was a county, not a municipality. A sounder approach
would have treated the case as one regarding an attempt to impose a tax
upon a lessee's interest in county-owned land. This does not involve any
provision in the text of the constitution, but rather, as discussed under the
preceding heading,546 has been developed by statutes and case law. The
approach which the court took in the post-Pan American decision of
Straughn v. Camp, 47 discussed above, would have been appropriate to the
facts of the Pan American case itself. Viewed in this light, Pan American
would have required the court to decide, first, whether the legislature had
authorized the tax exemption; second, if not, whether Dade County had
the jurisdiction to authorize the exemption without an enabling statute;
third, if the exemption were found to be authorized either by statute or
by Dade County's own action, whether the use by Pan American satisfied
the public purpose test, without which the grant of exemption by statute
or by Dade County would be constitutionally defective. The relevant
public purpose test would be the test developed by case law on the exemp-
tion of the interests of lessees in county-owned property, culminating in
Straughn v. Camp.548
Instead, the court discussed public purpose in terms of article VII,
section 3 (a), which arguably requires a different public purpose test in
order to determine the exemption of property owned by a municipality-
the test under section 3 (a) is whether the property is used exclusively
by the municipality for a public purpose. The court's interpretation of
this section in the Pan American decision should perhaps be regarded
546. See text accompanying notes 538-40 supra.
547. See note 540 supra and accompanying text.
548. See text accompanying notes 538-40 supra.
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as dictum, since it was clearly inapplicable to the facts of the case; never-
theless, this interpretation represents a significant judicial attempt to
clarify the meaning of this section.
In brief, the court held that two questions must be answered in deter-
mining whether property is used exclusively for public purposes under
article VII, section 3 (a): First, whether the facility is a public one; sec-
ond, whether the property is used exclusively for that purpose. Applying
this two-fold test to the present case, the supreme court concluded:
[T]he property leased to the airline is used exclusively for
public purposes. The parties have stipulated that the airport
facility is used for a public purpose; the incidental private pur-
pose of a profitmaking venture by the airline has merged into
the meaning of the stipulated "public purpose"; and there is no
evidence in the record whatever to indicate that the property
is not being used exclusively for the stated "public purpose. ' 5 49
In City of Bartow v. Roden,550 property owned by the city at the
municipal airport was leased to private parties, starting in 1961. No
attempt was made to impose county ad valorem taxes until 1970, when
the assessor assessed those portions of the property which, in his deter-
mination, were being used for private purposes, including land for which
the city had not yet found a tenant, but which was being held out as
available for lease to any private party. The court upheld the assessor,
finding that the property leased or held out for lease for private purposes
could not qualify under the public purpose test. The court cited and dis-
tinguished Walden551 and Pan American,552 on the question whether the
public purpose test was satisfied. The opinion would have been more
useful by pointing out that Walden and Pan American involved attempts
to tax the leasehold interests of the lessees of county-owned land, while
the present case involved the taxation of the freehold interest of the city
itself under the "exclusive public purpose" provision of article VII,
section 3 (a).
c. Property used for exempt purposes
The 1968 revision states: "Such portions of property as are used
predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation." '5 3 This pro-
vision omits "municipal" from the list of purposes exempted by this
section; 54 municipal property is dealt with separately, in the provision
549. 275 So. 2d at 512.
550. 286 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
551. See note 539 supra and accompanying text.
552. See notes 544-49 supra and accompanying text.
553. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a).
554. The 1885 constitution listed municipal exemptions in the same sentences as other
exemptions, such as literary, charitable, etc. FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1; art. XVI, § 16 (1885).
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discussed previously in connection with the Pan American case."' The
1968 revision introduces a new concept by limiting the exemption to "such
portions of property" as are used "predominantly" for the designated
purposes. Further, the 1968 revision can be implemented only by general
law, in contrast to the 1885 provision which merely required a law.55
In Christian & Missionary Alliance Foundation, Inc. V. Schooley,557
the owner filed a timely but incomplete application for tax exemption for
the portion of its property used as a nonprofit old-folks' home. The court
held that tax exemption was not necessarily lost for the year. All facts
and circumstances should be considered to determine whether the appli-
cant was guilty of laches or in some other way estoppped from denying
it had waived the exemption.
d. Personal property exemptions
The 1968 revision increases the exemption of household goods of
the head of a family from $500 to $1,000, continues the additional exemp-
tion of $500 to widows and the disabled, and extends the $500 exemption
to the blind.558 All of these exemptions are minimum figures guaranteed
by the constitution, and the 1968 revision for the first time authorizes
the legislature, by general law, to increase any or all of these exemptions
without limit. The United States Supreme Court, in Kahn v. Shevin,550
sustained the validity of the $500 widow's tax exemption against a chal-
lenge on equal protection grounds because of its availability to women
but not to similarly situated men. The Supreme Court held that to dis-
tinguish between women and men was reasonable.
e. Homestead exemption560
The 1968 revision continues the basic concept of homestead exemp-
tion from taxation, but with significant changes. 6' The constitution guar-
antees a minimum exemption of $5,000, but now authorizes the legisla-
ture, by general law and subject to conditions specified therein, to increase
the exemption up to $10,000 if the owner is 65 years old or totally and
permanently disabled.562 A 1971 statute563 partially implements this pro-
vision, by increasing the homestead exemption "for taxes levied by district
school boards for current school operating expenses" to $10,000 for per-
sons at least 65 years old who have been permanent residents of Florida
for the five consecutive years prior to claiming such exemption. Another
555. See notes 544-51 supra and accompanying text.
556. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, revising FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 16 (1885).
557. 289 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
558. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b); FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 9,11 (1885).
559. 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
560. This heading deals with homestead exemption from taxation, as distinguished from
the exemption of homestead from alienation, discussed under 0. infra.
561. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6, revising FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7 (1885).
562. FLa. CONsT. art. VII, § 6(c).
563. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3) (1973).
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change in the 1968 revision extends the homestead exemption to condo-
miniums and cooperative apartments. 64
In 1967, while the draft of the proposed 1968 revision was being
considered, the legislature enacted a statute565 extending homestead
exemption to condominiums and cooperative apartments, effective on the
first January 1st after adoption by the people of a constitutional revision
including a similar provision. The 1968 revision was adopted at the No-
vember, 1968 election and became effective on January 7, 1969, too late
to affect the homestead tax status of property for calendar year 1969.566
The question arose whether the 1967 statute, which purported to extend
the homestead exemption to condominiums and cooperative apartments
effective January 1, 1969, could be sustained on the basis of the 1885
constitution. 67 In Ammerman v. Markham,68 the supreme court held
that the statute was valid, as a legislative interpretation of the term "real
property" eligible for the exemption under the 1885 constitution.
In Horne v. Markham, 69 the supreme court held that a homeowner
who had failed to make a timely application for homestead tax exemption
could not complain of being denied the exemption; the constitutional
provision is non-self-executing and the legislature has established reason-
able procedures by which an applicant can establish his right.
5. ASSESSMENTS AND RATES
a. Rates
The 1968 revision preserves the general requirement that all ad
valorem taxation shall be at a uniform rate within each taxing unit. 7°
An exception is preserved in the case of intangible personal property
taxes, which may be at different rates, not to exceed two mills. 57 ' The
single intangible tax in lieu of other assessments is also retained with re-
gard to obligations secured by mortgage, deed of trust or other lien on
real estate, but the 1968 revision omits the prior requirement that this
single tax must be paid at the time of recordation.
b. Assessment
Subject to the exceptions to be discussed below,5 72 the 1968 revision
preserves the prior requirement of assessment on the basis of "just val-
uation. 575
In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dade County,
74
564. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
565. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.031, .041 (1973).
566. Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423,424 (Fla. 1969).
567. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7 (1885).
568. 222 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1969).
569. 288 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1974).
570. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1885).
571. Id.
572. See note 578 infra and accompanying text.
573. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1885).
574. 275 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973).
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the supreme court in 1973 reiterated prior case law, to the effect that
"just valuation" requires assessment at fair market value, and that a
taxpayer is entitled to relief if his property is assessed at a percentage
of its market value substantially higher than the percentage at which
other property in the taxing unit is generally assessed, even though his
property is not assessed above its fair market value. The court then held
that the general level of assessment of other properties could be demon-
strated to the courts by means of sales ratio studies, if reliably prepared
according to generally accepted principles for the conduct of such studies.
Another 1973 decision, District School Board v. Askew, 575 involved
disparities in assessment levels from county to county. The Minimum
Foundation Program allocates state funds to the public schools, under a
formula which takes into account the total assessed value of taxable
property in each school district. If a county systematically underassesses
property, the result is to relieve the county taxpayers of paying their fair
share of school taxes and to burden the state with the need to contribute
an excessive subsidy. In order to remedy this problem, the legislature
authorized the Auditor-General, for purposes of computing the allocation
of state funds to school districts, to adjust the total assessed value re-
ported by county tax assessors; if the Auditor-General determined that
a county had underassessed, he could limit their allocation of state funds
to the level which would have resulted from a proper level of county
assessment. The supreme court held this statute17 1 unconstitutional, since
it impinged upon the constitutional authority of county tax assessors.
577
The court noted that other remedies were available to challenge im-
proper assessments, notably through suit filed in the circuit court.
The 1968 revision continues to exempt stock in trade and livestock
from the just valuation requirement.5 7 A new provision states that "agri-
cultural land or land used exclusively for non-commercial recreational
purposes may be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis
of character or use."'579 This provision essentially restates pre-1968 case
law interpreting statutes which achieved similar results through the
exercise of the legislature's constitutional authority to prescribe the regu-
lations for securing the just valuation of property. 580
c. Millage cap
The 1885 constitution placed a maximum limit on school tax mil-
lages.581 Article VII, section 9(b) of the 1968 constitution imposes, for
the first time, a general "millage cap," limiting the rate of taxation which
575. 278 So. 2d (Fla. 1973).
576. FrA. STAT. § 236.07(8) 1973.
577. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
578. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(b); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 14-A (1885).
579. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(a). See Wershow, Ad Valorem Assessment in Florida:
The Demand for a Viable Solution, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 49 (1972).
580. See, e.g., Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965); Matheson v. Elcock,
173 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), cert. dismissed, 184 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1966).
581. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 8 (1885).
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may be levied by local governmental units on real estate and tangible
personal property, subject to enumerated exceptions.
The general rule is that ad valorem taxes shall not be levied in excess
of the following millages: "for all county purposes, ten mills; for all
municipal purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills; and for
special districts a millage authorized by law approved by a vote of the
electors . . .,,582 The exceptions provide that higher millages may be
imposed on any of the following justifications: 88 (1) for the payment of
bonds (apparently on the assumption that the bond issue was previously
approved by a referendum); (2) when authorized, for periods not longer
than two years, by a referendum; or (3) to the extent authorized by law,
by a county furnishing municipal services, within the taxing limits fixed
for municipal purposes.
The constitutional provision requires that the referendum be limited
to freeholders. However, this limitation clearly violates post-1968 case law
of the United States Supreme Court, 8" and has been declared inoperative
in Florida.585 The referendum must now be open to all electors in the
taxing unit.
Taxation by a county rendering municipal services has been dis-
cussed under a previous heading. 6
d. Distinction between void and voidable tax assessments
In Florida East Coast Railway v. Reid,587 the court distinguished
between void tax assessments, which can be judicially reviewed even
after expiraiton of the statute of limitations for filing suit, and voidable
assessments, which cannot be judicially reviewed thereafter.
K. Borrowing
1. PLEDGING CREDIT
The 1968 revision prohibits the state and local governments from
pledging or lending their credit to any individual or corporation and from
becoming a stockholder in any corporation. The 1968 revision, however,
introduces some exceptions. 8 First, public trust funds may be invested
without regard to the general prohibition, a result which had developed
under the pre-1968 case law.8 9 Second, other public funds may be in-
vested in obligations issued or insured by the United States or any of
582. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 9(b).
583. Id.
584. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
585. State v. City of Miami Beach, 245 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1971).
586. See notes 523-24 supra and accompanying text.
587. 281 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
588. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, revising FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 7, 10 (1885).
589. D'Alemberte commentary on art. VII, § 10, 26A Fla. Stat. Ann. at 176 (1970).
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its instrumentalities.'9" Third, an important change has been made re-
garding the ability of local governments to issue industrial aid bonds.1a
a. General rule-the public purpose test
In situations where none of the 1968 exceptions apply, the general
prohibition against the pledge or loan of credit and the ownership of
stock means the same under the 1968 revision as under the 1885 consti-
tution. The test continues to be the public purpose test developed by the
supreme court in numerous pre-1968 cases and reiterated in cases decided
under the 1968 constitution:5 92 a bond issue will be approved if the
primary purpose is public, even though incidental private benefits may
be enjoyed, and conversely the bond issue will be disapproved if the
primary purpose is private, even though incidental public benefits ensue.
The general rule was applied by the supreme court in the 1972 case
of Hillsboro Island House Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Town of
Hillsboro Beach .593 The town proposed an $800,000 bond issue to finance
anti-erosion measures. The town is a peninsula, joined to the mainland at
the northern end, which is less than 600 feet wide. The length of the town
(from north to south) is approximately 3.2 miles, with the eastern side
fronting on the Atlantic Ocean, and the western side fronting on the Intra-
coastal Waterway. Most of the proceeds of the bond issue were to be used
to add sand along the northernmost one mile of the Atlantic shore, and
the remaining proceeds were to be set aside for other anti-erosion mea-
sures as needed.
Objection to the bond issue was raised by a group of citizens residing
on the western side of the town, who claimed that their property would
not be benefited by the anti-erosion measures undertaken on the opposite
side of the peninsula. They therefore argued that the project should be
financed by special assessments against the property owners directly
affected, rather than by a bond issue payable by taxpayers throughout
the town. The supreme court rejected this argument and approved the
bond issue, finding that the private benefit to the owners of property on
the Atlantic shore was incidental to the public benefit arising from
preservation of the shore line.
The supreme court also applied the rationale of Seadade Industries,
Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co."" The anti-erosion project in Hillsboro
Beach required approval by various independent regulatory agencies.
The court held, on the basis of the Seadade precedent, that the bond issue
could be validated where the proponents had made a reasonable showing
that the necessary approvals would be forthcoming.
590. Id.
591. Id. See notes 595-604 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this provision.
592. See cases cited in notes 592-94 infra; see also Betz v. Jacksonville Trans. Auth.,
277 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1973).
593. 263 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1972).
594. 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971). See note 485 supra and accompanying text.
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b. Industrial aid bonds
Pre-1968 case law applied the general public purpose test to indus-
trial aid bond projects as well as to others. A classic statement appeared
in the 1967 decision in State v. Jacksonville Port Authority,"95 where the
supreme court expressed the general rule: "[I] f the paramount purpose
is a public purpose, such project may as an incident thereto lawfully
benefit private corporations or individuals."5 96 Applying this rule, a four-
to-three majority of the court invalidated a proposed bond issue for the
construction of a shipyard to be leased to a private corporation. The dis-
senting justices pointed out that previous decisions had found the requisite
public purpose in
such different things as golf courses, race tracks, fraternity
houses, trade marts, concessions, fishing piers, marinas, garages
and filling stations, airports, overhaul and repair facilities for
aircraft, airport hotels and urban renewal private housing.
9 7
In State v. Reedy Creek Improvement District,"' decided in 1968,
the supreme court validated drainage revenue bonds, to be issued by the
District in the vicinity of the proposed new Disneyworld project. The
court observed:
Successful completion and operation of the District no doubt
will greatly aid the Disney interest and its contemplated Disney-
world project. However, it is obvious that to a lesser degree
the contemplated benefits of the District will inure to numerous
inhabitants of the District in addition to persons in the Disney
complex.
The proposed improvements also embrace measures de-
signed to develop improved sanitation and pest control condi-
tions as well as aiding the conservation of natural resources.
Besides the public benefit derived by inhabitants of the District
from such measures, we conclude that the integrated plan or
workings of the District and its related improvements are essen-
tially and primarily directed toward encouraging and developing
tourism and recreation for the benefit of citizens of the state and
visitors to the state generally. 99
Thus, the promotion of tourism is regarded as a public purpose, even
where private interests are "incidentally" benefited.
Another 1968 decision, State v. Ocean Highway & Port Authority,00
emphasized the weight accorded to a legislative pronouncement that a
project constitutes a public purpose. The supreme court approved a bond
issue for the construction of a pulp and paper plant to be leased to a
595. 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967).
596. Id. at 884.
597. Id. at 891 (Ervin, J. dissenting).
598. 216 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1968).
599. Id. at 205-6.
600. 217 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1968).
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private corporation, where the authorizing statute declared it was for
a public purpose. The court noted:
We do not hold that legislative action can convert black into
white. However, in this matter of defining what is or is not a
"public" as distinguished from a "private" purpose, we labor
in a "judicial grey zone" where the ultimate judgment may be
colored, if not concluded, by definitive legislative pronounce-
ments.601
The public nature of the project in this case was buttressed by the cir-
cumstance that the statute's effectiveness was conditioned on the favorable
outcome of a referendum on the project in Nassau County, and that the
referendum resulted in a vote of 1,340 in favor of the project and 493
opposed.
Against this background, the 1968 revision preserved the general
public purpose test, but added completely new language regarding indus-
trial aid bonds. Article VII, section 10(c) permits statutes authorizing:
(c) the issuance and sale by any county, municipality, special
district or other local governmental body of (1) revenue bonds
to finance or refinance the cost of capital projects for airports
or port facilities, or (2) revenue bonds to finance or refinance
the cost of capital projects for industrial or manufacturing
plants to the extent that the interest thereon is exempt from in-
come taxes under the then existing laws of the United States,
when, in either case, the revenue bonds are payable solely from
revenue derived from the sale, operation or leasing of the
projects. If any project so financed, or any part thereof, is oc-
cupied or operated by any private corporation, association, part-
nership or person pursuant to contract or lease with the issuing
body, the property interest created by such contract or lease
shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately
owned property.
Thus if a project satisfies the requirements of article VII, section 10(c),
it has thereby satisfied the public purpose test without the need for fur-
ther inquiry. If, on the other hand, a project does not fit within this new
subsection, it must still satisfy the public purpose test, and the inquiry
proceeds along the same lines and subject to the same precedents as
controlled before 1968.
The impact of article VII, section 10(c), added by the 1968 revision,
became apparent in the 1972 supreme court decision in State v. Jackson-
ville Port Authority.0 2 The Authority proposed to issue $1 million of
Industrial Development Revenue Bonds to finance the acquisition and
construction of an industrial plant for the bottling, storing, shipping and
distribution of wines and liquors. By a vote of four to three, the supreme
court found that the project was authorized by statute and by the Au-
601. Id. at 104-5
602. 266 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
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thority's charter as one which would promote waterborne commerce.
Upon finding this authorization, the court next found that the project
fell within the category of industrial aid bonds authorized by article VII,
section 10(c). Accordingly, no determination of public purpose was neces-
sary and the bond issue was approved.
Another example is the 1971 decision in State v. Dade County."°'
The county proposed to issue $3.85 million in Industrial Development
Bonds for the purpose of financing the acquisition of an industrial or
manufacturing plant for processing meats, and for the rehabilitation, im-
provement, renovation and equipment of the plant so acquired. The plant,
as renovated and equipped, would be leased to a private corporation. The
supreme court approved the project and ruled on two points which had
been urged by the objectors. First, the court held that renovation and
improvements, as well as original acquisitions, could properly be financed
under the relevant statutes and under article VII, section 10(c). Second,
the court addressed the question of how the Florida courts, in bond vali-
dation proceedings, should determine whether the project will yield inter-
est which is exempt from federal income tax, as required by article VII,
section 10(c). The supreme court stated:
[W]e hold that it is not necessary for a local agency contem-
plating a revenue bond issue to obtain a determination of exemp-
tion from the Federal Government, although of course such local
agency may go through the Internal Revenue Service or the
U.S. Tax Court if it desires to do so.
However, this does not mean that no safeguards surround
such determination at the state level. The question is one of
law to be decided under the facts of each case. Initially, the
County Commission makes the determination upon advice of
the county attorney in conjunction with qualified bond counsel,
but because the question is one of law, it is subject to review
by both the Circuit Court and this Court. If an erroneous deter-
mination of exemption is made, this Court is empowered to over-
turn such determination on appeal." 4
2. STATE BONDS
The 1968 revision deals separately with two types of state bond:
full faith and credit, and revenue.
a. State full faith and credit bonds
As a departure from the limited ability of the state to issue bonds
under the 1885 constitution, the 1968 revision grants a broad authoriza-
603. 250. 2d 875 (Fla. 1971).
604. Id. at 878-79. See generally Storace and Gong, The Florida Industrial Development
Financing Act: Public-Private Investment in Social Engineering, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 433
(1972); Note, Industrial Development Bonds under Article VII, Section 10 oj the Florida
Constitution of 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 656 (1969).
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tion for bonds pledging the full faith and credit of the state, if issued to
finance or refinance the cost of state capital projects upon approval by
a statewide referendum 0 5 The referendum is not required for an issue
of bonds which refunds an outstanding issue at a lower net average
interest cost. The total outstanding principal of state bonds issued pur-
suant to this provision shall never exceed fifty percent of the total tax
revenues of the state for the two preceding fiscal years.
Another source of state bonding authority is article XII, sections
9(c) and (d), which authorize the "second gas tax" monies to be pledged
for highway and road construction and which authorize the state to
pledge the full faith and credit of the state to guarantee school bonds
funded by the motor vehicle license tax. In State v. Division of Bond
Finance,0 decided in 1971, the supreme court sustained the validity
of $4.9 million in bridge bonds proposed by the state and Escambia
County for the construction of a four-lane toll bridge and causeway
across Santa Rosa Sound. The bonds were to be secured by: (1) net tolls
collected from the project; (2) 80% of the gasoline tax funds accruing
to the Department of Transportation and allocated to Escambia County
under the "second gas tax" provision; and (3) the full faith and credit
of the State of Florida. The court found that the project was authorized
under article XII, section 9(c) and therefore the full faith and credit of
the state could be pledged without a referendum.
b. State revenue bonds
The 1968 revision authorizes the state or its agencies to issue revenue
bonds without referendum only to finance or refinance the cost of state
capital projects. °7 Such bonds shall be payable solely from funds derived
from sources other than state tax revenues or rents or fees paid from state
tax revenues.
In State v. Inter-American Center Authority,08 the supreme court
approved a proposed issue of $203 million development revenue bonds by
the Inter-American Center Authority, an instrumentality of the state
created by statute. In connection with this project, Dade County entered
into a cooperation agreement to aid the Authority on a deferred basis
605. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11(a). D'Alemberte's Commentary on this provision, 26A
FLA. STAT. ANw. at 197 (1970), states:
Under the 1885 Constitution, the state had the power to issue state bonds only for
the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection (Article IX, Section 6).
Of course other obligations of state revenues were incurred generally through one
of the specific authorizations in the 1885 Constitution (i.e. school bonds, gas antic-
ipation certificates, etc.), or through the revenue bond concept. The Florida Supreme
Court allowed the state to build capital facilities through bonding with the bonds
repaid by "rents" paid to the agency operating the facility. This stretched the
revenue bond concept somewhat for in substance, if not in form, it obligated the tax
resources of the state.
606. 246 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1971).
607. FLA. CONST. art. VII § 11(c).
608. 281 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1973).
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with certain funds other than ad valorem tax revenues; the Authority in
turn undertook to make certain land and recreational facilities available
to the county. The court held that Dade County's proposed aid, coming
from sources other than ad valorem taxes, did not violate the constitution
and did not require the project to be approved by a referendum.
3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT BONDS
The 1968 constitution clarifies and only slightly changes prior pro-
visions on local government bonds.6 0 9
a. Local government bonds payable from ad valorem taxation
Article VII, section 12 authorizes counties, school districts, munici-
palities, special districts and local governmental bodies with taxing powers
to issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation
certificate, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than
twelve months after issuance. Generally, such bonds must be for the pur-
pose of financing or refinancing capital projects authorized by law and
approved by a referendum. As an exception, the referendum is not re-
quired when the bonds are issued to refund outstanding bonds and interest
and redemption premium thereon at a lower net average interest than the
original. The constitution limits the referendum to freeholders, but post-
1968 United States Supreme Court and Florida case law has extended
the franchise to all electors in this situation, as with the elections for ad
valorem taxes in excess of the millage gap.610
The 1970 Supreme Court of Florida decision in State v. Dade
County0 1' pointed out that the 1968 revision closed a loophole. Certificates
of indebtedness were not mentioned in the 1885 constitution and the
supreme court had not subjected them to the same referendum require-
ment as applied to bonds. But the 1968 constitution, by making express
mention of certificates of indebtedness, clearly brought them into the same
category as bonds with regard to the need for referendum.
b. Local government revenue bonds
The conditions imposed by article VII, section 12, discussed above, 12
apply only to obligations payable from ad valorem taxation. Other types
of obligation are, by implication, unaffected by these conditions. The
supreme court recognized this implication in the 1973 decision in State
v. Orange County. 1 ' The county proposed to issue $3 million in capital
improvement bonds, payable solely from the proceeds of race track funds
609. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1885).
610. State v. City of Miami Beach, 245 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1971), applying City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). See notes 584-85 supra and accompanying text.
611. 234 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1970).
612. See notes 610-11 supra and accompanying text.
613. 281 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1973).
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and jai alai fronton funds accruing annually to Orange County pursuant
to statute. The county, a non-charter county, adopted this proposal by
ordinance, in reliance upon general law. By a vote of four to three, the
supreme court held that article VIII, the Local Government article of the
1968 constitution, together with the general law and county ordinance,
authorized the project. Further, the court found nothing in the 1968
constitution to preclude the issuance of such bonds without a referendum,
since the bonds were not payable from ad valorem taxes.
In another four to three decision, 614 the supreme court validated
a proposed bond issue by Orange County Civic Facilities Authority for
enlargement of the Tangerine Bowl, where the county guaranteed to pay
the authority $200,000 from revenues other than ad valorem taxation. The
court held no referendum necessary since the ad valorem taxing power
was not committed.
Two 1971 supreme court decisions considered whether mortgages
could be used as security for bonds issued without an election. In Nohrr
v. Brevard County Educational Facilities Authority,610 a revenue bond
was proposed to finance construction of a dormitory and a cafeteria at
a private junior college. As security for the bondholders in case revenues
from the facility were insufficient to provide for payments, the proposed
bond issue included a mortgage of the facility in favor of the bondholders.
The supreme court held that the mortgage was not valid without an elec-
tion. The court noted that the same statute could also authorize a similar
bond issue for a public institution of higher learning, in which event the
county might incur a moral obligation to pay the bondholders from gen-
eral county funds to prevent foreclosure against the facility. This was
the equivalent of a pledge of ad valorem taxes and therefore required
an election.
No election, however, was needed in State v. Putnam County De-
velopment Authority."16 The Authority issued revenue bonds to finance
acquisition and construction of a water treatment facility needed by a
business corporation in order to meet standards promulgated by the state
for pollution control. The bonds included a mortgage of the facility to
protect bondholders in case the revenues were insufficient. In holding
the mortgage valid without the need for an election, the court found that
the county would not be under a legal or even a moral obligation to pay
the bondholders from public funds in the event of default and threatened
foreclosure.
State v. City of Miami Beach 1 7 sustained the validity of $12 million
of bonds payable from the proceeds of the resort tax, which was an excise
tax authorized by population act and imposed by the city. The supreme
614. Orange County.Civic Facilities Auth. v. State, 286 So. 2d 193 (FIa. 1973).
615. 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971).
616. 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971).
617. 234 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1970).
19741
650 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
court held that no election was required, since the ad valorem taxing
power was not committed.
4. POST-1968 AMENDMENTS
Four amendments of the constitutional provisions on borrowing
have been approved since 1968.
The November, 1970 election adopted the new article VII, section 14,
authorizing certain state bonds to be issued, without election, to finance
the construction of air and water pollution and abatement and solid waste
disposal facilities, to be operated by any municipality, county, district
or authority, or by any agency of the state. In the 1973 decision of State
v. Division of Bond Finance,1 " the supreme court held that this new
section must be given full effect, as authorizing certain types of full faith
and credit bonds to be issued without referendum, as a special exception
to article VII, section 11 which expresses the general requirement of a
referendum for state full faith and credit bonds.
The March, 1972 special election adopted the new article VII, sec-
tion 15, authorizing revenue bonds to establish a fund to make loans to
students, as prescribed by law.
The November, 1972 election approved the amendment of article
XII, section 9(a) to restore a provision of the 1885 constitution which
had been eliminated in the 1968 revision, so as to allow the state to issue
revenue bonds for the purchase and improvement of land and water areas
to promote outdoor recreation and natural resources conservation.
The same election also approved the amendment of article XII,
section 9 to extend the duration and coverage of the allocation of motor
vehicle license tax revenues for school capital outlay debt service.
L. Spending and Using Public Resources
The 1968 revision restates the provisions of the 1885 constitution
regarding the spending and use of public resources. Article III, section 12
prohibits appropriation bills from containing provisions on other subjects.
Article VII, section 1(c) prohibits money from being drawn from the
treasury except in pursuance of appropriation made by law. And article
VII, section 10, previously discussed in connection with borrowing, 19
also imposes limitations on the purposes for which funds may be spent,
by prohibiting the state and local governments from giving, lending or
using their taxing power to aid private parties.
1. APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS
An advisory opinion rendered in 197020 interpreted the constitu-
tional requirement that appropriation bills contain provisions on no
other subject. The justices advised that:
618. 278 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1973).
619. See notes 602-04 supra and accompanying text.
620. Advisory opinion to the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
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[T]he Legislature does not have the power nor the right under
the Constitution of this State to make law in an appropriations
bill on other subjects, unless the other subjects are so relevant
to, interwoven with, and interdependent upon, the appropria-
tions so as to jointly constitute a complete legislative expression
on the subject. 21
While certain individual items in the 1970 appropriation bill might at
some future time be found to violate this requirement, those items could
be severed from the remainder of the statute; accordingly, the justices
advised that the statute as a whole should be regarded as valid.
In Dickinson v. Stone,6 22 the supreme court held that the "no other
subject" provision was violated by the 1971 appropriations act which pro-
vided for the transfer of personnel and data processing equipment from
the Comptroller to the Department of General Services. But in Thomas
v. Askew, 623 the court sustained the validity of the 1972 appropriations
act, including a provision requiring the construction of a new state capitol
building. In distinguishing this result from Dickinson v. Stone, the court
stated:
It has never been seriously contended that a new building, a
new state service or function, or a new state program could not
have its genesis in a line item appropriation. The prohibition
of Article III, Section 12 has only been applied to substantive
other matters wholly independent of or unconnected with an
appropriated item which matters were improperly but expressly
written into the general appropriations act. Implied or secondary
results from the operation of a line item appropriation have
never been raised to the equivalent status of an ungermane
written rider improperly inserted into an appropriations act.624
Department of Administration v. Home 25 held that a taxpayer has
standing to contest the validity of provisions of appropriations acts on
constitutional grounds related solely to the taxing and spending power,
without the need to show that the taxpayer is subject to any special injury.
In O'Malley v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n,626 the supreme
court held that the constitutional provisions regarding the appropriations
process do not apply to all public funds. The association is a public
corporation created by statute, as a mechanism for paying claims on cer-
tain classes of insurance policy if the insurance company becomes in-
solvent. The statute authorizes the corporation to assess and collect
payments from insurance companies doing business in the state and
selling the class of insurance involved. The court held that the funds of
this non-profit, public corporation were connected with the administration
621. Id. at 11.
622. 251 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1971).
623. 270 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1972).
624. Id. at 711.
625. 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
626. 257 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1971).
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of government, but were not subject to the appropriations process nor to
control by the comptroller of the state or other constitutional provisions
relating to public funds. The court characterized the corporation's funds
as trust funds separate and apart from general tax funds or other state
revenue.
2. ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY
In an opinion rendered in 1972,27 the attorney general advised that
a county is constitutionally prohibited from constructing an office build-
ing for the purpose of leasing facilities in the building to private physi-
cians. This project would involve the expenditure of the county's resources
-and thus the use of its taxing power-primarily for the benefit of pri-
vate parties, in violation of article VII, section 10.
3. LEASING PROPERTY
Once a governmental unit has acquired property for a proper pur-
pose, a subsequent lease of the property to private parties for private
purposes is, apparently, not precluded. This rule is implied by Bannon
v. Port of Palm Beach District.628 The Port District owned Peanut Island,
an artificial island which had been created during the dredging of Palm
Beach Inlet. The island had for some years been used primarily as an
undeveloped recreation facility until the Port District leased it to a private
corporation for development purposes. After finding the project authorized
by statute, the supreme court noted that the project did not commit the
Port District to any expenditure or pledge of financial obligation. Ac-
cordingly, stated the court: "We do not find it necessary to determine
whether the purposes to be served by the development of the leased prop-
erty are primarily public or private in nature." '629 The court's opinion
does not discuss whether the rental under the lease was equal to the fair
rental value of the property. This point seems to have a bearing on the
validity of the project. If the rental was less than the fair rental value,
arguably the Port District was conferring a subsidy upon the lessee to
the extent of the rental bargain, which could be regarded as a use of
public resources for the benefit of private parties.
In City of West Palm Beach v. Williams,6 30 the supreme court fol-
lowed Bannon and concluded:
In summary, we hold that where bonds are not issued, public
funds are not spent, and the power of eminent domain is not
exercised in furtherance thereof, a municipality can lease public
land for private uses in accordance with legislative authority.631
627. Op. ATTY. GEx. FLA. No. 072-129 (Apr. 6, 1972).
628. 246 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1971); cf. Op. ATTY. GEN. FLA. No. 072-167 (May 18, 1972).
629. 246 So. 2d at 740.
630. 291 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1974).
631. Id. at 578.
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As in Bannon, the court failed to discuss whether the situation would
be affected if the rental were less than the fair rental value.
M. Claims Against State and Local Government and Officers
Article X, section 13 of the 1968 constitution states: "Provision may
be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all
liabilities now existing or hereafter originating." This is identical to the
corresponding section of the 1885 constitution6 2 and has received iden-
tical judicial interpretation.6 3 The courts continue to hold that the state
is immune from suit except to the extent this immunity is waived by gen-
eral law. The same immunity is enjoyed by counties, on the theory that
they are subdivisions of the state. However, municipal corporations do
not derive immunity from this constitutional provision. The courts have
developed doctrines of partial municipal immunity, independent of any
constitutional text. 3 4
1. IMMUNITY OF STATE AND COUNTIES
The 1969 legislature enacted two statutes concerning claims against
the state. The first statute waived immunity in connection with certain
types of claim; 0 35 the second statute repealed the first, effective one year
later.13 Thus, Florida waived its immunity, in some respects, for a twelve
month period which ended on June 30, 1970. A follow-up statute enacted
in 1971 revived all causes of action which had accrued during the one-year
waiver period and conferred continuing jurisdiction on the courts to dis-
pose of such cases .6 7
The 1973 legislature enacted a new tort claim act, permitting suit
to be brought against the state for certain types of incident occurring on
or after January 1, 1975.38
In Schmauss v. Snoll,639 the district court reiterated that the immunity
of counties is coequal with the immunity of the state itself. The court
further held that, for purposes of immunity, Metropolitan Dade County
should be regarded as a county, and therefore immune, although for
certain other purposes Dade may be regarded as a municipality.
Even when suit against the state is barred by immunity, a claimant
may still seek relief from the legislature in the form of special legislation.
632. FLA. CoNsT. art. III, § 22 (1885).
633. See notes 639-41 infra. A general statement of the rule under the 1885 constitution
is Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1968).
634. See notes 643-51 infra and accompanying text.
635. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-116.
636. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-357.
637. FLA. STAT. § 768.151 (1973). See State Dept. of Trans. v. Feltner, 266 So. 2d 670
(Fla. 1972).
638. FLA. STAT. § 768.28-.30 (1973). See Note, An Insurance Program to Effectuate
Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunity, 26 U. FLA. L. RzV. 89 (1973).
639. 245 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 248 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1971).
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The two-thirds vote which the 1885 constitution required for such legis-
lation is no longer required by the 1968 constitution, as interpreted by
the Attorney General; a simple majority is now sufficient.64°
In Willits v. Askew, 641 petitioner had obtained a judgment against
the state, arising out of a tort which had occurred during the one-year
waiver of immunity. The Governor declined to cause a state warrant
countersigned by him to be issued to pay the amount of the judgment.
The supreme court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, issued a
peremptory writ of mandamus to require the Governor to issue the
warrant. The court noted that article IV, section 4(e) of the constitution
provides:
The treasurer shall keep all state funds and securities. He shall
disburse state funds only upon the order of the comptroller,
countersigned by the governor. The governor shall countersign
as a ministerial duty subject to original mandamus.
In situations where this newly added language is applicable, it deprives
the Governor of his prior immunity.
In State Department of Education v. Howard,642 the supreme court
sustained an order issued by the Career Service Commission, granting
thirty days' severance pay to a former department employee. The Com-
mission and the court rejected the department's argument that it could
not disburse the severance pay because the legislature had not appropri-
ated any funds for this purpose.
2. PARTIAL IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPALITIES
Adoption of the 1968 constitution had no effect on the judicial de-
velopment of the partial immunity of municipalities.
City of Tampa v. Davis64 denied recovery to a plaintiff for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident resulting from failure of city em-
ployees to replace a stop sign which had been knocked down in a prior
accident. The district court noted that the control of highway traffic is
a governmental, not a proprietary function; consequently, the case was
governed by Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach644 and Modlin v. City of
Miami Beach,45 and not by the general principles of tort law which
would apply if a proprietary function were involved. The Davis opinion
phrased the Hargrove-Modlin holding as follows:
[A] municipality is liable in tort, under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, when its agent or employee commits a tort
in the performance, or by the nonperformance, of an executive
640. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
641. 279 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
642. 279 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973).
643. 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
644. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
645. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
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(or administrative) duty within the scope of a governmental
function, only when such tort is committed against one with
whom the agent or employee is in privity, or with whom he is
dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct transaction or con-
frontation.646
In Town of Largo v. L & S Bait Co., Inc.647 the same court, quoting
its Davis holding with approval, ruled that the construction and operation
of a municipal sewage disposal system is a governmental, not a proprietary
function. Consequently, unless the plaintiff could prove that the town
owed him a special duty, he could not recover damages from the town
for the flooding of his property caused by the negligence of town em-
ployees in operating the sewer system.
Similarly in Moore v. City of St. Petersburg,s the same court re-
iterated that construction and operation of a sewer system is a govern-
mental function, as opposed to a "corporate or proprietary" function
"such as street and sidewalk maintenance." Therefore the plaintiff, who
had been injured by falling into a caved-in sewer area, could not recover
against the city without showing a "direct transaction or confrontation"
with the tortfeasor.
Wong v. City of Miami649 involved the liability of a municipality for
damage sustained by a citizen during a time of civil disturbance. Shortly
before a civil rights rally, merchants in the neighborhood asked for addi-
tional police protection. In response to this request numerous police
officers were sent to the area. Subsequently the officers were removed
by order of the mayor, confirmed by the sheriff. Thereafter, some par-
ticipants in the rally became riotous and inflicted more than $100,000 of
damage to the merchants' stores. In damage suits filed by the merchants
against the city and county, the supreme court denied relief on four
grounds. First, no sufficient connection was alleged between withdrawal
of the officers and the alleged damages. Second, police protection was a
duty owed to the public generally which would not inure to the benefit
of private citizens, even though police officers had been sent to a specific
area upon the request of the plaintiffs. Third, removal of the officers was
within the realm of governmental discretion. Fourth, the plaintiffs had
not convinced the court that the decision to withdraw the officers was
negligent. The court posed the question:
Who can say whether or not the damage sustained by petitioners
would have been more widespread if the officers had stayed, and
because of a resulting confrontation, the situation had escalated
with greater violence than could have been controlled with the
resources immediately at hand? If that had been the case,
646. 226 So. 2d at 454 (emphasis in original).
647. 256 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
648. 281 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
649. 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970).
19741
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
couldn't petitioners allege just as well that that course of action
was negligent? 650
Cleveland v. City of Miami,"' by a vote of four to three, sustained
a jury verdict awarding damages to a widow whose husband, an innocent
bystander, had been killed by police gunfire during a disturbance. The
supreme court held that the trial judge was correct in not sending the
question of assumption of risk to the jury since no evidence had been
introduced to show that the victim "willingly exposed himself" to the
gunfire, and assumption of the risk could not be established without such
evidence. The court held also that the trial judge was correct in instruct-
ing the jury to award damages if they found that the police officers, under
the circumstances, were negligent in the manner in which they conducted
themselves in firing upon the building; the question of negligence was
not precluded by the statutory provision 52 that officers "shall be held
guiltless and fully justified in law" if any person participating in an
assembly "or other person present," is killed or wounded by reason of
the efforts made by the officers to disperse the assembly or apprehend
the participants.
3. DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS MADE BY OFFICERS
In Roberts v. Lenfestey, 55 the district court held that a junior college
president was immune from suit arising out of statements made at a
faculty meeting explaining why he had not appointed a certain candidate
to the faculty. The court followed McNayr v. Kelly,654 which held that
executive officials of government are absolutely privileged as to defama-
tory publications made in connection with the performance of the duties
and responsibilities of their office, to the same extent as such absolute
immunity is afforded to members of the legislative and judicial branches
of government.
4. IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS FOR DISCRETIONARY AND
LEGISLATIVE DUTIES
In City of Homestead v. International Association of Firefighters,
Local No. 2010,55 the court held that a councilman was immune from
personal liability to the labor union arising from his acts in negotiating
labor contracts establishing salary levels and working conditions for the
city's firemen, since he was performing discretionary and legislative
functions.
650. Id. at 134 (emphasis in original).
651. 263 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1972).
652. FLA. STAT. § 870.05 (1973).
653. 264 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
654. 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966) where the Florida court adopted the reasoning of Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
655. 291 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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5. LIMITS OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
In Reina v. Metropolitan Dade County,6 56 a passenger had alighted
from a county bus and was across the street when he made an obscene
gesture to the bus driver. The driver stopped the bus, ran after and beat
the passenger. The court held that the county was not liable for the
driver's tort, since he was not furthering the interests of the county when
he left the bus and pursued the passenger.
N. Education (Including Student Discipline)
In Conyers v. Glenn,657 the district court issued an injunction to
restrain the Pinellas County School Board from suspending a student
who, with parental consent, wore his hair longer than permitted by the
Board's regulations. Citing United States Supreme Court decisions on
the right to privacy, the court held: "[ S ] ome showing of overriding public
necessity is a necessary predicate to state action interfering with the
freedom of the individual. ' 5 8 The court found nothing in the record of
the case to indicate that the student's hair style had caused disruption.
Satz v. Board of Public Instruction,6 59 a reported decision of the
Dade County Circuit Court, sustained the validity of the statute and
school board regulations providing for the "paddling" of students as a
means of discipline. The court urged the school board to amend its reg-
ulations to provide safeguards to arbitrary and excessive paddling.
A federal district court, in Augustus v. School Board,6 0 barred Con-
federate symbols from a school, in view of the circumstances of the times.
In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction, the supreme court held,
by a vote of four to three, that the Government in the Sunshine Law
requires a county school board to keep its meetings open to the public
even when engaged in quasi-judicial decision-making.661 The court ob-
served that when the legislature conferred quasi-judicial powers on the
school board, it did not thereby convert the board into a judicial body
beyond further legislative control. To the contrary, the legislature re-
tained control and was authorized to require openness of the process.
Thus, the court vacated a disciplinary decision which had been reached
by the board after a recess for private deliberations during an otherwise
public hearing.
0. Homestead Exemption from Alienation
This topic is distinct from homestead exemption from taxation, which
is discussed under a previous heading of this survey.
62
656. 285 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
657. 243 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
658. Id. at 206.
659. 36 Fla. Supp. 38 (Cir. Ct. Dade Co. 1971).
660. 361 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
661. 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973). The Sunshine Law is codified as FLA. STAT. § 286.011
(1973).
662. See notes 560-68 supra and accompanying text.
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1. FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
The 1968 constitution makes homestead exemption available to the
"head of a family." ' The 1885 constitution used the expression "head
of a family residing in this State. '6 4 The significance of this change has
yet to be interpreted by the courts.
According to In re Estate of Wilder,665 a person qualifies as head of
a family where there is a continuing communal living by at least two
persons, one of whom is recognized as being in charge of the household,
and the person claiming the exemption is under a duty to support the
others. Thus, a woman was declared ineligible for homestead exemption
where the "family" consisted of herself and her gainfully employed
grandson and his wife. The woman was under no duty to support the
other members of the household.
2. TYPE OF PROPERTY
The 1885 constitution provided that the homestead exemption on
property located inside a municipality "shall not extend to more improve-
ments or buildings than the residence and business house of the owner." 66
By contrast, the 1968 constitution refers only to "the residence of the
owner or his family."' 6' 7
3. TIMING OF CONVEYANCES AND ENCUMBRANCES
In Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Insurance, Inc.,66s a judgment had
been rendered against the owner of a homestead located outside a
municipality. Subsequently, he purchased an adjacent tract of land. The
new and the old land combined amounted to less than 160 acres. The
owner then claimed that the new as well as the old land was protected
by homestead exemption from the judgment debtor. The supreme court
sustained the claim for exemption. Where the homestead status and the
judgment lien attach at the same time, as in the case of a purchase or
inheritance of land by a judgment debtor, the homestead prevails.
Conversely, in Aetna Insurance Co. v. LaGasse,6 9 a claim for
homestead exemption was denied where the court found that the judgment
lien had attached before the homestead status. The judgment was re-
corded in 1961. Debtor's father died in April, 1965, at which time debtor's
mother acquired life tenancy and debtor acquired a vested remainder
663. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
664. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1885).
665. 240 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
666. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 1 (1885).
667. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (1).
668. 207 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1968); noted in 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 134 (1968). See generally
Note, Our Legal Chameleon is a Sacred Cow: Alienation of Homestead under the 1968
Constitution, 24 U. FrA. L. REV. 701 (1972).
669. 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969) ; noted in 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 321 (1969).
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interest in the property which had been the father's homestead. Debtor's
mother then died in September, 1965. The court held that the judgment
lien attached to debtor's vested remainder interest at the time of her
father's death in April, 1965, while homestead could not be claimed by
debtor until her mother's death in September, 1965.
4. DEVISE AND DESCENT
The 1885 constitution permitted the owner to devise his homestead
"if the holder be without children. '0 70 The 1968 revision changed the
wording, declaring: "The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the
owner is survived by spouse or minor child."67 A 1972 amendment added:
"except the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be
no minor child."
The effect of the 1968 revision was considered in In re Estate of
McGinty.7 2 A statute 73 enacted before 1968 provided that the home-
stead should not be the subject of devise if the decedent was survived
by a widow or lineal descendants. A majority of the supreme court held
that this statute had been rendered unconstitutional by the 1968 revision
which prohibited devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child.
Thus the decedent could validly devise his homestead to one of his
daughters since at the time of his death he was a widower with four
children, all over the age of twenty-one years; he was survived by lineal
descendants, but not by any minor child. Justice Adkins dissented, con-
tending that
'[t]he legislature is empowered to determine the law of suc-
cession as long as such laws are not in conflict with the Consti-
tution and additional legislative restrictions should be held
valid.... The majority opinion can be justified only if we over-
look the basic principle that the Constitution is a limitation upon
power, not a grant of power.' 74
P. Coverture and Property
The status of married women's property was significantly changed
by the 1968 revision. Article X, section 5 provides: "There shall be no
distinction between married women and married men in the holding,
control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and
personal; except that dower or curtesy may be established and regulated
by law."
Pre-1968 law is illustrated by Bogle v. Perkins,7 5 decided by the su-
670. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1885).
671. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
672. 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971), noted in 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 801 (1972).
673. FXA. STAT. § 731.05(1) 1973.
674. 258 So. 2d at 452 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
675. 240 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1970).
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preme court in 1970 under the 1885 constitution. The court denied spe-
cific performance against a married woman on her contract to sell her
real estate because her husband had not joined in signing the contract.
The change brought about by the 1968 revision is illustrated by Hall-
man v. Hospital & Welfare Board.67 6 A wife signed a promissory note
payable to the hospital at the time her husband was discharged. Later,
she argued that the note should not be enforced against her separate
property since she had not executed an instrument expressly subjecting
her separate property to her husband's debts, as required by pre-1968
law. The supreme court decided, in 1972, that Article X, section 5 super-
seded prior law, and that the wife should be liable on the note. The court
stated:
The people of our State, in adopting [art. X, § 5], recognized
that married women had assumed a position of prominence in
the daily marketplace, so the legal shackles which hindered the
progress of married women in the business world should be re-
moved. In removing the shackles it was also necessary to lower
the protective wall immunizing married women from various
causes of action, for freedom of activity carries with it many
responsibilities. It is inconsistent to say that the distinction be-
tween married women and men in encumbering their property
is removed and, at the same time, hold that a married woman
may be held liable for the payment of her husband's debt only
if she executes an instrument in writing according to the law
respecting conveyances by married women.677
The supreme court relied upon Article X, section 5 along with other
provisions as the basis of its 1971 decision in Gates v. Foley 78 A wife
sued for damages for loss of consortium as a result of injuries to her
husband, caused by the negligence of the defendant. Prior Florida case
law had followed the common law in denying such a cause of action. The
supreme court noted the "recent changes in the legal and societal status
of women in our society," including article X, section 5, and held that a
wife can henceforth maintain the action for loss of consortium. However,
article X, section 5 has not changed every aspect of married women's
property. In First National Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 79 the supreme
court held that article X, section 5 did not affect the law regarding tenancy
by the entireties by a husband and wife in a joint checking account,
since the provision dealt with capacity of parties, whereas the tenancy
must be viewed with regard to their intent.
In Yordon v. Savage, 80 the supreme court traced the development of
676. 262 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972).
677. Id. at 670.
678. 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971). This decision was applied retroactively in Ryster v.
Brennan, 291 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
679. 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971).
680. 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973).
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equal treatment of men and women in various legal contexts and held
that this principle must prevail with regard to the right to bring suit for
injury to a child. Either parent, or both together, must be able to bring
suit. Both parents are necessary parties. If one parent files suit alone, he
must either file as trustee for the other parent, or must name the other
parent as defendant. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to pro-
tect the interest of the non-participating parent. The court shall apportion
the proceeds to either or both parents.
